

THE GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE OF MODERN PERU

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To Mary,

Who knows how far it was from Arlington.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Search for the Facts

Look at the evidence--Evidentially, the Latin American government executive is an unknown element. It has been discussed in general terms, depicted in definite classes and groups, and treated of a multitude of individualized personalities, largely on impressionistic evidence. Few, indeed, and limited in scope are the studies which have attempted to probe more deeply by means of detailed and systematic investigation of these facts. The result is that the Latin American government official has remained obscured behind the barriers of language, the "Latin mystique," and impressionistic generalization. A vague understanding exists that these executives differ from the general population of their countries, that they appear to be the products of certain geographic areas of their nations, descended from a group apart, educated in a kind of clerical system cut-off-touch with reality, relying not on their positions and controlling entry of others through a network of patronage. Yet the feeling is nebulous and the evidence is slim; the Latin American executive remains an enigma.

In an attempt to formulate a more realistic and a more reality-based interpretation of the Latin American government executive, the present study consists of an empirical investigation of the backgrounds, origins, mobility, and attitudes of a group of senior executives of the governments of Peru.

PERU AS A SUBJECT.--Several reasons converged to make Peru an appropriate choice for such a study. ¹Considered in terms of development, Peru appeared to possess a number of attributes of a "transitional" country in the sense used by Fred W. Riggs in his work on the primitive society.² (Some of these evidences of transition will be discussed in Chapter II.) Thus the government of Peru seemed to provide much potential for application of some of the features of Riggs' model. ³In addition, the probable transitional character of the country suggested that its bureaucracy and the innovations that may in slight time be full counterparts on the continuum between Riggs' primitive bureaucracy and the more fully developed institutions of a nation such as the United States.⁴ Finally, the appearance of the work of W. Lloyd Warner and his colleagues on United States government executives⁵ offered an excellent opportunity for a comparative study in another sphere of public administration. Furthermore, the increasingly important role of government and its impact on Peruvian society naturally drew attention upon the members of the government of Peru who occupy positions of high responsibility. The influence of national government officials in Peru probably has increased during recent years despite various attempts at decentralization of national government power. Despite

¹Especially in Administración en Desarrollo: Guayana. The Theory of Primitive Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964).

²Almond and Coleman place Peru in the group of countries with a "semi-imperative" political system. In the study of political modernity, they describe Peru as "halfway" between "modern" and "traditional", along with Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama. Gabriel A. Almond and James E. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 124.

³W. Lloyd Warner, et al., The American Political Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

continued pressure for reform of the local government structure of Peru, essentially the same arrangements -- characterized by a high degree of centralization -- have persisted down colonial times.

³ The centralized pattern set during Spain's rule of the Viceroyalty of Peru was carried over to the postindependence unitary system. This continuity of administrative centralization stands in marked contrast to the social and geographic diversities of Peru. Although sporadic attempts have been made to achieve some measure of decentralization, until the very recent past the results have been meager and many of the various experiments in decentralization proved to be short-lived.

Various factors -- such as the continued centralized governmental system of Peru, the traditional dominance of Lima over the national life of Peru, and the reputed important role of a small elite group -- continue to emphasize the importance of understanding the leaders of the Peruvian government.

Government Functioning as Objects of Study

Progress in the study of bureaucracy and bureaucracy. -- For the maximum contribution to systematic study of public administration, research ought to be related to what has preceded it, employ a rigorous research design, be oriented by careful use of hypotheses, and draw on the analytical value of existing models.

Almost any study of bureaucracy derives utility from basic formulations concerning bureaucratic organizations as set forth by Max Weber in his ideal model.⁴ Weber's model of bureaucracy as the ideal system,

⁴For example, see L. R. E. Gantt and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

with a rigid hierarchy, a closed system, in which the formal is divorced from the informal. In this model, organizational tasks are set up through clear-cut division of labor and high specialization, both designed to foster cooperation. Offices are arranged in a hierarchy. Formal rules and regulations govern official decisions and actions. Officials are impersonal, looking upon clients as cases, not people. Administration is by full-time officials who are thoroughly and expertly trained, and by general rules which are quite stable and comprehensive.

A shift from traditional and simpler approaches in studying public administration toward various approaches using empirical research gradually led to a more realistic understanding. As Selznick and others of the sociological school delved further into large organizations,² a much clearer light was cast on the way that formal organizations work. The actors in these organizations -- the executives and the bureaucrats -- came to be recognized as elements far more humanly frail than Weber's model implies.

Management of the organizations studied by Selznick, for example, proved to be much more complicated in terms of motivation and unanticipated results, especially in relation to delegation of authority. Thus bureaucracy became much more than merely a device for using specialized skills. Taking on virtually a life of its own, bureaucracy built inertia and is impelled by the people who comprise it, its steps not suggested by Weber. In effect, as Selznick points out, bureaucratic structures continuously

²Maxwell Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations* (Oxford: University of California Press, 1949).

create conditions that modify these structures.⁵

Much more has come to be known about government executives as individuals and focused on their action elements in the bureaucratic process.⁶ In addition, the bureaucracy does try to be considered more than building blocks of skills to be fitted into an organizational structure. The importance of various factors that influence these people received increased attention.⁷ Thus in the study of Warner and his collaborators, many of these factors -- occupational, geographic, national origins, influence of family, educational backgrounds, career patterns, personalities, value orientations, self-image, and role conflicts -- were pointed in detail.

In summary, our understanding of government executives has broadened and deepened considerably since the basic formulations of bureaucratic types of Max Weber.⁸ The professional, highly trained, impersonal official who comprised Weber's ideal type of bureaucrat -- one rather far removed from the human factors and complications of organizations and one quite insulated from the smothering or corrupting influences of family background, region of birth, and similar conditions -- has come to be recognized as somewhat typical of government officials even in the highly formalized, extremely regulated bureaucracy of the United States.⁹ A growing store of knowledge and understanding of large and small organizations, the internal and external groups that comprise these organizations, and the factors which influence bureaucratic behavior have brought about a more complicated and probably more accurate description of government executives. It has been learned from a much deeper probing (into organizational behavior,

⁵ Peter Hall, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Interorganizational Relations in the Government Agencies (New York: Columbia University of Chicago Press, 1963).

especially through such techniques as role analysis, that men in organizations are subject to a kind of human and environmental pressures that channel behavior and decisions in ways far different from the rather rational, impersonal, almost machine-like functioning assumed for Weber's ideal bureaucrat.

The value of models.—Whether Weber's ideal bureaucratic organization can achieve the hoped-for ends -- such as precision, speed, continuity, reduction of friction, and elimination of irrational elements -- has been questioned by later students for a number of reasons.⁵ But as a practical matter, how close the model approaches reality is not nearly as important as how useful the model is as a conceptual tool and as a benchmark for research, against which one's perception of reality may be measured. Weber's analysis of types of authority, for example -- authority legitimized by the sanctity of traditions, charismatic authority, and legal authority -- might serve as a useful model for study of executive attributes. Recognition of such progress in the understanding of government executives should not be interpreted as either completely denying the validity and the usefulness of devices such as the Weberian model or completely refuting the importance of Weber's formulation in terms of its actual or attempted application in practice.

Models, or "constructed types," serve several useful purposes. They are not intended to serve as a description, for example, of a particular system of government. Rather, as Rigg points out, they serve a "heuristic"

⁵For example, by Robert Frerking, The Bureaucrational Decision in Analysis and Theory (New York: Knopf, 1962), and Peter M. Hall and M. Richard Smith, Bureaucrationalism: A Constructive Approach (New Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962).

purpose.⁶ Such models are useful in providing a frame of reference and "variables of relevance." Assembly of data around the framework of the constructed model was sought; relationships out of material which otherwise might appear quite undifferentiated.

In this sense, of course, Weber's model of bureaucracy serves a useful purpose in facilitating the selection, ordering, and relating of data.⁷ Merre Kilgus' "case" model provides even greater utility in its ecological base. In attempting to relate administrative behavior to ecological factors typical of transitional societies, Kilgus offers an invaluable tool for comparative analysis in a variety of bureaucratic situations.⁸ In the following chapter, more detailed attention will be devoted to Kilgus' case model and the use to which it is put in this research.

Latin American Sociologists, bureaucrats as objects of study.—Previous studies, to the limited extent that they have treated the Latin American government structure, have related in each case at least qualitatively to disciplines of bureaucracy and the humanism. The usual approach has been descriptive rather than analytical, with apparently a generally limited empirical base.⁹ Only very preliminary progress has been made toward

⁶ Fred W. Kilgus, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Case' Model," in *Farrell Rensky and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), Essays in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1960), p. 25.

⁷ Max Weber's attempt to apply the Weberian model of bureaucracy to Egypt led him to conclude that Weber's formulation was inadequate for use in such transitional societies. See Merre Kilgus, *Ecological and Eclectic in Weber's Egypt: A Study of the Higher Civil Service* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). Kilgus's interview guide was useful to the writer in the present study.

meaningful comparative studies.¹⁰ Two serious stand out: first, an acceptably realistic sociologically-based model was not available, and second, few students have bothered to test a set of hypotheses especially in the field situation, as we will, even in the empirical field research.

A variety of interpretations and meanings has resulted from the limited attention devoted to government structures in Latin America. For example, the typical bureaucracy has been described as lacking "in its rather highly idealized view [of] social class and in its definition in the scientific, technical, and administrative spheres."¹¹ A tendency to centralize power has been attributed largely to insecurity of office and the class pattern.¹² One student commented that the social system "is widely perceived ... the struggle for power is very much associated with the striving for individualism in the form of hierarchical positions."¹³ Another commented on the high rate of turnover of employees -- "a major turnover and shuffling of personnel, all up and down the hierarchy" -- whenever political leadership changes.¹⁴ Other writers, however, conclude that leadership changes are typically accompanied by personnel turnover only at the higher levels, and that the rate of relatively stable personnel is affected only slightly by top-level changes. Instability of tenure is a frequently recurring theme in discussions of Latin American

¹⁰Among broader studies, one should note Public Administration Clearing House News, Public Administration in Latin America: Structures for Progress Through Structural Organization (Bridgetown: Pan American Union, 1967).

¹¹Levin L. Barry, "Public Administration and Civil Service," in David Eugene Davis, Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald Press, 1961), p. 403.

¹²Ibid., p. 403.

¹³E. A. Gomez, Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 27-28.

¹⁴Barry, "Public Administration and the Civil Service," p. 403.

commitments, but no studies which attempt to document such alleged inefficiency are known to the writer. Patronage connections and influence also receive considerable attention, but again with very limited substantiation. Professor Hershberger, for example, believes that such a "personal legislation" in the Spanish and Portuguese traditions are so strong as to make difficult the development in Latin America of dependable large impersonal organizations like corporations or governments.¹⁵ He sees a strong tendency among officials of government and business to seek retirement or embezzlement. Therefore, "the level of performance is often below what might be expected of a trained and experienced career civil service."¹⁶

Ruben Wachs has commented on the lack of efficiency of civil service laws in Cuba, where he pictures public administration as a notorious case of corruption, inefficiency, and cynicism.¹⁷ An attempt to establish a merit system in Ecuador failed because no effort was made to identify other officers or leaders. Part of the difficulty has been its failure to relate such administrative efforts to local cultural norms.¹⁸

Obviously, because of the many variations in political systems of the Latin American area, different patterns of bureaucracy and administration should be anticipated. Although persistent uniformity may become evident after study of various types, such uniform characteristics likely will emerge only from detailed, empirical investigations based

¹⁵Harvey S. Hershberger, "Latin America: Where Bureaucracy Stagnates," *The Strife of the New Americas World*, ed. Hans Christian Osmund (New York: World Books, 1957), pp. 130-131.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 147.

¹⁷Ruben Wachs, "Los temas persistentes del servicio civil: algunas ejemplos de la Republica Latina," *Estudios de Ciencias Sociales*, I (Mexico, 1957), 31-34.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 31-33.

upon systematic research designs. The lamentable aspect is that most of the earlier studies contain generalizations based not even on straightforward idiographic work, much less on any conceptualization and testable propositions. Many of the previous works in governments of Latin America are lacking precisely in this respect.¹ Generalization has been attempted to increase factual, empirical evidence on which to base conclusions was not available. If this shortcoming is applicable to the study of government and politics, it applies doubly to more specialized subjects such as bureaucracy and the bureaucracy.

The Focus of the Study

↓ General objectives.—It is this said that the present investigation is a modest beginning in designed in field. Forming as a limited aspect of the bureaucracy of the government of Peru, the study consists of a fairly detailed examination of the social Peruvian bureaucracy.

↓ ¹The core of the present study, a body of data concerning these executives, is built upon empirical observation in the field situation. Not equally important, these Peruvian data were obtained through systematic use of hypotheses and a controlled attempt to identify critical independent and dependent variables regarding the background of Peruvian government executives. After the detailed results of this investigation are synthesized to produce a composite of the social bureaucracy of Peru, an attempt is made to test certain preliminary hypotheses and to generalize about bureaucracy in the Peruvian government. Even then the generalizations of the present study are set forth more in the way of proposals for further study than as final conclusions.

↓/In general terms, the study is directed toward determination of the

kinds of people who fill the higher positions of the government of Peru, their backgrounds and those of their families as far as these can be determined, their attitudes, their individual characteristics, and religion, and the extent to which this particular group of officials is representative of the people of Peru.

Such data are important because the official role of government officials cannot be understood fully or considered in terms of the future without knowledge of their social origin, education, mobility, and other factors. "It has been shown by numerous studies of administration since Weber's time that members of organizations condition those organizations and accommodate to them considerably on the basis of their own backgrounds and values. Thus it is crucial to understand such attributes of people in bureaucracies."

A thesis outlined the recent study of W. Lloyd Warner and his colleagues of the federal government executives of the United States.¹⁸

"The present study, founded upon this thesis, is an adaptation of the Warner framework and approach to the Peruvian public administration context."¹⁹ "It is an initial attempt to evaluate the quality of information which exists on Latin American government executives."

Cross-cultural transference of a sociological framework designed for application to a modern industrialized, democratic nation with wide social mobility in traditions and patterns of development presents a difficult problem. Because of such difficulties in the subjective application of

¹⁸ Warner, *ib. id.*, p. 3.

¹⁹ The author is grateful to Professor Warner for his encouragement of the application of his questionnaire and conceptual scheme to Peru.

the United States and Peru, Korten's framework had to be employed judiciously. Nevertheless, the general methodology followed in the American study was considered adaptable in the case to Peruvian public administration. Of course, variations in heritage and the environmental condition of Peruvian society not only require interpretation of empirical data in terms of a different set of beliefs, values, and ideology, but also demand certain methodological revisions to collect valid data. Some of these methodological problems will be considered in Chapter II. Where the framework of the Korten study did not appear adequate, particularly for that part of the research regarding personal interviews, it was necessary to turn to a more sociologically related model. For these purposes, Fred W. Riggs' *state model* appeared to approximate the Peruvian bureaucracy most closely.²¹ Apparently appropriate features of the *state model* were selected for use in the Peruvian research.²² These aspects are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, where the conceptual framework, hypothesis, and methodological approach are considered at length.

Specific purposes of the study.—The principal immediate aims of the study are three: first, to define, identify, and analyze the personnel in that portion of the Peruvian government service that may be considered as the policy-making segment; second, on the basis of evidence and information gathered through the use of personnel records, questionnaires, and interviews, to compare functions of selected ministries of the government and management personnel of government corporations; and third, in addition, principally through depth interviews and limited role analysis of government officials, to draw tentative conclusions as to the extent of

²¹In this respect, heavy reliance is placed on Riggs' constructed model of the "prismatic society" and the "state." Fred W. Riggs, *Imperialism, Capitalism, and Bureaucratic Development: The Theory of Prismatic Society*.

approximation of the Peruvian bureaucracy to certain characteristics of Rigsby's model of the primitive society.

Personnel of government corporations are included as subjects because a significant portion of government operations is conducted by various types of autonomous and semi-autonomous entities in the so-called Sub-Sector (Entidad Independiente). Usually assuming the form of corporations, these entities function in a broad spectrum of activities ranging from monopolies in rail and airlines to operation of government tourist hotels and regional industrial development. Because of the importance of such entities in the overall governmental process, a phase of research in the project was devoted to study of their senior management personnel. Corporations in the Independent Public Sub-Sector often have government ministers or other government officials as ex officio members of their boards of directors or other governing body.¹ Because they are relatively uncontrolled by formal civil service requirements, these corporations are able to attract personnel by higher salaries and other benefits.

This greater latitude in personnel management for government corporations suggested the likelihood that the type of personnel attracted by the independent entities would differ from regular statutory personnel. The existence of approximately 400 entities in this sector precluded complete coverage. However, several of the most important organizations are considered in the study. For this research, the same questionnaire as that used in the ministries was employed.

Organization of the study.² The present investigation was carried out in two major phases and the findings are presented in two principal sections. ¹Methodology and the conceptual framework are discussed in the following chapter. ²After consideration of methodology, the major body of

data relative to executive backgrounds, characteristics, and origins is presented in Chapters III and IV in tabular form accompanied by analysis of the statistics. Such data are arranged and tested according to various hypotheses which are discussed in Chapter II. In Chapter V, a characterization of the senior Peruvian bureaucracy, based on a series of personal depth interviews, is attempted. Executive roles and considerations of reaction to administrative and developmental changes are analyzed in Chapter VI. In that section, attention is given to certain features of the Peruvian bureaucracy that correspond to attributes of Rizzo's role model. A summary of the investigation and general conclusions about the role of the Peruvian government executive are presented in the last chapter.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

Uses of a Real Model

Scope of the study.--The stimulus for the present study of American government associations derived from the work of W. Lloyd Warner and his colleagues, The American Social Hierarchy. A basic purpose of that study was to draw broad generalizations about the representative character of the American bureaucracy and about occupational mobility and ascension in American society. The "representativeness" of bureaucracy is important because of its close connection to the mobility process and its institutional consequences. Although Warner did not imply that the bureaucracy should copy the total society in this respect, it was expected that governmental elites would be at least as representative as any elite group in the nation.

In general, from research on 12,826 civilian and military executives in the American Federal government, Warner reached the conclusion that American society is not becoming "caste-like" at the levels studied. Rather, that society is more flexible than it has been, with more people in social motion. Such evidence, of course, does not deny the advantages of men "born at the top" or the somewhat less than full freedom of competition. "The values of competitive and open status are higher today than previously and those of inherited position and fixed position, while still powerful, are less potent now than they were a generation ago."¹

¹Warner, op. cit., p. 28.

Of course, there are no definitive answers to the question of what consequences follow from the nature of the activity process. What does a activity process which leads to representative bureaucracy actually come in terms of the institutional consequences? Perhaps there are still no totally adequate answers to such questions as that posed by Harold Kaplan in his review of the Warner study: How do social backgrounds affect behavior in office? Kaplan believed that this most important point remains an untested assumption.²

Nevertheless, the value of Warner's work as a major contribution toward understanding of the United States civil service supported the possibility of a similar study in Latin America, where practically no detailed and rigorous investigation of the top leaders of the governments had been conducted. The present study attempts to adopt Warner's conceptual framework and general methodology to a study of Peruvian public administration. It was considered that the general methodology of the Warner study, with some modifications to fit the Peruvian situation, was applicable and would be adapted well to study of executives in the Peruvian bureaucracy. As noted in the preceding chapter, in the interview phase of the present study, it was necessary to draw considerably from the more ecologically related model of Hippo.

A great debt is owed to the work of Warner and his colleagues for many aspects of this investigation. Obviously, much of the main questionnaire employed in the study comes from The American Federal Executive. To the extent that these instruments appeared to be applicable to the Peruvian environment, these questions were adopted verbatim for the Peruvian

²Harold Kaplan, Review of The American Federal Executive, by W. Lloyd Warner, PLA, Canadian Forum, April, 1961, 27-30.

study. Naturally, such adaptation raised numerous problems in translating some of them will be discussed below. Not only language, but in many instances a substantively different understanding or interpretation on the part of respondents, necessitated a careful analysis of responses to ascertain the meanings implied.

Administrative Systems: The United States and Peru

The context of American public administration.—Before considering the specific problems of methodology, translation difficulties, and protest procedures, it is desirable to discuss cultural and environmental differences between the United States and Peru as they affect the application of the Bureau research techniques. ¹Difficulties arise, of course, because the study is an attempt to transfer cross-culturally a conceptual framework and specific research techniques which were designed originally for the American setting. The subjects of the Bureau study in the United States were constituted by a set of institutions differing considerably from their Peruvian open government officials in the Peruvian setting. Although the author makes no pretense of ability to measure most of these factors precisely, a certain value can be derived from recognition of some of them.

For a statement of fundamental distinguishing features of the American system of public administration, to be used as a point of reference for comparison with the Peruvian system, the conceptualization and principles thought of Leonard B. White are paraphrased below:

1. American public administration is based on law and public officials are responsible to ordinary courts for their actions.
2. American public administration is organized as representative, elected legislative bodies, subordinated to democratic control and responsive to public opinion.

3. American public administration is democratic in spirit.

4. The conduct of American public administration depends heavily upon the consent of the people.

5. American public administration since 1800 has tended strongly toward professionalism.

6. American public administration is small in structure, personnel, and point of view.

7. American public administration is "flexible and adaptive, experimental, collaborative, and unfettered by precedent."

8. The American system of administration is federal, with distribution of power and functions being both constitutional in nature and also the result of distance, variety, and public preference.

9. American public administration is rooted deeply in local communities.

10. American public administration operates on a large scale, both in numbers of personnel and in services performed.²

The contrast of Peruvian public administration.³ When the salient characteristics of Peruvian public administration are considered on the same basis, in this student's judgment several significant differences become apparent.

1. Peruvian public administration, though strongly legalistic in origin and tone, also exhibits many elements of formalism.

2. Peruvian public administration, with some exceptions stemming from constitutional restrictions, operates more independently of legislative bodies, which themselves are less representative than American legislatures and less responsive to public opinion.

3. Peruvian public administration reflects much of the hierarchical rigidity characteristic of Spanish colonial administration, with a corresponding loss of democratic tone and atmosphere.

4. Peruvian public administration generally operates with relatively little dependence upon the consent of the people.

5. The growth of professionalism in Peruvian public administration dates from about 1908, with strong efforts not commencing until 1915.

²Lawrence G. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, 11th (2nd ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1940), pp. 28-29.

¹⁴ 4. Peruvian public administration is affected by the military influence, with defense ministries under strict military control, and staffing of numerous positions by military officers.

¹⁵ 5. Peruvian public administration tends to be inflexible, non-innovative, reluctant to experiment, unimaginative, and generally strongly fettered by precedent.

¹⁶ 6. Peruvian public administration is military in nature and strongly centralized (in authority if not in control).

¹⁷ 7. Peruvian public administration has relatively limited roots in local communities except in the matter of staffing provincial posts solely with local citizens.

18. Peruvian public administration operates on a relatively small scale, with the majority of the personnel headquartered in the capital.

Peruvian public administration functions in a military governmental system wherein practically all responsibility lies in the central government, primarily in the president. Operating through a hierarchical arrangement from the capital, authority flows downward through 26 departmental prefects to sub-prefects and governors of 140 provinces and over 1,000 districts. The capital is the point of initiation and decision on most matters affecting all levels and regions of Peru. Executive power is vested in the president, two vice-presidents, and twelve ministers of state who form the cabinet. Power tends to be concentrated in the presidency and is reinforced by special powers permitting him to make law by decree and suspend certain constitutional guarantees in cases of emergency.

The twelve ministries of government operate principally in the capital, having provincial jurisdictions for areas outside Lima. But practically all decisions come from Lima, the provincial areas having little autonomy.

The control of Peruvian society.--Deterministic explanations of the character of a people and culture tend to fall short as analytical

designs because certain historical, geographic, cultural or other factors are often emphasized to the virtual exclusion of others. Thus, an over-emphasis on the cultural conditioning of the Spanish colonial era passes as an explanation for the continued centralization of many Latin American governments. Likewise, the alleged fatalism of the Indian Indians and their nonparticipation in political life is said to arise from the stultifying effects of caste or from the depressing effects of high altitudes of the region or from persistent psychological resistance growing from mistreatment and exploitation during and after the colonial period. Each explanation serves the purposes of its exponent, and probably will not survive to a degree. In a similar fashion, the geographic barriers confining many countries of Latin America, undoubtedly significant in their effects, are given disproportionately as explanations of their developmental influences on national characters.¹⁷ Because of the many pitfalls of such deterministic explanations, a deliberate attempt is made in the present study to avoid superimposition theories. Where the empirical data of the study indicate a certain tendency or an apparent correlation, the interpretation will be presented as a suggested explanation but as mere.

Most students, in approaching the study of various aspects of Peruvian society, seem to later confront the fact of a country characterized by numerous dichotomies -- social, geographic, economic, and political. Each division stands out in the separation of each of the Indian population of Peru from the gaitano and so-called white elements. They are also identifiable in the obvious geographical barriers of the country which set apart the sierra, the sierra, and the sierra and in the economy which encompasses the vast modern market and credit system as well as primitive,

primitive barter system totally removed from the market economy.⁷ They can also be discussed in the political system, seeing severely limited representative government but with the largest political party still uncertain of its role and its acceptance in the governmental process.

⁸ Peru, with nearly a half million square miles of area, ranks third largest of the countries of South America and in 1964 had a population of 11,000,000. Its territory is divided into three principal regions.

⁹The coast, covering less than 12 per cent of the area, contains about a third of the total population and is the nucleus of export agriculture, industry, and important economic activity in general. ¹⁰The sierra, comprising the Andean highlands and used mainly for domestic agriculture, makes up 27 per cent of the national area but contains 46 per cent of the country's population. ¹¹The selva or guayana is a sparsely populated region extending down the eastern slopes of the Andes over the lowlands of the Amazon basin. ¹²Although 60 per cent of Peru's territory lies in the selva, only about 10 per cent of its population is found there.

Peru's population is very unevenly distributed among the three principal regions, and the largest cities stand in marked contrast to a typically rural landscape. ¹³The urban population is distributed among several cities and towns, all of which are growing rapidly. ¹⁴Lima, the national capital, overwhelms all other urban areas of the country with a metropolitan population of 1.7 million. The next largest city, Arequipa in the south, has only one-fourth the population of Lima.

¹⁵Finally, the country is divided about evenly into two main groups: the mestizo and white population on one hand, and the Indian population on the other. The indigenous population, descendants of the Incas, lives mainly in the Andean mountain ranges. Attaching strongly to collec-

tielist and communal patterns of living of the past, largely illiterate, the Peruvian Indian has been exposed to a great extent by changes which have taken place elsewhere.⁴ This deep social disturbance makes the term "subject" itself as a description of the country, and stands as one of Peru's most serious and potentially dangerous problems. Peru, as Delaney comments, remains a relatively unexploited nation, and unlike Mexico and Bolivia, it has not experienced an abrupt break with the traditional past through violent social revolution.⁵

When the observed faces come together in the different elements and sections of Peru -- especially the stark contrast of the capital, Lima, with most of the provincial areas -- he is confronted immediately with the problem of choosing any kind of common denominator which will describe adequately such a distinctive, heterogeneous nation.

Use of a Generalized Model

Adaptations from the "Primate Society." -- The purpose in this brief consideration of Peru as a society is to attempt to employ as an analytical tool some features of the theoretical model developed by Fred W. Riggs in his works on administration in developing countries.⁶ The investigation of the social government association of modern Peru can be made more meaningful if the burghmaster is studied in relation to his society, and more particularly, according to some of the criteria which

⁴Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Report 1963, Fourth Annual Report (Washington, 1963), pp. 437-445.

⁵Ellen R. Delaney, "Changing Community Activities and Values in Peru: A Case Study in Social Change," Social Change in Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy, ed. Richard M. Adams (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), pp. 62-67.

⁶Especially in Administrative Development in Developing Countries: The Theory of Primate Society (Oxford: Routledge Kegan Paul Co., 1961).

derived by Riggs in his concept of prismatic society.

Some of the attributes of Riggs' state model, the typically prismatic bureau, are intended to attempt to apply its appropriate features to the bureaucracy of Peru. It should be emphasized at this point, however, that this application of the state model is limited to that section of the study dealing with institutional aspects of the Peruvian bureaucracy. Even in this restricted application of Riggs' model, valuable advantages can be gained. This is true particularly in regard to such features and problems of the bureaucracy as elite recruitment and adaptive incorporation of administrative changes.

In this study, an attempt is made to apply all the features of the Riggs' model of prismatic society. The concern is with only that portion of the model dealing with the state -- the prismatic bureau -- and more specifically, with characteristics of state administration that relate directly and can be applied to the group of bureaucrats under study. The particular aim in this limited application of the state model is to gain new insight relative to the operation of Peruvian bureaucracy in the Riggs' scheme. The problem will be approached primarily through depth interviews of senior civil servants and subsequent analysis of their attitudes.

To make clear the pertinent features of Riggs' state model with which the study is concerned, there is offered below a summary of the salient attributes of state administration as conceptualized by Riggs in his prismatic society. This summary will have the advantage not only of further defining the foundation of the employment of Riggs' model, but will also facilitate uniform usage of his somewhat idiosyncratic, and certainly singular terminology.

Initially, a distinction should be made between "transitional" societies and "primitive" societies. Such differentiation is important because although primitive societies may be also transitional societies, they are not necessarily so. Also some of the basic hypotheses of this study are predicated on the assumption that the various segments of the bureaucracy of a society in transition will undergo their transitions at different rates and in different forms.

Evidence of Development.—The sense in which "transitional" is employed here identifies movement toward "modernity." Without attempting to define modernity precisely, the fact of Peru's movement toward the type of industrialized and democratic society exemplified by the United States can be substantiated in several ways. Among these are its sustained economic growth in recent years and the adjustments this has forced in its economic system. Peru's economy since 1960 has recovered from a previous lull and showed steady growth. Gross national product grew at a rate of nearly 4 per cent between 1960 and 1963, with a similar rate in 1964. Agricultural output, representing about 20 per cent of the GNP, has increased but at a slower pace than the rest of the economy. The increase in manufacturing output in 1963 amounted to 4 per cent, with the share in the GNP approximating that of agriculture. The spectacular growth of the fish and fishery placed Peru first among the world's fishing nations in 1964. The country enjoys the important advantage of well diversified exports, including fish meal, cotton, copper, sugar, and other mining and agricultural commodities. Peru has maintained a favorable balance of payments position since 1960.⁷

⁷Inter-American Development Bank, Social Economics Index, Latin American Social Study, 1965, pp. 140-141.

¹On the political side are broadened suffrage; meeting evidence of a general willingness to try democratic political procedures, i.e., the legalization of the Aprista party, free municipal elections in December, 1962,² acceptance of the results of the 1962 national elections by the military Junta and by all political parties, a Congress controlled by the opposition and the executive's accepting such a situation. Increasing reform efforts have been made in public administration, the most notable being the program stemming from Joint Peruvian-United States establishment of a national public administration center. The Oficina Nacional de Actualización y Capacitación de la Administración Pública (ONACAP) since 1962 has functioned as a training center for public servants, a nucleus of expansion of R and M techniques, and a stimulus for growing interest in administrative problems. Peruvian universities probably are contributing their own to national development, reflecting this increasingly by curriculum changes to upgrade offerings in political science and institute courses in public administration, including work in R and M techniques and personnel administration. In addition, the government has begun to move more systematically and resolutely to institute the agrarian reform program. Agrarian reform represents a fairly but still crucial response to Peru's extreme maldistribution of land. The program finally has been recognized as a possible alternative to a violent solution to the problem.³ These points are considered to be clear evidence of transition.

²The local elections had been held previously since 1959.

³Many of Peru's land distribution problems, as Ford shows, stem from a sheer lack of arable land. But concentration of land ownership compounds the problem -- concentration on the coast being a result of expansion of capitalist agriculture that of the sierra a survival of colonial latifundia. Thomas R. Ford, Man and Land in Peru (Baltimore: University of Florida Press, 1942), pp. 47-48.

criticism of the "sala,"²⁰—according the classification of Patai as a transitional society in Riggs' sense, it is then useful to outline briefly the principal structure of the "sala model" and primitive society. Riggs' constructed model which shall be employed in several respects.²¹ Although not all the elements constituting the primitive society will be introduced into the present study, a brief description of the model will give a more complete understanding of the way in which certain aspects are related.

²⁰ The sala, first of all, exhibits a heterogeneity. This mixed character stems from a kind of traditional (fixed) characterization on one hand and modern (differentiated) traits on the other.

²¹ Also related to the sala is a situation in which forms do not represent reality.²² This deviation is measured in the degree of discrepancy or congruence between what is prescribed formally and what is practiced effectively — the difference between norms and realities. As Riggs says, the greater the congruence, the more realistic the situation; the greater the discrepancy, the more formalistic. "Congruence" is another feature of the sala. Riggs in this aspect of his model refers to the extent to which formally differentiated structures of a diffracted type co-exist with undifferentiated structures of a fused type. Differentiated societies have institutions that are functionally quite specific. As Riggs points out:

But norms and values appropriate to the differentiated structures are given lip-service, but the older values of an undifferentiated society still maintain a strong hold.²³

Further, in the sala patronage is evident, and "familistic considerations

²⁰It should be noted, as Riggs points out, that "primitive" has no teleological, unevolutionary — transitional changes cannot be assumed, Evolutionism in Developing Countries, pp. 25-26.

²¹As Evolutionary Approach: The 'Sala' Model," p. 28.

domestic appointments, although the formal rules prescribe non-partisan-
ship tests.¹² Similarly, the law in this situation is likely to be
applied "generously to relatives, stringently against strangers."¹³

"The rule is typified also by patronage and communitarianism.¹⁴ Such officials are likely to discriminate in favor of their
own community and against members of other communities. Positions may
be filled only with those recruits from the dominant community.

The rule is also likely to exhibit effects of the "bureaucratic,"¹⁵
the economic submodel of political activity. Corruption is institutional-
ized; in-group members get favorable prices, and prices are institutional-
ized.

"When new norms and political structures based on foreign experience
are superimposed on a social order which continues to adhere, in large
measure, to older traditional norms, structures, and myths," the result is
disruption, miscommunication, and parochialism.¹⁶ Difficulty for the organiza-
tion results when officials, although publicly adhering to new norms,
"very secretly reject them as meaningless or not binding."

Other attributes of the rule are elitism, centralization of power,
authoritarianism, and closed hierarchy. By elitism, Higgs refers to the

¹²Higgs, Administration in Developing Countries, p. 273.

¹³Higgs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'State' Model," p. 24.

¹⁴Higgs refers here to "a branch, section, or division of bureau-
cracy, all of whose members are recruited from a given community or com-
munities, organized so as not only to carry out [its formal duties but
also to represent communal interests, to be obedient to members of
certain communities, and, no doubt, to administer rules in a discrimina-
tory fashion." Administration in Developing Countries, p. 273.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 277.

scope of primitive power, in which there is a "fairly circumscribed range of direct power" for officials, but a "fairly wide spread of effective control."¹⁴ The equivalence of power means the separation of authority and control. In this respect, extreme centralization of authority can be seen as "a desperate attempt to bring the bureaucracy and society under control."¹⁵ The product of this equivalence of power is the human error or the domino effect. Janda-Roth describes a situation in which rules are enacted formally but not effectively enforced. Codes say one thing but mean another.¹⁶ The problem is blocked throughout is that official blockade of the bureaucratic system by extreme formal rules causes the "input-output traffic" to ignore these obstructive formalities.¹⁷ Many of the features of Hays' rule model probably could be employed usefully in analysis of the Peruvian bureaucracy. However, it was decided to concentrate chiefly on aspects of rigid centralism and the extent to which adaptation of foreign norms and administrative formulae has caused divergence and poly-centralism in Peruvian administration. The manner in which these features were used is discussed in the following section.

Conclusions

Structural considerations.—It was anticipated during the preliminary phases of the study that significant differences would exist among the offices and ministries of the Peruvian government in terms of qualifications,

¹⁴ Hays uses formal power to mean authority; informal power is mean control. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

educational attainments, and other characteristics of citizens. The different functions of the ministries of the central government and the varying circumstances under which these functions are conducted supported the existence of such differences. For the same reason, variations in the degree of stability of executives in different ministries were expected. Likewise, because in this student's opinion Peru is a transitional country, it appeared likely that younger civil servants would exhibit a greater degree of social mobility, commensurate with changes in Peruvian society.

To attempt to measure these factors more methodically and rigorously, several working hypotheses were formulated. Each of these hypotheses is examined below in some detail before consideration of other aspects of methodology.

Hypothesis 1 (H-1).—Significant differences exist among officers and executives of the Peruvian government in the qualifications and educational attainments of officials in the following respects:

(a) Executives of ministries directly and significantly involved in professional or scientific activities, i.e., the Ministry of Public Health or the Ministry of Foreign Relations, or in foreign cooperation programs will exhibit higher educational attainments and qualifications than personnel of ministries engaged predominantly in non-professional and domestic affairs, i.e., Ministry of Government and Police.

(b) In terms of educational attainments and qualifications, executives of corporations and other entities in the Independent Public Sub-Sector will surpass personnel of non-professionally oriented ministries but not personnel of professionally oriented ministries.

In this respect, the term "professionally oriented ministries" will be employed to indicate ministries or agencies in the Independent Public Sub-Sector which have as their primary mission programs or functions principally professional or "outward-directed" in nature, or whose functions necessarily breed or intimate association with foreign or international agencies. Examples of predominantly outward-directed functions are foreign relations and national defense (especially Navy and Air Force).

The term "non-professionally-oriented ministries" will be used for those ministries or agencies which have programs or functions principally non-technical and domestic in nature as their primary aim. Examples of predominantly non-technical and domestic programs are government and police, telecommunications and post office, justice and religion, labor and Indian affairs, and agriculture.

Hypothesis H-1 and its sub-hypotheses are posited because of the assumption that executives of ministries and offices which are required on a regular basis to deal closely with professional personnel of foreign origin will tend to develop skills and attain educational levels closely approximating those of their associates and counterparts. Such development becomes almost a necessity for them to be effective representatives of their profession and their country.

¹ Hypothesis H-2.--Executive stability varies according to the character and orientation of ministries.

(a) Executive stability will be higher in "professionally oriented" ministries because of the necessity for development of professional competence on the relative isolation of these ministries from domestic politics.

(b) Stability will be lower in ministries and agencies engaged in programs of high national priority or in programs of a highly controversial nature, i.e., agriculture reform and agriculture, because of the probable effect on stability of pressure, criticism, and opposition, especially legislative criticism.

² Hypothesis H-3.--Executive stability varies in direct relation to ministerial stability.

The reasoning which supported Hypotheses H-1 and H-2, concerning executive stability, involves both constitutional and political factors. Constitutionally, Peruvian ministers of state are subject to impeachment. Votes of no-confidence may be moved by a single deputy or senator. Deposed ministers must resign and the President is obliged to accept

the resignation.²⁰ In addition, organizational interpellations appear to have further-reaching effects in some instances. Politically-inspired interpellations and resources seem likely to carry a "political burden" which may threaten the career stability of executives in the industry involved.

In the detailed consideration of these hypotheses in the section on career stability, patterns of stability will be examined closely in an attempt to relate them to the history of executive and ministerial careers in the two-year period 1968-1980.

A useful model for analysis of stability is that of Alfred Dussert in his study of French public administration.²¹ Dussert hypothesized that in the presence of a strong political consensus a modern nation's administrative machinery will develop its own rules and procedures. Bureaucratic devices will enable it to function without political direction. The particular point of interest for the present study is the consideration of whether Peruvian public administration has developed forms of internal controls which carry it through political instability and various other vicissitudes.

Hypothesis H-3.--There is a direct correlation between age and social stability of executives in the Peruvian government.

(a) Social stability is highest in lower age groups.

This hypothesis stems directly from the fundamental assumption that Peru is a transitional country in the sense suggested by Ruggs.²² That is to

²⁰Constitution of the Republic of Peru, Arts. 145-175.

²¹Alfred Dussert, "The French Administrative System: The Republic Faces but the Administrative Revolution," Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration, ed. William J. Wilson (Columbus: Department of Government, Indiana University, 1977), pp. 183-218.

²²Ruggs, Administrations in Developing Countries.

ary that, in addition to the aspects of a primitive society which Peru exhibits, the Peruvian society as a whole shows also a transitional development toward modernization. Certain substantiating evidence of this process has been offered. From this assumption, there is derived the hypothesis that younger age groups will demonstrate a greater social mobility, commensurate with an accelerated trend toward modernity.

1. Hypothesis 8.3.—Effects of elite recruitment vary directly with the degree of professional orientation of the organization, ranging from negative in nonprofessionally oriented organizations to non-competitive within or relative to more professionally oriented ones.

Continuing the basic hypothetical distinction between foreign-oriented and domestically oriented organizations and between professionally and non-professionally oriented organizations, it is hypothesized that significant differences will appear with varying degrees of professionalism. Of course, the use of the role attribute of nepotism in elite recruitment is apparent in this regard.

Again we suggest the extension of the weight of traditional considerations in recruitment, although these are few which are based on empirical field research. The classification of Peru as a transitional country suggests not only that administrative characteristics are undergoing basic modifications, but also that the rate and intensity of change, as illustrated by traditional considerations, will differ according to professional orientation of various aspects of the bureaucracy.

1. Hypothesis 8.4.—Effects of adaptive incorporation of adaptive/instinct changes (creativity or "unprogrammed" changes), especially gerrymandering, tend to be stronger in non-professionally oriented organizations than in professionally oriented organizations.

Peru's developmental pattern appears to correspond quite closely to the sequence form of changes described by Riggs.²² This adaptation,

²² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

as in Kipp's terminology, nonpersonal response to the impact of modern industrialized societies seems to be typical of Peru, where developmental stimuli have come mainly from the outside. Without denying the inevitability of development toward the "modern," it has been concluded that Peru is a transitional society. Substitution of this assumption was offered in detail at earlier points. But the important concept is that different segments of the society and different parts of the bureaucracy undergo this transition at different rates and in different forms. Some organizations of the bureaucracy must of necessity take "glide-steps" to adapt to sudden technological change; others, because the pressure to change is less, are able to lag behind. For example, it would be reasonable to expect that the Ministry of Public Health would be compelled to adopt ideas more rapidly to handle advances in modern medicine and public health practices. In the same way, the Ministry of Development and Public Works, intimately involved in development work requiring international cooperation and considerable expertise, would likely adopt more rapidly. Taking the next logical step, it is hypothesized that those organizations which are not compelled by technological, political, or other pressures to change, will tend not to change. When modifications do come about, especially those resulting from outside stimuli, such organizations will be more likely to resist change and to exhibit various effects such as diffusion, polystructuralism, and anomie. In this respect, patterns of behavior characteristic of the role will be apparent.

For the purpose of testing these hypotheses systematically, the following classification of activities will be employed:

Professionally oriented

Development and Public Works

Public Health and Social Assistance

Public Education

Foreign Relations

Non-professionally oriented

Government and Police

Justice and Welfare

Agriculture¹

Treasury and Commerce

Labor and Indigenous Affairs

It should be noted that, for the testing of hypotheses B-3 and B-4, the only reliance is placed on executive activities concerning the matters of recruitment and administrative change. "The assessments" and interviews are assigned major weight in the conclusions.

Methodological ApproachSelection of the population to be studied—Major problems were

encountered in the preparatory stages of the project, both in identification of the segment of the public service for study and in distribution of the study questionnaires. "The essential nature of some of the basic research involved may be appreciated from the fact that no directory of government officials existed in Peru when the study was initiated. Likewise, no dependable statistics were available upon the total number of employees of the central government. The most satisfactory source of the Peruvian civil service appears to be that performed in 1945 by INIAF. For information and comparison, Table I shows approximate total numbers of employees in permanent positions in each branch of the central government and in each civilian ministry.

Several factors contributed to the final selection of the population to be studied. First, it was desired that the executives chosen should be roughly comparable in level and position to those in Warner's design.

TABLE 1

EMPLOYMENT POSITIONS IN THE POLYVIRAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1960

<u>Ministries</u>	<u>Employees</u>
Presidential offices	540
Government	6,000
Foreign Relations	340
Justice	1,700
Labor	1,647
Education	67,844 ^a
Treasury	6,725
Development	4,110
Public Health	18,508
Agriculture	2,344
Comptroller General	280
	<hr/>
Total	114,595

Totals (excluding Legislative Branch)

Executive branch	114,565 ^b
Judicial branch	2,000
Electoral branch	1,450
	<hr/>
Total	116,015 ^b

^aIncludes 53,206 government teachers of the Ministry of Public Education.

^bNot including the armed forces, military forces, associated civil personnel in the military, hourly teaching personnel, contracted personnel, and the Independent Public Sub-Sector.

SOURCE: PERU, Oficina Nacional de Recensamiento y Departamento de la Administración Pública (Office), *Informe* [Mem. April 17, 1963], Cuadros 1 and 4.

study. Included in that study were 12,409 civilian and military executives in the career civil service, the foreign service, political positions, and in top levels of military command. These executives held civilian positions ranging from address level to General Schedule (GS) grade level 14 or equivalent and military grades from colonels and generals to captain in the Navy and colonels in the other services.²⁴ Thus it was decided early in the preparatory stage that the group of government executives studied should be persons of a high level of responsibility to the Federal government. The principal criterion followed was that the level chosen should reasonably justify an assumption that such a group will exercise considerable influence on decisions, probably making a large portion of them, and to a significant extent determine the direction of policy formulation and development. It was considered justifiable to assume that government executives at the level of director and director-general and sub-director play an important role in the governmental process in Peru. Their position alone, at a strategic level in the bureaucratic hierarchy, justifies an investigation of their characteristics and professional qualifications. However, the choice of this "policy-making segment" implies an attempt to determine conclusively that the study group actually dominates the policymaking process.

Preliminary study revealed that a high degree of standardization exists in the central government of Peru in position titles at the level chosen. All ministries fairly consistently arrange their organizational structure by division with directors at the level immediately below

²⁴Barber, et al., p. 4.

that of the minister. Some ministries employ a director-general who functions in title as a vice-minister or as general administrative coordinator for the ministry. This position may also be referred to as deputy-director-general or secretary-general in some ministries. The principal executive official immediately below the director is deputy ministerially titled sub-director. The absolutely arbitrary decision made was that the "policy-making segment" would be defined as the segment of the function central government bureaucracy which consists of director-general, deputy, and sub-directors, and their equivalents where title standardization of titles does not exist.

The decision to include management personnel of the major organizations in the Independent Public Sub-Sector recognizes the importance of such entities in the overall governmental process of Para. A rapidly increasing portion of government operations, ranging from regulatory functions to monopolies in rail and airlines to operation of government owned hotels and regional industrial development, is conducted by various types of autonomous and semi-autonomous entities in the Independent Public Sub-Sector. The decision to include management personnel of such entities having been made, it was then necessary to define the limits of the management group.

Defining the boundaries of the study of executives in the Independent Public Sub-Sector was more difficult than the choice of regular government executives. This was true for several reasons. Management personnel of the entities in this sector are of two principal types: management functionaries and boards of directors. The former category includes the manager, assistant manager, foreman, director of personnel, and similar governing personnel. The boards of directors,

in typical corporate form, usually consist of a president and a vice-president plus a varying number of other members. Selection and appointment methods differ considerably among the entities in this sector, but as a rule, the boards of directors are composed of representatives from several areas of national life. For example, the directory board of the Banco Central de Reserva consists of seven members: three named by the President of the Republic, one elected by the state development banks, one elected by the commercial banks of Lima, one elected by the regional banks, one each from the Instituto Nacional Agrario and the Nacional Sociedad de Industrias; and finally, one director representing both the Asociacion de Camaras de Comercio of Lima and the Corporacion Nacional de Coordinacion. According to the reports on creating the bank, the directory then elects the president of the bank.

This pattern is followed, in general, by the majority of organizations in the Independent Public Sub-sector. The problem is definition of the study boundaries arose chiefly from the fact that many boards of directors include representatives from the central government ministries. In many cases, these representatives were executives included in the study boundaries for the central government. For this reason, therefore, and because directory members are not full-time employees in the sense of the study, it was decided to exclude directory personnel from the study. Only senior functionalaries, in a full-time operating capacity, fell within the study boundaries.

Using these boundaries, it was judged that the two groups of executives -- senior executives of the central government and senior management functionaries of the Independent Public Sub-Sector -- correspond adequately in terms of levels of responsibility and executive functions discharged.

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The next major problem, after deciding where the boundaries of the investigation should be set, was identification of the executives. Much was made aware of the absence of any form of a directory of government officials of Peru. Fortunately at this stage of the study, the Oficina Nacional de Recrutamiento y Capacitación en la Administración Pública (ONRCAP) was undertaking the preparation of a directory of senior executives of the government of Peru. This directory project needed the point where rough drafts of the listing of senior executives were available in time to serve as the basis for distribution of the study questionnaires. A second phase of the directory project -- which would publish a directory of management personnel in the Independent Public Sub-Sector -- was only partially completed at this time; listings of managers were used for questionnaire distribution as they became available. During the distribution, it became necessary to obtain some new listings directly from some ministries as the original ones were outdated in some extent.

Another decision was necessary in the choice of entities to be studied in the Independent Public Sub-Sector. The difficulty of this decision became apparent when one considers the broad range of activities, the geographical dispersion, and the large variations in capital investment and number of employees characteristic of the Independent Public Sub-Sector. Because of the great variety of entities in this sector, it was decided that the use of a precise formula for choosing representative to be studied would not be feasible. For example, selection of a random sample very sensitively could cause the omission of the most important organizations in terms of size, investment, or number of employees, economic impact, effect on the social or administrative systems, or other

significant characteristics.

²⁵In the matter of checking expenditures, the simple availability or non-availability of personnel listings was an important factor. A repeatable characteristic of the Peruvian bureaucracy -- non-response or slow response to requests for information -- plagued the production of the executive directory of the government. The Independent Public Sub-Sector is particularly responded slowly and incompletely to the request of OEAIR for personnel listings. This lack of response was due partly to the ill-defined relation of some entities in this sub-sector to the central government.²⁶ Another likely factor was the subordinated reputation of OEAIR, the sponsoring organization. Its requests to other government agencies probably would be given less weight and receive less attention. However, in spite of this incomplete return of personnel listings, it is considered that the listings which were available encompassed an acceptable portion of those entities deemed "important" in the scope of the study.

An obvious and unfortunate gap resulted in regard to the defense ministries, the Ministry of War, the Ministry of the Navy, and the Ministry of Aeronautics. The original research scheme projected the use of data on military executives for comparative purposes because the publication of Warner's American study encompassed the military. However, repeated efforts to gain access to military officials at equivalent rank

²⁶The Ministry of Treasury and Commerce experienced the same problem in preparation of the financial budget of Peru for 1984. On July 20, 1983 of transmitted to Congress of the Budget for the Independent Sub-Sector, the Minister observed that only 26.1 per cent of the 2nd entities in this sub-sector furnished their budget documents to the General Budget Office -- partly because of their unclear organizational relationships. Peru, Compendio Estadístico de la República para 1984. Vol. III. Sub-Sector. Oficina Independiente. Lima, 1984, p. 11.

to the senior officials themselves were not fruitful. Lists of military officers similar to the registers published by each armed force of the United States are not available; even organization charts of the war ministries are considered classified information. To illustrate the sensitivity of the defense ministries in regard to outside requests for information, a request from OSMA for a simple organization chart and a list of directors of each ministry, to be included in a directory of the central government, was denied. Several informal requests to high officials of each defense ministry for permission to solicit questionnaire data from OSMA military executives were unsuccessful. One official, a top-level air force officer, advised the author that his intelligence service had given a negative report on the questionnaire. Another general felt that the Peruvian armed forces simply were not ready for this type of study: "perhaps in six or eight years they will be." He similarly stressed the sensitivity of the armed forces, who are defensive about their role because they realize they have no military role in the way that United States armed forces do.

Finally, after failing to obtain the approval of the director of the Peruvian test organization to solicit the defense ministries' cooperation officially, because he believed it "not prudent, especially for a small," it was decided reluctantly to proceed without data from the three defense ministries.

In terms of numbers and coverage of the population studied,¹² the total number of executives in the study group was 686. Of these, 226 were directors, sub-directors, and equivalent executives in the central government of Peru, including nine ministries (six except the defense ministry) and various autonomous and semi-autonomous organizations

which can be described generally as "personnel officers." Another 88 were senior management personnel of entities in the Independent Public Sub-Sector. For comparative purposes, in addition, 80 middle management personnel of the government are analyzed. This group of functionaries is considered separately in an attempt to discover variations in social mobility in a different age group and at a lower level of seniority and responsibility.

Methods of data collection.—Various options were collected, from Peruvian government officials and other persons who had the benefit of experience in the Peruvian environment, in regard to the most effective method of distributing the study questionnaires. In addition, several different methods of distribution were employed with similar groups before the main study began. Without exception, all studies indicated (and especially that from Peruvian sources) emphasized the need for close contact and follow up -- the Peruvian propensity for personalization being the prime positive cited.

The small-scale experiments early in the study used two different methods of distribution. The first was a direct mail solicitation to a group of 80 middle management government officials. This group of employees had participated in an accounting seminar in Puerto Rico under the auspices of ORMAP and therefore had an established connection with ORMAP. Of the group, 75.8 per cent responded. In another trial, wherein questionnaires were distributed to a class of government officials in ORMAP, explained, and collected at a subsequent meeting, 80 per cent of the group responded. The result of these experiments suggested that a third method would be desirable, considering the probable difficulty of bringing the similar individuals together in a group.

For distribution of questionnaires to the main study group (the "policy-making segment"), it was decided that liaison personnel in each ministry would be used wherever possible. The persons who were requested to assist in the distribution were members of the Advisory Committee of OMBP and were themselves part of the segment to be studied. All were at least at the level of sub-director. The initial step was an explanation of the study to this group of executives in a meeting at OMBP, where their cooperation was requested. This meeting was followed by a series of personal visits with each liaison official, at which time the questionnaires, accompanied by a letter of explanation and a self-addressed envelope, were left for distribution to each executive.

A direct mail distribution was used for executives in the Independent Public Sub-Sector, principally because of the widely scattered locations of the various entities, many of them outside of Lima.

Three systems of follow-up were employed. After the lapse of one month, a follow-up letter was sent to each executive who had not responded. At that time, only 24.7 per cent of the group solicited in the central government had replied; only 17.1 per cent in the Independent Public Sub-Sector had responded. Two weeks after the mail follow-up those who still had not returned the questionnaires were called by telephone and requested to complete the form. At the time of the telephone contacts, 25.8 per cent of the executives had responded. Two further follow-ups were made to a majority of the group. When appointments for interviews were made with some officials who had not responded, they were requested at the time of the interviews to fill out the questionnaires. Finally personal visits were made to persons in those ministries whose percentage of returns was unacceptably low. Such personal visits were quite successful in

producing additional returns. No further follow-ups were attempted after completion of the interview phase. At that time, 58.2 per cent of the group had responded.

Some frustrating problems were encountered in what normally should be simple, mechanical processes. For example, a follow-up letter, sent as a reminder to executives who had not returned the questionnaire, caused a large response from executives who stated they had never received the original questionnaire. Replacement questionnaires were forwarded to these officials, and attempts were delayed pending receipt of the late replies. It was not possible to isolate the cause for this misrouting of the original questionnaire.

During the final follow-up phase, in which each executive who had not responded was contacted personally, there fellow in communication became even more apparent. Many officials indicated that they had mailed the completed questionnaire, but these were not received, for unknown reasons, by the writer. In such cases, new questionnaires were left with these persons and collected personally at a later date.

The use of survey data in the study.—The lack of adequate source data for Peru presented various obstacles to complete analysis of the characteristics of the group of executives on a comparative basis. Population data, of course, were needed for use as standards against which the characteristics of the executives could be compared. Data on this group of executives could be analyzed more meaningfully if they could be compared with corresponding characteristics of the total population of Peru, particularly in terms of activity, age and sex, occupational distribution and educational levels.

It was determined that the average age of these senior executives

of the Peruvian Government was 48.2 years and of the middle management group of 25.8 years. Thus, for an appropriate standard for comparison, a census near the year 1920 was needed. In addition to the need for a population census near the year 1920, further census data for about 1940 were desired for comparison of the occupations of the fathers of the executives with those of the total population of Peru. The year was determined by adding twenty years to the average birthyear of the group of executives, assuming that the average member of the group commenced work at about twenty years of age.

Unfortunately, the only two useful population censuses available for Peru are those of 1940 and 1961. Not until 1920 was regularity of censuses established legally by Peru, at which time it was required by law²⁶ that censuses of population and housing would be conducted every ten years and economic censuses every five years.

It was decided against attempting any adjustments to the census figures for 1940 or 1961. There were two principal reasons for this decision. First, the varied rates of population growth for different sections of the country would lead to difficulties, if not impossibility, demographic estimation. The skewed rates of population growth for the coastal Indian-Indian states, especially Lima, Cuzco, and Chachabuco, would have compounded the problem. Second, little confidence in any census before 1940 was expressed by knowledgeable personnel in the Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos. Among the working hypotheses followed by the Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos in 1961 were two which assumed that there had been no perceptible changes in the residency patterns of Peru between 1940 and 1961, and further that the censuses of 1940 and 1961 are comparable in quality

²⁶ Ley No. 13548 of August 24, 1928.

and accuracy of data.³⁷

✓ To avoid adjustments of the available census data, which would be likely to introduce further error into statistics already less than totally accurate, it was decided to base all calculations which were necessary for comparative purposes on the censuses of 1940 and 1951. To a large extent, the 1940 census yields data acceptably close to the year required. Even in the instances where the 1940 census data are more years removed from the exact date pertained to the analysis, it is considered that their use is preferable to attempting demographic adjustments for another year.

Translation and cultural difficulties.—In many respects, the data used to the questionnaire of Martin and his colleagues in The American Political System is apparent. Many questions were adapted verbatim for the Peruvian study. Yet numerous problems of translational arose both from language interpretations and from the application of the questionnaire to another environment. Some of these are noted below.

Absolutely basic appeared when the questionnaire, translated initially by the author, was revised to apply to the unitary governmental system of Peru. Some difficulty arose in the attempt to make a necessary distinction between officials of the national government at the central level (in the capital) and at the departmental, provincial, and district levels. The idea of a unitary government reaching directly from the capital to the districts was misread as directly to the Peruvian officials' thinking that it was difficult for them to accept the necessary conceptual distinction between national government functionaries in the capital

³⁷ Peru, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Boletín Nacional de Estadística, Resumen Estadístico, Planificación, El Primer Trimestre, 1949, p. 313.

and central government officials in the provinces.

A question relating to occupational mobility raised the problem of applicability of some occupations to the social government structure of Peru. A group of occupations which would fall low on a prestige scale (youth, newspaper, unskilled manual worker, etc.) was dropped at first from the preliminary translation, for two principal reasons. First, doubt was expressed by knowledgeable Peruvians that any of the subjects of the study group would have ever engaged in such occupations, and second, such a question, as a status-prestige-conscious society such as Peru's, obviously would be offensive to the respondents and as such could prejudice the validity of answers to the remainder of the questionnaire. Eventually, despite such objections, the final questionnaire included the low-prestige jobs. It was important to secure data in regard to social mobility from these jobs -- at least to allow respondents the opportunity to furnish such information -- despite the risk of induced sensitivities. The author's assumption that responses relating to such jobs would be valid is as justifiable as an assumption that certain occupations would be inapplicable.

It was found also that the Warner study categories of farmers and agricultural workers in the occupational listing were difficult to transfer to the Peruvian environment. Agricultural terminology which is commoned fairly uniformly in the United States proved confusion when translated into Spanish. The main difficulty arose not from language itself but from the variety of meanings attached to terms describing agricultural workers which in Peru vary considerably in different regions of the country -- areas, sierra, and costa. The problem was to select

terms which would convey a reasonably standard meaning to all parts of Peru.²⁸

Questions relating to military service did not elicit the intended response in partials because of a different interpretation of the meaning of "service." Some respondents considered that completion of a course in military history, or joining a reserve organization by virtue of university graduation, constituted military service. The difficulty seemed to be solved satisfactorily by specifying and emphasizing that the questions pertained only to active military service.

It was found from preliminary responses that answers to the questions relating to education would require a considerable amount of study and interpretation. There were two principal reasons for this. First, respondents interpreted "post-graduate studies" to mean something other than studies beyond a university bachelor's degree. Consequently a multitude of responses was received indicating the completion of miscellaneous courses that were unrelated to university degree work. Second, a "título" in the Peruvian statement is likely to be interpreted as almost any form of degree, diploma, or certificate of completion of a course. Likewise, a título profesional means almost any title indicating any specialization. Thus, a person who had specialized in the study of Spanish would consider himself to have a professional title as a technician in tourism. For these reasons, codes were developed for each response as the questionnaires were analyzed, not beforehand.

A question relating to income was included in the original draft of the questionnaire. However, it was decided to omit income questions

²⁸ Food manufacturers similar difficulties in categorizing Peruvian agricultural workers. See Thomas R. Ford, See and Learn in Peru, p. 75.

completely exempt for one question asking if the official received any income from jobs other than his government post] because it became apparent that such questions probably would not elicit valid answers. For example, in Slovenia the difficulties inherent in financial questions, the census of 1961, in answer to a question on weekly income of government and private business employees, received in over 15 per cent of the replies answers not specifying amounts. Nearly half of those not answered were government employees.²⁹ The obvious indication was that similar questions in the present study likely would receive similar responses. A question relating to previous occupations, which categorized occupations as small, medium, or large by financial criteria (approximate annual sales), was retained. Even so this question, the inclusion of financial criteria raised doubts in the minds of several persons who reviewed the questionnaire that suspicions in regard to tax liability would be created.

Coding and data processing.—Data received on the written questionnaire were coded on ordinary IBM punch cards. Where required codes had not been anticipated in pre-planning, additional ones were devised as data were analyzed. This was necessary, for example, in coding of specializations of college graduates and degrees received. Basically a simple method of analysis was used; none of the work really required a computer. For example, in complicated types of factor analysis where sophisticated necessary, all the tables were arranged by relatively simple matrices.

Key punching, verification, and other data processing were performed on conventional IBM machines at the data processing center of the

²⁹ Survey of Social Structure in Yugoslavia, p. 154.

Observatorio de Investigaciones y Cartografía of the Government of Pinar del Rio. Supplementary work was made in the High Electronic Computer Center at the Georgia Institute of Technology.

In Chapters III and IV, the analysis of the main body of data from the study questionnaire is presented, along with tests of some of the study's hypotheses.

CHAPTER III

PROFILES OF THE PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES

Scope of the Study

Sample studied.—Profiles have been developed of the senior executives of the Paraguayan government from the research described in the previous section. The profiles offer the best means to present clusters of characteristics and, if possible, typologies. The group with which the study is concerned consisted of 176 senior executives at the level of director and sub-director and 45 middle-management personnel. These officials, all but two of whom are men, were distributed fairly evenly throughout the central government of Paraguay and the Independent Public Sub-Sector. All ministries of the central government except the Ministries of War, Agriculture, and Navy are represented, along with a number of entities in the Independent Public Sub-Sector. Representations included in the survey are indicated in Table 2. Of the 176 senior executives who responded to the questionnaire, 76 were Directors in the central government; 46 were sub-directors; and 54 were executives of equivalent grade in the Independent Public Sub-Sector.

Table 3 indicates the distribution of ratings and returns by ministry and sector. It was expected that a correlation would be evident between percentages of returns and the "character" of agencies, and that returns would be lower in those ministries which were considered less professionally oriented. Although this was substantiated partially, as Table 3 shows, the pattern of return percentages is not such that meaningful

TABLE 2

PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

Central Government

Ministry of Government and Police
 Ministry of Foreign Relations
 Ministry of Justice and Religion
 Ministry of Labor and Indigenous Affairs
 Ministry of Public Education
 Ministry of Treasury and Commerce
 Ministry of Development and Public Works
 Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance
 Ministry of Agriculture
 National Planning Institute
 Comptroller General of the Republic
 National Office of Public Administration Modernization
 and Training (ONMMP)

Subsidiary Public Enterprise

Banking Bank of Peru
 Fund of Deposits and Consignations
 Peruvian Shipbuilding Corporation
 Labor and Basic Resources Service
 Mining Bank of Peru
 Bank of Agricultural Development of Peru
 Central Reserve Bank of Peru
 Port Authority of Callao
 Employees Social Security Board
 Peruvian Commercial Airports and Aviation Corporation
 Electric Energy Corporation of the Marañon
 National Productivity Center
 Promotion and Economic Development Corporation of Tarma

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF BILLAGES AND RETURNS BY MINISTRY AND SECTOR

Ministry or Sector	Billed	Returned	Percentage Returned
Army and Police	27	10	37.0
Foreign Relations	30	11	47.8
Justice and Religion	24	18	75.0
Labour and Indigenous Affairs	21	9	42.9
Public Education	28	12	42.9
Treasury and Commerce	11	27	64.0
Development and Public Works	26	15	57.7
Public Health and Social Assistance	14	12	85.7
Agriculture	28	28	100.0
Presidential Offices	18	18	100.0
Independent Public Sub-Sector	48	34	70.8
Waste Management	60	40	66.7
Total	280	220	78.6

conclusions could be drawn. The many adverse factors influenced the situation to attribute roles of nature solely to the "character" of the organizations.

Geographic Origins of Peruvian Executives

Concentration in Peru.—The extreme concentration of the economy and society influences the geographic origins of the group of executives. As Myrta points out, although such concentration is a common pattern in Latin America, in Peru it is found in more extreme form than in the majority of the countries of the area.¹

Of the population of Peru, approximately 10,400,000 in 1940² and estimated to be 11,649,000 in 1945, some 85.8 per cent resides in rural regions and 14.4 per cent lives in urban localities.³ Of the total population, 16.4 per cent lives in the key area of Lima, the capital, and Callao, contiguous with Lima and the major part of the country.⁴

Although such concentration of population, as well as of economic activity, characterizes Peru, it should not be forgotten that the country

¹William P. Myrta, La Base de Ocas de Vida Rural en el Perú (Lima: Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje y Trabajo Industrial, 1944), pp. 22-24.

²Peru, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 7 de Julio de 1941, Resultados Finales de Censos Esenciales (Lima, May, 1944), p. 1; and Servicio del Empleo y Recursos Humanos, Clasificación y Programación de las Necesidades Humanas, Población del Perú (Servicio del Trabajo Nr. 2, 24 de Lima, 1953), p. 4.

³Urban was defined broadly in the 1941 census to include population of districts capitals and of other communities with urban characteristics. However, the percentages above are based on the number of inhabitants residing in communities of 2,000 or more. Servicio del Empleo y Recursos Humanos, Clasificación y Programación de las Necesidades Humanas, Población del Perú, pp. 24-25.

⁴Ibid., p. 25.

has experienced strong effects from regional and territorial differences. Just as Bates and Van Dine noted in regard to the United States,⁵ "conditions of locality and region have been strong in Peru. Thus we find that a native of Arequipa, for example, even though he has lived in Lima for most of his life, persists in referring to himself as an arequipeño. Such loyalties have the major strength of the numerous united states of the capital, each comprised of migrants from various provincial cities as regions.

The contribution of provincial areas stands out sharply when the origin of Peru's presidents is studied. As Ernesto Díaz Canevaro points out, the great majority of those who have occupied the office of president ("por delegación, por usurpación o por accidente") have been provincials.⁶ Of a total of 173 executives, Lima has given only 18 per cent; 14 were limeros, the other 756 were provincials.

Neither the questionnaires nor personal interviews attempted to isolate effects of birthplace on the values and attitudes of these officials. Yet consideration of place of origin can be most revealing in understanding Peru. First, the census was closely with what regions produce the senior executives of the Peruvian government. Through analysis of census data, the distribution of executives by region of birth was related to determine the productivity ratio for each region. Second, a comparison of department of birth with department of present residence indicated the extent and form of mobility of the officials.⁷

⁵Bates, *ibid.*, p. 39.

⁶Ernesto Díaz Canevaro, El origen geográfico de los gobernantes por delegación, usurpación o accidente en el Perú, Boletín de la Universidad Nacional de la Libertad, 1964, 19-20.

⁷Peru's unitary system of government functions through 18 departments and the constitutional province of Callao, each headed by a prefect appointed by the President of the Republic.

Such analysis can provide the foundation for speculation about the effects of population concentration on national life, and the potential advantages and disadvantages imposed on regions by virtue of uneven distribution of population.

Environmental and regional categorization --Executives of the study group were asked to indicate their place of birth by district, province, and department (or foreign country); the birthplaces of their spouse, father and paternal grandfather, and mother and maternal grandfather. In addition, they were asked for information on the location of their first government job and their present post, as well as the number of years they had served in various parts of Peru and in foreign countries. Analysis of these data provides a rather complete picture of regional representation and mobility, besides valuable information on ancestry.

The findings relative to productivity ratios of the four regions of Peru are presented in Table 4. For comparison of productivity ratios, population figures for the census of 1940 were employed. The 1940 census was used to increase the accuracy of the calculations by linking ratios on a period closer to the year of birth of the executives.

Most of Peru's population, according to the census of 1940, was distributed fairly evenly among the northern, central, and southern regions, with only the region of the sierra being out of proportion with only 1.4 per cent of the total population.³ Not when considered in terms

³For our purposes, the four regions of Peru comprise the following departments:

<u>Northern Peru</u>	<u>Central Peru</u>	<u>Southern Peru</u>	<u>Sierra</u>
Cuzco	Arequipa	Ayacucho	Lima
Piura	Trujillo	Apurimac	San Martín
Chiclayo	Jaya	Wraylla	Amazonas
La Libertad	Des	Peru	Madre de Dios
La Libertad	Manayallan	Wraylla	
Amazon	Des	Trujillo	
	Callao	Cusco	

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES BY REGION OF BORN^a

Region	1960 Population of Region (Per Cent)	Executives Born in Region (Per Cent)	Productivity Ratio ^b
Northern Para	30.9	26.7	0.86
Central Para	30.8	56.5	1.86
Southern Para	30.5	27.5	0.90
State	100.0	100.0	1.00

^aExcludes foreign-born executives.^bProductivity Ratio = $\frac{\text{Executives born in region (X)}}{\text{1960 Population (X)}}$

of productivity ratios, the four regions show marked differences. First, an almost exact correlation exists between population and productivity ratio in the case of the Paraense state. Containing 3.4 per cent of the 1960 population, the four departments of the state, Para's jungle region, produced 5.2 per cent of the executives of the study group. At the other extreme, the central region, including the great Rio-Culene urban center as well as the middle Amazon departments, with 30.8 per cent of the population produced 56.5 per cent of the executives. Its productivity ratio, 1.86, places the central region far out of proportion in terms of its contribution of leaders to the government of Para. We find that northern and southern Para with 30.9 and 31.5 per cent of the population,



Figure 1. Regions of Peru.

respectively, provide only 18.5 and 17.6 per cent of the executives. Their ratios of productivity thus amount to slightly more than half the expected ratio.

Of course, such indications of productivity should not be accepted as complete evidence of low productivity without consideration of patterns of mobility of government leaders and general internal migration. It is necessary to relate productivity ratios of the various regions of Peru to patterns of mobility and migration for a better picture of regional contributions to government leadership. Because the study did not encompass elements of the central government outside of the capital, except to a limited degree for certain ministries and autonomous agencies, the productivity ratios must be interpreted with care. For example, it is conceivable that the lower ratios of productivity of the northern and southern regions of Peru could have been exaggerated here in these regions were employed more expensive labor, and would be under-represented in the study. The proximity of most of the central region to the capital would lend some credence to this possibility, but studies of internal migration lead rather to the conclusion that the northern and southern regions simply do contribute fewer leaders to the government.

These studies of migration⁸ within Peru reveal the principal sources of internal migration to be as follows:

- a. from the entire country toward the capital,
- b. from the sierra to the costa,

⁸For example, Perú, Instituto Nacional de Planificación, Aplicación de la Encuesta Demográfica del Perú 1966, 1967 as quoted in Revista del Instituto y Recursos Humanos, Migración y Programación de los Recursos Humanos, Boletín del Perú, no. 10-11.

- c. along the coast,
- d. along the valleys, principally in the great Andean valleys such as Arequipa, Huancayo, and Cuzco to Arequipa and
- e. colonization movements to the west.

The movement in the capital has been most drastic in impact. Analysis of the composition of population in the Lima-Callao area indicates that the central region contributes considerably greater numbers of migrants than do the other three regions.¹⁰ Thus it is likely that the probability ratios derived from the questionnaire data are a true reflection of the actual migratory patterns which exist in Peru.

Patterns of mobility.--Table 5 shows mobility patterns for the government leaders. Using four executive groups, a distribution is made of these types of mobility. Intradepartmental mobility is indicated for those whose department of birth and department of residence are the same. Intradepartmental mobility means that the department of birth and department of residence are different but within the same region. Inter-region mobility signifies that the department of birth and department of residence are different and in different regions.

Deploying these definitions,¹¹ the data show that sub-directors are most likely to remain in their department of birth in pursuing their career. Over 92 per cent of sub-directors were born and now live in the same department of Peru. Still, almost one-third of this group has moved between regions of the country.¹² In general, all of the senior executives follow approximately the same patterns of mobility, though executives of the independent public sub-sector show a higher intraregional mobility, even

¹⁰Verd, *Servicio del Impulso y Desarrollo Humano, Migración y Pertenencia en las Gerencias Nacionales, Colección del Verd, Cuadros 104 and 105, pp. 22-23.*

TABLE 5
PATTERN OF EXECUTIVE MOBILITY

Type of Executive	Intra- Departmental	Inter- Departmental	Inter- Region	Other ^a
All senior executives	45.26	36.50	33.40	3.83
Directors	44.6	37.8	35.2	5.3
Sub-Directors	33.3	18.1	35.4	3.1
Independent Director Executives	47.3	11.6	38.3	3.8
Wife's Management	31.3	6.7	40.0	3.3

^a "Other" includes international mobility and unexplained mobility.

38 per cent.

Standing apart from the senior executives is the middle management group. Officials of this segment demonstrate strongly the attractions of the capital, with 40 per cent having moved from other regions of Peru to Lima and another 4.2 per cent having moved from other departments. Such a pattern coincides with the steadily increasing, primarily one-way migration from all parts of Peru to the Lima-Callao metropolitan area. This, proper, middle management group is probably quite representative of the typical postwar highland of that class to the capital.

One must look as well to the racial situation for further insight into the relative productivity of the four regions. The region of lowest productivity, northern Peru, also contains the highest percentage of the Indian population of the country, with 415 that this means in terms of

higher illiteracy, less education, and other factors which would decrease opportunities for entry into the civil service. Although the most productive mineral regions also contain a large percentage of Indians, the effect on the productivity ratio is offset by the huge population of Lima, also in the mineral region.

Foreign-born government leaders.--In Table 8, the seniority of Peruvian senior executives and middle management personnel is compared with the population of Peru in 1940. Because of unreliability of census statistics relating to seniority of fathers and paternal grandfathers, the comparisons here are based on such ancestors, but applied only to the executives themselves.

"All categories of senior executives and middle management officials show up as overwhelmingly native Peruvians. In the case of sub-directors, 100 per cent were born in Peru. The highest percentage of foreign-born officials is seen in the middle management group, where 4.4 per cent were born outside Peru. In the group of directors, 2.1 per cent are foreign-born. Such differences might indicate increasing accessibility of civil service jobs to sons of immigrants, but the evidence is far from conclusive.

"Comparing seniority of senior executives with the seniority of the general population of Peru, it may be seen that the foreign-born are over-represented in the Peruvian bureaucracy. The census of 1940 counted 66,726 foreign-born inhabitants, or 0.47 per cent of the total population.¹ But 2.3 per cent of the senior executives were born in the exterior and 4.4 per cent of middle management personnel were foreign-born.

Percentages of native births drop consider- ably when fathers of executives are considered together with the executives. An interesting

TABLE 5

COMPARISON OF ACTIVITY OF PVA GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES
AND POPULATION OF PERU IN 1961

Sectivity	Population of Peru 1961 ^a	Directors	Sub-Directors	Independent Sector Executives	Mobile Managers
Executive born in Peru	75.28	76.72	70.88	77.22	75.42
Executive foreign-born	0.7	3.1	-	2.8	4.4
Father and executive born in Peru	6	71.7	77.8	76.1	73.2
Paternal grandfather, father, and executive born in Peru	6	74.0	82.8	80.2	80.0

^aSource of 1961 population data: Perú, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *Boletín Nacional de Estadística y Censos*, "Censos No. 3, Población de la República, por Lugar de Nacimiento," June 14, 1965.

^bData on activity of executives are not included in the census.

situation may be noted in this report where the director group exchanges places with the mobile management group as "first generation." The obvious cause is a higher proportion of foreign-born fathers in the case of directors. At the same time, sub-directors exhibit greater "mixing" of Peruvian ancestry with 77.8 per cent of sub-directors plus fathers born in Peru. But upon tracing ancestry to the third generation, and including paternal grandfathers with fathers and the executives, a further alteration of "Peruvianness" occurs. In this instance, although the director group remains "first generation," it is discovered that independent sector

executives are "best trained" when considered with factors and potential qualifications.

• Evaluating the effect of foreign-birth on the opportunities for careers in the bureaucracy, it must be concluded that native-birth is not advantageous, when that factor is considered in isolation. Properly, since foreign-born persons reach high levels in the Peruvian bureaucracy than do native Peruvians. The data indicates that the executives who have reached the highest level in the civil service are "born Peruvian" in terms of ancestry. Further substantiation of such data through deeper studies could lead to some revision of thinking about the "closed society" which frequently has been considered characteristic of Peru.

Situation of Peruvian Executives

General educational levels.--The importance of education in the Peruvian scale of values is clearly evident. He who who has observed the Peruvian government worker at close range can tell to be impressed by the high value placed on at least the external signs of education, such as a university diploma, degree, or certificate of course completion. The same spirit is evident in the eagerness with which Peruvians seek to complete courses of many descriptions. Formal education is looked upon as the key to social and occupational mobility.¹¹

In this section, comparisons will be made of educational levels attained by the executives and the educational levels attained by Peruvian

¹¹Wells before points out how education particularly was used after the famous article of 1929 as a path of social mobility. This important article after the Spanish World War, and in several years a new type of education--from the lower classes--was appeared on the scene. José María Velasco, "La instrucción superior social en el Perú," *Geographical Magazine*, Oxford (June-July, 1941), 109-117.

adult males. This analysis will be made of differences in university education and white training related to ethnicity. In addition, the contributions of various Peruvian and Foreign institutions to the education of the executives will be considered as well as the extent of specialization of college graduates.

College and university training appears to be a relatively essential stage in the careers of most Peruvian executives. Ninety-one per cent ¹¹ of the senior executives had at least some college training, and 78.6 per cent were college graduates. Over 36 per cent had undertaken some form of post-graduate studies. There were some differences in attained levels of education among the four groups of executives, with the sub-director group having the lowest proportion of persons with college training.

No executive in any group had less than high school training, and only 16 per cent of the sub-director group failed to continue beyond the high school level.

Table 7 aims in specification of how distinctly education sets Peruvian government executives apart from the rest of society. A comparison of the proportions of executives at various levels of education with proportions of adult males in the Peruvian population at these levels makes obvious the high overrepresentation of well educated persons among government executives. Although data for direct comparison exactly in these terms were not available, much value lies in consideration of similar breakdowns. In 1961, it was reported that almost 60 per cent of the adult population of Peru (over 17 years old) was illiterate.¹² Of

¹¹ State-Private Development Bank, Social Progress Study Panel, Growth, Social Progress, and (Washington, 1966), p. 446.

TABLE 7

EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF PARAGUAY GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES

Level of Education	All Senior Executives	Directors	Sub-Directors	Independent Sector Executives	Public Managers
Less than high school	-	-	-	-	-
High school	8.3%	5.3%	15.3%	8.4%	4.7%
Some college	24.5	11.5	15.5	28.5	24.4
College graduate	38.1	25.4	38.1	44.1	34.5
Post-graduate studies	34.4	44.5	28.1	28.4	34.4
No answer	5.5	1.5	-	-	4.4

These persons with some degree of formal education, the overwhelming majority had completed no more than the primary level. Only 4 per cent of this illiterate group over six years old had gone beyond secondary level.²¹

In terms of education, then, it is obvious that Paraguayan government executives stand apart as a highly elite group in their society. They are hardly comparable to even the average Paraguayan in this respect, and they are worlds apart from the great mass of illiterate Indians, completely without formal education. It is interesting to speculate about the ways in which such a dramatic difference might foster an attitude of paternalism among such executives.

²¹For a study of the illiterate population, see Ministerio de Educación Pública, Dirección de Estadística Nacional, Estadística Nacional de 1950 (Asunción, 1955), Cuadro No. 1.

Area of specialization.—A rather confusing pattern is apparent in the areas of specialization chosen by the different groups in their university training.¹⁴ Table 8 shows the proportions of executives in each group according to specialization in college. It is obvious that many differences exist among the four executive groups in terms of university preparation.

TABLE 8
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION OF COLLEGE GRADUATES

Specialization	All Senior Execu- tives	Senior Vice Pres	Sub- Sinc- vare	Delegated Senior Executives	Junior Managers
Humanities	-	-	-	-	-
Natural sciences	14.48	20.38	3.38	18.38	13.48
Physical and biological sciences	3.1	6.3	-	9.3	4.9
Law	20.4	28.3	20.3	15.3	16.8
Engineering	17.3	15.8	20.8	21.8	20.3
Other applied fields	25.3	25.3	25.3	9.3	21.3
Other	18.3	22.3	20.3	22.7	3.4

¹⁴In consideration of specializations, the humanities are defined as languages, general development, social sciences, and arts and sciences. Physical and biological sciences include physical sciences, medicine, science, chemistry, pharmacy, and biology. Engineering includes architecture, civil, chemical, mechanical, electrical, and industrial engineering, law, mining, and metallurgy. Other applied fields include agriculture or horticulture, education, public or business administration, "artistics," city planning, accounting, public relations, medicine, public health, dentistry, and social work.

In The American Federal Executive, the choice of an area of specialization in college was interpreted as the first of a long series of areas which opened or closed certain career perspectives. Such decisions were seen to be of crucial importance, influencing greatly the particular Federal office the man entered. Although the present study offers some possible data on educational specialization of Peruvian executives, the author is not convinced that the choice of specialization plays a role as strongly demonstrable as the authors of the United States study see for American executives.

However, what the data indicates for Peruvian executives may be even more significant. It can be seen that the largest proportion of executives in the director and sub-director groups specialized in law during their university years. Such specialization corresponds well with traditional notions of education and government service in Peru. Yet the independent sector executives and the middle management group show far less than half as frequently. At the same time, nearly 33 per cent of independent sector executives specialized in engineering, and almost 30 per cent of the middle management personnel followed other applied fields in their university training.

This greater emphasis on engineering and other applied fields of specialization by independent sector executives and middle management officials is believed to indicate significant changes in Peruvian government and society. A traditional education in the law no longer suffices for the developmental needs of Peru. There is a burgeoning demand for persons trained in a wide variety of new fields. These demands are felt strongly in the government, because much of the justification and impetus for development programs originates in the Peruvian bureaucracy.

Another striking aspect of the data on areas of specialization of Peruvian economists is the indication of complete absence of specialization in any of the humanities. The lack of representation of graduates in the humanities¹⁵ is somewhat surprising, in view of the proportion of Peruvian university students engaged in the study of "letters." Table 8 shows that nearly 15 per cent of all students were in letters in 1955. Apparently none of these has entered or reached the level of the university included in the research.

In terms of more direct preparation for a public service career, such as through specialization in public administration and related fields, it was found, as expected, that few economists had chosen such a specialization.¹⁶ Historically, Peruvian universities have concentrated little or no research in the area of public administration. Only recently have central universities in Peru begun to develop courses in administration.¹⁷ The Federico Villarreal National University in Lima presently offers the shortest program existing in Peru which is directed specifically at training public administrators. Professor East's comment in regard to the weakness of available programs leaves openings:

The central fact that accounts for specific offerings in the field of Public Administration, the superficiality of the study and the lack of scientific interest in foreign public law is found in the absence from the University curricula

FOOTNOTES

¹⁵The humanities are defined to include languages and literature, the fine arts and music, classical studies, philosophy, and history.

¹⁶None of those who had no specialized work skills management potential, mainly in accounting.

¹⁷The author is grateful to Dr. Edwin F. East of Brooklyn College for the use of his report, *University Training for Public Administration in Peru*, prepared for the Institute of Public Administration of New York, January, 1958. Many of these comments are based on Professor East's report.

TABLE 5

UNIVERSITY MATRICULATION IN FIVE BY AREA OF SPECIALIZATION:
1952-53

Specialization	Matricu- lated in 1952	Matricu- lated in 1953	Percentage in 1952	Percentage in 1953
Letters	1,666	8,584	40.25	26.76
Law	1,204	8,547	9.51	21.12
Sciences (preparatory)	2,316	8,847	24.56	24.32
Medicine	2,560	1,772	24.62	6.62
Statistics	687	261	5.66	.72
Geology	574	708	3.61	3.27
Veterinary medicine	109	208	.76	.76
Pharmacy and biochemistry	282	959	3.66	6.43
Biological sciences	121	777	.82	.73
Physical sciences and mathematics	184	142	.87	.52
Geology	87	267	.56	1.27
Agronomy	534	615	5.85	5.65
Chemistry and chemical engineering	720	441	5.78	1.72
Engineering	1,025	3,408	6.44	22.40
Technical and commercial sciences	1,503	3,922	9.60	24.62
Education	1,202	1,775	7.61	6.63
Journalism	171	217	1.20	.62
Others	205	21	1.20	.04
Totals	22,507	26,448	100.00	100.00

Source: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, Programación del Desarrollo, Vol. 3, Cuadro 5 (Lima, 1962), as quoted in Weyl, *La Ruta de Lima al Asia Oriental*, p. 90.

of Political Science as an area of scientific objective study and thinking. The resulting neglect of Peruvian higher education, such as the case told us the university class of continental Europe, has left us free ground in which Political Science could grow. Early indications of an interest were lost as the political faculties played to the narrowing pressure for professional training.¹⁸

present developments in Peruvian higher education should lead to much wider interest in political science and public administration and probably to significant changes in areas of specialization of college graduates among Peruvian universities. Recent historical materialism programs under the Alliance for Progress have served to stimulate interest in public administration not only in the Peruvian government but in the academic sector as well.

The universities that produce executives.--There can be little doubt of the pervasive importance of higher education in the careers of Peruvian government executives. It was shown above that 74 per cent of the major executives had at least some college training and that nearly 75 per cent were college graduates, with 44 per cent undertaking some post-graduate studies. Such data naturally draw our attention to the universities that produce Peruvian executives. Table 14 offers such information.

In analyzing educational background, separate notes were compiled for each major institution reported in Peru and other notes for foreign universities located in different regions of the world.

It was found that Peruvian executives attended public institutions much more than private universities. Such findings were not unexpected, considering the predominance of public institutions in Peru. The Unoversited National Report de San Marcos in Lima, one of America's oldest

¹⁸ ibid., pp. 3-4.

TABLE 10
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

University	All Gender Enroll- ments	Over- seas	Sub- Sama- rangs	Independent School Enrollments	Public Management
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos	24,08	26,08	26,08	26,08	46,08
Facultad de Medicina del Cuzco del Perú	1,10	26,0	6,6	8,8	6,6
Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería	11,4	7,3	12,8	22,6	6,3
Universidad Nacional Agraria	9,7	12,6	6,7	2,9	6,4
Universidad Nacional Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	6,6	1,0	-	-	6,6
Universidad Nacional de la Libertad, Trujillo	1,1	1,0	2,2	-	6,6
Universidad Nacional San Agustín, Arequipa	3,3	3,1	2,2	-	-
Other Peruvian Univer- sities and schools	3,4	3,1	6,3	2,9	2,3
Foreign universities-- United States	1,7	-	2,2	5,9	-
Foreign universities-- Western Europe	1,7	3,1	2,2	-	-
Foreign universities-- Latin America	3,4	4,3	4,3	-	13,3
No answer	8,6	7,3	4,3	17,6	4,4

university, stands far above other universities in numbers of executives produced. Nearly 32 per cent of all senior executives and about 48 per cent of the middle management group attended San Marcos. The Pontificia Universidad Católica, Peru's second largest university, provides the second largest representation of executives in the Peruvian hierarchy. Seventeen per cent of all senior executives attended the Catholic University. Large differences were found in the proportions of various executive groups attending Catholic University, ranging from 25 per cent of the directors to 5.5 per cent of sub-directors and less than 1 per cent of the other executive groups. The data suggest no explanation for such variations, accounting for the third largest number of graduates among the executives is the Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería, Peru's most important engineering school. Over 11 per cent of the senior executives studied at the National Engineering University. A much larger proportion -- 35 per cent -- of independent senior executives came from the Engineering University, perhaps reflecting stronger interest in applied education by these executives. Only one other institution -- the Universidad Nacional Agraria -- provides numbers comparable to the three universities considered above. The Agrarian University fills nearly 15 per cent of the senior executive positions and over 8 per cent of the middle management jobs.

Table 10 shows the relatively minor role played by other universities of Peru in producing future government executives. Only the Universidad Nacional de La Libertad at Trujillo supplies a comparable proportion, nearly 7 per cent of the middle management group. Clearly, as Table 11 indicates, the "Big 4," San Marcos, Catholic University, National Engineering University, and National Agrarian University, dominate in the

TABLE 11

INSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDED THE LARGEST NUMBER OF DEGREES
REPORTED BY PROVINCE UNDER INVESTIGATION

Number of Degrees Granted	Accumulative Number	Accumulative Percentage	Distribution
50	50	29.5	San Marcos
26	76	46.5	Catholic
28	104	61.9	National Engineering
17	121	67.4	National Agrarian
4	125	69.7	San Agustin, Arequipa

Total four-year level degrees: 145.

role of producing Peruvian government executives. All of these major universities are located in the capital and are thus in a better position to attract larger numbers of students. Yet traditionally, San Marcos and Catholic University are the schools to attend, and numerous such as the Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal, despite their more advanced offerings in subjects such as public administration, still lack the prestige of the traditional leaders.

Foreign universities account for nearly 7 per cent of the middle executive groups, the largest numbers coming from universities in other Latin American countries. Over 12 per cent of the middle management group studied at universities in other parts of Latin America. United States universities provided about 4 per cent of the executives in the independent public sector.

Education and attainment according to ministry. - Another aspect

of the research was a determination of the correlation, if any, between the type of ministry and the level of education and qualifications of the executives. One of the working hypotheses was that significant differences would exist among offices and ministries in the qualifications and educational attainments of officials. It was hypothesized that executives in professionally oriented or foreign-oriented ministries would exhibit higher attainments in this regard than executives in non-professionally oriented ministries. Furthermore, executives in the Independent Public Education were expected to surpass in these respects their counterparts in the non-professionally oriented ministries but not those in the professionally oriented ministries.

Several factors were selected for use as measures of qualifications and educational attainments. These were: level of education, commercial training, other training, and language knowledge. Data relating to each factor are presented in Tables 12 through 15.

Reference to Table 12 will show that in regard to level of education, the hypothesis was substantiated in part but must be rejected partially. The professionally oriented ministries do tend to be staffed by better educated executives, although it was surprising to find that the Ministry of Foreign Relations was lowest in this respect among the professionally oriented ministries, having 42.2 per cent of its executives with college degrees or post-graduate work. The non-professionally oriented group, especially the Ministry of Government and Treasury, generally tend to show lower educational attainments, although not in every degree.

More significant, however, is the finding relating to executives in the Independent Public Education. These executives not only rank

TABLE 17

EDUCATION OF EXECUTIVE IN MINISTRIES

Ministry or Sector	Highest level of Education Attained (Percentage)				
	Primary Only	Secondary	Some College	University Graduate	Post- Graduate
Foreign Relations	-	-	26.3	58.1	15.6
Development	-	-	8.7	53.3	38.0
Public Health	-	-	18.7	33.3	48.0
Education	8.8	-	8.8	21.3	58.0
Government	-	20.0	20.0	30.0	40.0
Justice	-	5.3	5.3	27.9	31.5
Treasury	-	26.3	21.1	26.8	15.7
Agriculture	-	-	8.0	44.0	48.0
Labor	-	11.3	23.3	44.8	20.3
Public Management	4.4	8.4	24.4	38.8	25.0
Independent Public Sub-Sector	-	8.8	26.8	44.1	20.4

lower than most officials in the professionally oriented ministries (except Foreign Relations) but also stand considerably below many executives in the non-professionally oriented group. Of the latter group, only the Ministries of Government and Treasury rank lower than the Independent Public Sub-Sector. This finding reveals a situation quite different from the type of executive reported to be found in such civil-servant activities of Latin American governments.

Turning to the second element used as a measure of attainment,

TABLE 13
COMMERCIAL TRAINING OF EXECUTIVES

Ministry or Sector	Correspondence Courses or Institutes Taught	University Courses in Related
Foreign Relations	-	45-46
Development	20-26	26-5
Public Health	-	6-3
Education	12-6	-
Government	18-0	20-8
Justice	5-3	26-3
Tribunary	26-4	36-3
Agriculture	-	20-8
Labor	-	48-4
Water Management	8-7	25-8
Independent Public Sector	26-6	26-4

commercial training, it may be noted from Table 13 that the findings are inconclusive. Several factors were the data deficient. Substantial numbers of executives in most ministries and offices either had no such training or failed to respond to the question. Further, correspondence as such as element in commercial training could be an indication to areas where executives might have been need for such training. The data do not support clear conclusions. In regard to the third measure, other training in administration or management, essentially the same results

TABLE 14

TRENDS TRAINING IN ADMINISTRATION OR MANAGEMENT

Ministry or Sector	Training of 3 months or more	University Courses in Administration or Management	University Political Science Courses	Other
Foreign Relations	5.25	-	26.25	9.15
Development	25.8	4.75	-	16.5
Public Health	8.3	25.0	-	8.3
Education	8.3	18.4	8.3	-
Government	20.8	-	20.8	-
Justice	-	5.3	21.1	26.7
Treasury	21.3	5.3	26.7	-
Agriculture	23.8	12.0	4.8	8.0
Labor	22.3	11.1	16.3	-
Public Management	21.1	22.0	-	8.9
Independent Public Sub-Sector	25.4	22.5	3.8	15.9

are entered in Table 14. The data do not permit adequate testing of the sub-hypothesis in this respect.

One further measure of qualifications is the extent of knowledge and command of languages. Questions relating to linguistic knowledge were included in the questionnaire not only to provide a measure of education but also to determine the numbers of executives capable of communicating in the indigenous languages of Peru. Because a very large

TABLE 15

DIVERSIFIED RECEIPTS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Agency or Sector	Spends Only (1)	Receipts in Agency (2)	Spends on foreign affairs other than European (3)	Receipts from non-European (4)	Spends on European (5)	Receipts from European (6)	Surplus plus deficit (7)
Foreign Relations	-	-	5.28	-	31.88	19.138	8.25
Development	13.35	8.78	53.2	-	35.8	-	-
Public Health	18.7	18.0	25.0	8.26	41.4	18.2	8.2
Education	8.0	18.34	23.0	6.3	35.8	-	-
Conservation	54.0	-	26.0	-	35.8	-	-
Justice	26.0	15.7 (11.4)	34.8	15.7	51.5	-	-
Treasury	26.0	-	41.0	-	34.2	-	-
Agriculture	-	20.0 (4.0)	26.0	4.0	32.8	-	-
Other	58.8	111.1	64.4	11.1	51.5	-	-
Agency Management	26.8	41.0 (4.0)	61.0	4.0	37.2	-	-
Indeterminate Public Sub-Sector	5.0	111.1	55.6	11.7	34.8	-	-

Percentages in parentheses in this column are included in Column 4. Percentages in parentheses in this column are included in Column 5.

majority of the Peruvian Indian population speaks only Quechua or Aymara. It is important to know what barriers to direct communication exist in the bureaucracy and among the bureaucrats.

Table 13 indicates the proportion of executives who have a reading or speaking command of various languages. Several features stand out in the data. "It is apparent that very few government executives at this level have a command of Peru's indigenous languages, Quechua and Aymara. Those executives who do communicate with such ability, are being the strategic Ministry of Government. This same ministry also has the highest proportion of executives (50 per cent) who speak only Spanish." In general, executives of the professionally oriented or foreign-oriented ministries exhibit the most extensive language capability. This is not, however, a strong tendency, and as many restrictions exist that it is not feasible to assert that the hypothesis is sustained definitely.

Career Lives of Peruvian Executives

Career studies.—As part of the analysis, the main career routes of Peruvian bureaucrats were considered in an effort to determine patterns of movement in and out of occupations of different status, although an executive's birthplace, his geographic origin, his education, and other factors are strongly determinative of his career, much more depends on his performance when he becomes self-supporting.

Almost exactly the same proportion of Peruvian under executives that Walter Ford saw among American Federal executives -- those besides -- begin their careers in one of the professions or in a white-collar job. But in Peru, unlike elsewhere from the United States, only

1.1 per cent started as lecturers. Just over 8 per cent began their careers in the armed forces.

When the professions are considered in detail, as in Table 17, it can be seen that engineering and the law, with 38 per cent and 26 per cent respectively, lead by far in the numbers of executives who chose these professions. ¹⁷ Similar proportions followed the professions of teaching and accounting, with 11.5 per cent of the executives beginning in both these fields. Medicine attracted 4.2 per cent of the officials as their first occupation.

Proportions of executives in the professions, as may be seen in Table 18, remained very stable for the first ten years of their careers. Fifteen years later, however, the professions exhibited a large decrease, from 44.4 per cent to 36.4 per cent. The decrease may be explained by a corresponding increase in the proportion of major executives during the same period, from 5.1 per cent to 23.3 per cent. The questionnaire asked the executives to indicate their principal occupation at four time periods, and apparently many considered their responsibilities as major executives to outweigh their professional role.

In terms of content in and out of occupations, there are many indications of transition. ¹⁸ We find a steady decrease in proportion of white-collar workers, from a high of 27.8 per cent in the first occupation to only 3.3 per cent fifteen years later. ¹⁹ There is an increase of minor executives at the five and ten year stages, then a sharp decrease at fifteen years. ²⁰ Movement of professional non executives principally of females is explained and largely over the fifteen year period, most of them are apparently then considering themselves as major executives.

TABLE 30

CAREER SEQUENCE OF SENIOR PUBLIC-SECTOR GOVERNANCE EXECUTIVES

Description of Executive	First Decade 1950-1959	Five Years Later	Ten Years Later	Fifteen Years Later
Laborer	11.18	-	-	-
White-collar worker	27.8	18.58	7.48	3.28
Minor executive	6.3	18.5	18.5	8.8
Major executive	1.1	3.4	9.1	15.3
Business owner	8.8	8.4	6.6	3.1
Professional man	46.0	46.6	46.6	36.4
Unpaid forces	6.3	5.1	3.7	4.5
Other	1.1	2.6	1.1	6.6
No answer	3.8	10.4	13.1	21.9

Number of organizations.—Considerable variation was revealed among different types of executives in the number of organizations (government or private) in which they served. As may be seen in Table 18, sub-directors are least likely, though not strongly so, to come between organizations. About 35 per cent of the sub-director group has served in only one organization. Although 75 per cent of all senior executives are likely to have served in three or less organizations, the executives in the independent public sub-sector show somewhat greater propensity toward inter-organizational movement. Only 16.7 per cent have served in three or less organizations. But almost 75 per cent of them may have served in four or less, and relatively small numbers

TABLE 17

CAREER SOURCE OF SENIOR EXECUTIVES, THE
FEDERATION OF PERU

Profession	First Occupation	Five Years Later	Ten Years Later	Fifteen Years Later
Engineer	28.25	22.55	26.05	25.75
Medical doctor	6.5	7.5	11.5	10.5
Banker	-	-	-	-
Lawyer	24.7	23.5	22.7	27.2
Scientist	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
School teacher	13.1	11.5	5.5	5.5
Architect	-	3.5	3.5	-
Professor	3.5	3.5	4.5	3.5
Accountant	13.1	5.5	13.5	13.5
Other	5.5	12.5	13.5	14.1
Total persons	50	52	52	54

are inclined to move very often.

Comparison of interorganizational mobility in Rostow's United States study¹⁷ and the data on Peruvian executives show American federal executives much more inclined toward movement. Furthermore, American executives are about as likely to make two or five moves as one or ten. Among Peruvian executives, after the third organization there is

¹⁷ The American Federal Executive, p. 176.

TABLE 12

NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS JOINING EXECUTIVES' PARTIES

Number of Organizations	All Executive Executives	Non- Executive	Sub- Executive	Integrated Executive	Executive Management
1	27.33	28.28	34.42	11.33	25.28
2	22.2	22.9	18.4	24.5	24.5
3	20.5	19.8	22.9	17.5	22.2
4	9.5	7.8	4.5	20.5	15.2
5	7.5	8.2	14.9	8.5	1.1
6	4.5	5.2	2.2	5.5	-
7	1.1	1.2	-	2.5	1.1
8	1.7	2.2	-	2.5	-
More than 8	2.2	2.2	2.2	-	1.1
No answer or unknown - not listed	4.5	4.5	2.2	5.5	21.1

is marked down in volatility. Mexican government executives appear to be much more likely than their American counterparts to decide to join organizations.

Stability of Political Recruitment Strategies

The hypothetical interest.—Instability is virtually an essential feature associated with dissolution of Latin American governments. A long record of non-en-blocback, coup d'état, frequent revisions of constitutions, and governmental turnovers naturally suggests that public administration would be characterized by such instability and job

stability. As it was indicated in Chapter I, only are the studies which concern with stability; few if any, however, have offered any indication of such assumptions.

For this reason, one of the principal aims of interest in the Foreign Service was a study of stability in the upper levels of the Foreign bureaucracy. Two hypotheses were formulated as from part of the research upon the matter of stability. Hypothesis 1-2 stated that personnel stability varies according to the character and orientation of ministries. Further, it was hypothesized that stability will be higher in foreign-oriented ministries and in professionally oriented ministries, and will be lower in ministries and agencies engaged in programs of high national priority or in programs of a highly controversial nature. Hypothesis 1-3 stated that personnel stability varies in direct relation to ministerial stability.

In fact, each of these hypotheses in the research, the actual record of personnel turnover was studied for each ministry. The author was fortunate in being able to obtain quite complete records of personnel changes for most ministries. In others, the data are somewhat fragmentary.

The findings, of especial interest in this aspect of the research was the idea that changes in government, particularly extra-constitutional changes, bring about wholesale turnover of personnel. Is this idea a myth? Various contradictory remarks offer hints that it might be less than completely true. For example, one Foreigner expressed the belief that every time the government changes, the public service is swept clean. Yet, immediately following that statement, he volunteered that his cousin, who had served 30 years in a ministry, should be of

assistance in explaining ministerial organization.

Other fragments of the "debates" were equally revealing. For example, a *dicke*, or saying, holds that "el puesto de director es por poco tiempo y nada por siempre" (the job of director is brief for today and nothing for tomorrow). The *dicke* conveys a belief that the posts of directors and sub-directors are ones of great transiency, that change with changes in the government. Other posts subordinate to this level do not seem to be affected so strongly (at least according to the *dicke*) by this tenet of transiency.

The same pattern also held this explanation also indicated that the Bolivian government had not replaced officials in the customary manner, but only replacements only in critical positions where the success of its program depended upon the loyalty of party sympathizers.

Thus, from the newspaper-less newspaper data on all civilian ministries except the Ministries of Public Health and Public Education, and limited data on these two ministries, executive stability was ascertained. Because the data are considered to be somewhat unique, they are presented in considerable detail in Tables IX and X. The analysis covers the period extending from the change of government in July, 1966, upon the inauguration of President Manuel José Uscátegui, through the extra-constitutional government of the Military Junta (1968-69), to the administration of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry as of March, 1969 (for March-April and June, 1969 (for ministers)).

Several factors should be kept in mind in interpretation of the data in Tables IX and X. The government of Manuel Uscátegui was ousted by the coup d'état of July 18, 1968. However, because the crisis took place shortly before the normal time for completion of the term of

office, there was no political alternation of ministerial tenure in the Franks administration. Terms of office during the one-party administration of the military junta government reflect that short period. Finally, data on the Brindley administration are derived from the period dating from the inauguration in July, 1963 through June, 1965.

It should be recognized also that the period from 1956 to 1965, generally speaking, was one of constitutional government except for the interregnum rule of the military junta. Because of this, it is entirely possible that no fundamental changes occurred during the period, changes such as might be expected before 1956 or in the period 1946-1956. Nevertheless, substantiation of the absence of significant movement in and out of the civil service from 1956 to 1965 would be an important finding in itself. Such a finding would indicate a tendency toward better job security in the public service and greater stability in the government in general.

Findings on stability --In Table 18, data on stability of ministers of the Peruvian government during three administrations are presented. The data are arranged according to ministry and time period. For each ministry and time period, the average length of ministerial service was computed. In relating these findings to hypothesis H-2, ✓ it will be recalled that in Chapter II, four ministries -- Development, Public Health, Education, and Foreign Relations -- were classified as "institutionally oriented." It can be seen from Table 18 that hypothesis H-2 is confirmed only partially by the data. The Ministry of Foreign Relations was found to possess the highest stability of ministers, with an average length of service of ministers equalling 12.6 months during the Franks administration, 12 months during the military junta,

TABLE 14

BUDGETARY STABILITY IN PERU: 1954-1963

Ministry	Average Length of Service (in Administration of):		
	General People's Republic ^a 1955-1962	Revolutionary Junta 1962-1965	President Velasco's Cabinet 1963-on to June, 1968 ^b
Foreign Relations	(40) ^c 17.8 mos.	(12) 12 mos.	(31) 24.0 mos.
Government	(44) 17.5	(10) 4	(2) 8.0
Justice	(44) 11.3	(11) 12	(2) 7.0
Treasury	(31) 6.5	(10) 4	(3) 12.0
Development	(32) 13.7	(11) 12	(4) 8.0
Agriculture	(32) 14.4	(10) 4	(3) 7.7
Education	(32) 16.8	(11) 12	(3) 11.0
Public Health	(32) 12.0	(11) 12	(1) 20.0
Labor	(32) 15.7	(11) 12	(2) 11.5

^aOverthrown by military coup d'état in July, 1962.^bData on Velasco's administration covers only the period from July 26, 1965, to June, 1968, the cut-off date of the study. The one-plus month change in September, 1963, is not reflected.^cFigures in parentheses indicate the number of incumbents represented.

and 26 months during the early period of the Trudeau government. The Ministry of Public Education, third highest in stability during Frede's term, dropped to 11 months in Trudeau's administration. Stability in the Frede term for the other two ministries classified as professionally oriented, Development (12.7 months) and Public Health (12 months), did not sustain the hypothesis. In the Trudeau government, the Ministry of Development exhibits the worst stability -- four ministers in less than two years with an average tenure of only 5.8 months.

For the five ministries which were considered to be non-professionally oriented -- Government, Justice, Agriculture, Treasury, and Labor -- it was hypothesized that stability would be lower. A sub-hypothesis was developed on the assumption that the lowest stability would occur in connection with progress of a controversial nature. In the latter instance, the main focus of interest was the Ministry of Agriculture, center of activity in the Canadian agricultural reform program.

Again, the data relating to these five ministries are inconclusive as to the extent that an clear pattern of stability could be inferred. The Ministry of Development, for example, expanded to exhibit a very low stability, from the second highest stability -- 17.5 months -- during the Frede administration. The Ministry of Agriculture, rather than being lowest, possessed one of the longer average lengths of service -- 14.4 months -- under Frede. Ranking lowest in stability during the Frede government was the Ministry of Treasury with 5 months average service among ministers in that portfolio.

When stability of the nonprofessionally oriented ministries during the Trudeau administration is considered, the hypothesized

TABLE 20

NUMBERS OF SECTIONS OF SERVICE ORIGINATING AGENCIES

Category	Percentage according to Number of Years of Service									
	Under 1 Year		1 - 3 Years		3 - 5 Years		5 - 7 Years		Over 7 Years	
	Part ^a	Percent ^b	Part	Percent	Part	Percent	Part	Percent	Part	Percent
Foreign Relations	8.7	26.6	26.4	8.7	4.3	13.3	20.8	-	10.8	-
Development ^c	16.2	5.7	7.7	15.4	18.3	3.8	-	3.8	7.7	15.4
Public Health				Detailed data not available						
Education				Detailed data not available						
Conservation	45.3	3.8	22.4	13.8	8.4	-	8.1	1.3	1.3	-
Justice	-	4.8	48.3	14.3	14.3	4.8	-	-	8.8	4.8
Treasury	-	-	4.8	15.3	-	9.5	4.8	4.8	15.8	15.3
Agriculture	3.8	13.8	35.7	14.5	5.4	5.4	8.3	-	15.8	3.8
Labor	7.1	-	31.4	35.7	7.3	-	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.1

^aValues listed here^c include divisions serving during the period 1934-1935 but not those in position as of March, 1935.

^bValues listed "Percent" include divisions in position as of March, 1935.

^cIn eight cases, length of service is given; that indicated. Records available indicated beginning of service as "before 1934."

results are substantiated more clearly. In general, stability of these ministers under Belaunde is significantly lower than that in the professionally oriented ministries, and even lower than stability in the non-ministries under Peron. The fact that Belaunde had not completed his term does not alter the trend toward lower stability. Indeed, judged by the record to the date of the study, it appears that the Belaunde administration may establish a very low overall stability rate.

However, despite the substantiation provided the hypothesis in this instance, it must be recalled that the hypotheses relating to the stability of ministers are not, in general, fully sustained. It cannot be stated firmly from the presently available evidence that the professional character of the minister necessarily determines ministerial stability.

Continuing the consideration of stability of other executives, it was hypothesized that stability of executives also would vary according to the character of the ministry, and furthermore that executive stability would vary in direct relation to ministerial stability. In Table 20, data are presented for executives in the civilian ministries except the Minister of Agriculture and Public Health. Looking at the professionally oriented ministries, it is apparent that length of service of executives in the Ministry of Foreign Relations tends to be short. Over 75 per cent of these executives had served for less than one year. In the Ministry of Development, half the executives had served more than three years in the same position, and 33.3 per cent over seven years. The overall pattern of lengths of service makes it impossible to generalize extensively; however, the Ministry of Development does exhibit fairly high stability.

Of the non-professionally oriented ministries, Government and

TABLE 20
AVERAGE AGE OF DIRECTIVES AND AVERAGE AGE
AT ENTRY INTO PUBLIC SERVICE

Ministry or Sector	Average Age	Average Age at Entry
Government	54.8	18.4
Foreign Relations	50.6	20.0
Justice	44.2	23.9
Labour	49.7	20.3
Education	45.1	23.3
Treasury	49.7	22.0
Development	52.3	21.3
Public Health	49.7	24.3
Agriculture	45.7	24.8
Parliamentary offices	39.2	20.6
Public management	35.6	23.2
Independent Public Sub-Sector	43.5	26.1
Overall average	47.4	24.0

Police has the lowest stability. Nearly 50 per cent of its directors had terms of less than three years. About 28 per cent served less than a year. The Ministries of Justice and Labour had 67.1 and 64.2 per cent, respectively, of their executives serving less than three years in position. In general, these ministries show lower stability than the professionally oriented ministries. However, these differences do not

maintain conclusively the hypothesis.

One further perspective of executive stability in the Peruvian government bureaucracy is afforded by the data in Table 25. The respondents were asked to indicate the number of times their careers had been interrupted. "It is apparent from Table 25 that a very low average rate of career breaks exists in general. The average executive reported 0.8 career interruptions, the responses ranging from 1.2 breaks in the Ministry of Labor to 0.2 breaks in the Ministry of Government and being stable management officials. "The data appear to indicate a quite high degree of job stability among these executives. "It should be noted, nevertheless, that there is not necessarily a close correlation between length of total service and length of service as a director. "A rapid turnover at the High Director level occasionally could coincide with relatively long total service.

Relation of executive and ministerial stability. --Turning to the other aspect, Hypothesis H-3 predicted a direct relationship between executive stability and stability of ministers. "This hypothesis was not sustained. One of the ministries least stable in regards to ministers -- Development -- is among the most stable in regards to executives. The Ministry of Treasury shows much the same relationship. Indeed, all ministerial except Government are seen to have fairly large proportions of their executives remaining in their positions for over three years.

"Thus, a reasonably large stable corps of executives enables in each ministry to serve as nuclei for continuity. One is reminded of Diamond's study of the French administrative system, which continued to function even in the absence of political structure.²⁰ Perhaps somewhat

²⁰Michael Diamond, "The French Administrative System: The Bureaucratic Prince and the Administrative Revolution."

TABLE 22

CAREER INTERRUPTIONS AND LENGTH OF SERVICE OF EXCULSION

Majority of Sector	Average Number of Career Interruptions	Average Length of Service ^a	Average Time in Job ^b
Foreign Relations	0.6 per person	20.6 years	3.8 years
Development	1.2	25.0	6.4
Public Health	1.2	22.7	5.3
Education	0.5	22.8	2.1
Government	0.2	26.0	2.7
Justice	0.4	20.3	3.8
Treasury	0.4	26.1	4.8
Agriculture	0.4	19.5	3.3
Labour	1.2	24.4	6.5
Public Management	0.3	24.4	2.5
Independent Public Sub-Sector	0.4	23.9	4.8
Overall average	0.6 per person	24.2 years	4.2 years

^aComputed from average age of recruitment and average ages at entry into the public service. Does not reflect career interruptions. See Table 21.

^bComputed from ages at commencement of present job and present ages. Does not reflect career interruptions.

The same continuity is provided by a core of administrators in the Peruvian governmental system. There are, of course, instances of "house-cleaning" for political purposes.²³ In general, the data seem to indicate that it is not entirely accurate to consider Peru's administrative system highly unstable. At best, however, results of the research to date are not conclusive. Many unanswered questions remain to be studied. One of the more basic questions is what constitutes the ideal stability. The criteria of normal rotation in posts, such as that occurring in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, need further research. More detailed research, with rigorous control of pertinent variables, might reveal much more about bureaucratic stability in the Latin American environment.

Summary—In this chapter, an attempt has been made to formulate a more accurate profile of the senior executives of the Peruvian government. Starting the work was a set of hypotheses designed to promote more rigorous analysis. Each hypothesis involved tests based on the empirical data developed during the study.

The author reexamines closely the cumulative results of some of these tests. Part of the problem possibly stems from inadequate identification of pertinent independent variables. But there has been no searching of hypotheses to fit the results. What has been achieved constitutes considerably a subject which previously was perceived very dimly.

The research showed that the dominant control region of Peru provides governmental executives not in proportion to its population. Most of the executives appear quite likely to remain in their area of birth to follow their careers. The executive group is strongly native Peruvian, although the foreign-born are overrepresented in the government.

²³For example, because of the Minister of Public Education, Francisco Miró Quesada, in October, 1964, was accompanied by his firing of a large number of officials, mostly of the opposition party, before his own fall. La Prensa, Lima, October 4, 1964, p. 1.

Previously all the senior executives had at least some college training and nearly three-fourths are college graduates. In terms of education, the Farabos executive stands far above most of the rest of society. There is a persistence of traditional specialization in the law, but increasing emphasis goes to engineering and other applied fields. Persistence of the professionally oriented ministries tend to show higher educational attainments, but not in marked degree.

Most of the executives began their careers in a profession or in a white-collar job. The leading careers are the professions, engineering, and the law.

In general, the professional character of ministries does not appear to determine stability of ministries. Neither does there appear to be a direct relationship between executive stability and stability of ministries.

However, the profiles shown in this chapter offer only one perspective of these government officials. Each date, although revealing a great deal about who the executives are and how they achieved their positions, are not complete without knowledge of their family backgrounds. In the next chapter, the findings relating to families are discussed.

CHAPTER IV

THE FAMILIES OF PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES

In the preceding chapter, the executives were discussed in terms of their own characteristics, such as geographic origin, education, and career patterns. But for a deeper understanding of the process of social change occurring in Peru and of the potential effects of this on the government bureaucracy, it is necessary to delve further into the family backgrounds of the executives.

The Importance of Family Data

In an undivided society such as the Peruvian, characterized by various cultural dichotomies, and generally described as a fairly rigidly stratified social system,¹ the question of family influence assumes much importance. We are considering the socio-economic representativeness of the senior administrative leaders of the Peruvian government, that is, the proportions in which they are derived from fathers of various occupational categories. It is crucial that we attempt to understand the degree of "elitism" which characterizes the group. Are the upper levels of the bureaucracy monopolized by certain occupational strata of society and by sons of certain types of white families? What opportunities exist for

¹For example, by Allan R. Hirsch, "Changing Community Attitudes and Values in Peru: A Case Study in Cultural Change," Social Change in Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy, ed. Richard B. Adams (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 25; M. J. Dunn, Peru (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 52-73; and Karl A. Folsom and David S. Foran, Evolution of Society: Origins of Latin American Government and Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 44-55.

rate of fathers in lower manual occupations? These are some of the questions to which the following analysis is pointed.

The questionnaire by which data were obtained on occupational backgrounds of the executives and their families followed fairly closely that of Warner's study of American federal executives. Some of the modifications which were necessary to adapt the instrument to the Peruvian environment were discussed in Chapter I.

Parents of Executives

For a broad picture of the parental backgrounds of the major executives and the middle management group, Table II is presented according to a seven-fold division of major occupations. These seven major categories are detailed in twenty-four groups.

The laboring occupations.--A significant difference emerges immediately when the parental occupational categories of Peruvian executives are compared with those of American federal executives. Only 1.3 per cent of all senior executives are from the laboring class; the highest percentage is found among sub-directors with 4.3 per cent from this occupational background. The middle management group includes 3.3 per cent descended from laborers. All groups are markedly lower than the 21 per cent of laborers' sons which Warner found among American federal executives. Strong suggestions can be seen here of less social ascent of laborer classes in Peruvian society. The smallest proportion of Peruvian executives is from the laborer classes.

Turning to the other extremes, the largest group of senior executives descends from professional men (30.3 per cent). Professionals are followed in order by farmers (14.8 per cent), business men, executives,

TABLE 20

SCOURING OF EXPEND OF CONSUMERS EXPENDITURE^a

Occupation	All Other Expenditures	Expenditures	Sub- Expenditures	Independent Expenditures	Expenditures Management
Liberal	1.12	-	1.12	-	1.12
Artistic Student	-	-	-	-	1.12
	1.1	-	1.1	-	-
Real-estate worker	9.7 (6.4)	6.3 (6.3)	55.8 (8.7)	12.8 (3.0)	6.7 (4.4)
Class Business Office worker	8.4 8.4 8.5 (6.8)	- 1.2 9.7 (6.2)	- - 50.8 (8.7)	2.8 - 8.8 (3.0)	1.7 (2.2) 4.4 (3.5)
Executive	13.5 (5.0)	13.4 (7.2)	52.8 (4.2)	16.7 (3.6)	13.8 (3.4)
More executive worker executive	7.4 (6.0) 5.1 (3.2)	8.0 (4.2) 6.5 (6.1)	8.7 (4.2) 4.8	8.8 5.3 (3.0)	11.1 (3.4) 5.2
Executive owner	12.1	14.6	8.7	14.7	10.5 (3.2)
Small business Business business Large business	9.1 1.7 2.2	8.9 8.1 8.1	8.7 - -	11.8 - 2.8	15.8 (3.4) 5.8 5.3

TABLE 15.6—(Continued)

Occupations	all female managers	Directors	Sub- Directors	Independent Director Directors	all male managers
Professional					
Engineer	20.7 (18.3)	31.3 (11.4)	30.4 (11.4)	30.4 (30.7)	30.8 (24.2)
Architect/Engineer	3.7 (26.2)	4.8 (49.2)	4.3 (49.2)	3.3	3.3
Lawyer	21.1 (26.4)	4.3 (24.2)	30.8 (4.2)	-	-
Teacher	13.8 (24.2)	13.5 (13.5)	30.8 (4.2)	4.8 (2.3)	2.3 (2.3)
Artist	3.2 (1.4)	2.1 (21.1)	-	4.3 (2.3)	4.7 (4.7)
Accountant	3.1 (1.1)	-	-	2.3 (2.3)	-
Other	4.0 (1.8)	4.3	3.3 (4.3)	3.3 (2.3)	4.4 (3.3)
	6.4	1.3	-	-	4.3 (3.3)
Female	14.8 (16.4)	13.5 (4.3)	31.7 (4.2)	31.8	13.3 (3.3)
Director	13.8 (21.8)	9.4 (4.3)	13.8 (21.2)	31.8	11.1 (2.3)
Other	3.3 (26.2)	3.3	3.3 (26.2)	-	3.3
Other occupations	13.2 (21.1)	13.4 (13.4)	4.3 (4.3)	31.8 (13.4)	30.8 (13.4)
Food Service	3.2 (3.2)	13.3 (13.3)	4.3 (4.3)	3.3 (3.3)	4.3 (3.3)
Other	4.0 (4.0)	3.3	3.3	3.3 (3.3)	11.1 (4.4)
Male	3.7	4.3	4.3	3.3	4.4
Total	20.8 (44.2)	30.8 (41.3)	13.5 (40.2)	13.5 (35.2)	100.8 (40.2)

*Percentages in parentheses indicate percentages of fathers in the public sector.

"other occupations" (12.5 per cent), of which the armed forces contribute 8.5 per cent, and white-collar workers.¹ The proportion of fathers in the professional category is roughly equal for all of the executive groups (approximately 28 per cent) except for the stable management group, where fathers in the professional grouping occur among only 22 per cent of the group.

Education in the stable management group.--This substantial difference suggests a higher degree of social mobility among this group, and some junior group of government officials. As other occupational origins are compared, consideration shall be given to the extent to which hypothesis 8-4 is sustained. It was hypothesized in Chapter II that there is a direct correlation between age and social mobility of executives in the Peruvian government, and that social mobility is highest in lower age groups. The hypothesis was based on the assumption that Peru is a transitional country, with the implication that younger age groups (in this case the stable management group) would demonstrate a greater social mobility, commensurate with the accelerating trend toward modernity. Social mobility is defined as movement to a higher socio-economic category than father to son.

The stable management group draws considerably more (90 per cent) from the business owner family than do the senior executives (only 14.1 per cent). Likewise, many more stable management personnel are derived from fathers in "other occupations" (28 per cent), with the armed forces contributing some 8 per cent. Sons of government workers make up 42.5 per cent of this segment.

Fathers in the stable section.--One of the surprising aspects of family background for all four executive groups is the very large

proportion of these executives with fathers who were employed in the public service. These proportions range from 45.8 per cent of directors' fathers to 26.3 per cent of the fathers of independent sector executives. In Table 23, the percentages of fathers employed in the government service are shown in parentheses. A comparison of these data with the background data for American federal executives² shows that a really larger proportion of Peruvian government executives had fathers employed in the public service. There is a very strong propensity for the sons of government personnel to follow their fathers' footsteps and pursue a public career. As might be expected, this tendency is most pronounced among sons of white-collar workers, with about two-thirds of that group having fathers in the public service. Roughly two-thirds of the fathers who were professionals were also government workers.

A question which indeed definitely concerns the subject of nepotism in the Peruvian bureaucracy. If the bureaucracy approached Riggs' role model in this respect, strong indications of nepotism would be present. To gain some appreciation of nepotistic tendencies, the questionnaire asked the executives if their fathers worked in the same ministry as themselves. The response indicates strongly that few fathers and sons have or had employment with the same ministry. Of those executives who answered the question previously, over 85 per cent do not work in the ministry in which their fathers are or were employed. Another question can be found as yet, however, government service appears to reflect a sort of family tradition which is strongly determinative of the son's

² Bureau, et al., pp. 28-29

choice of a career.³

Another substantial and important difference between American and Peruvian executives is suggested by the relative proportions of executives whose fathers were in the armed forces. Warner found only 0.7 per cent of U. S. industrial executives from military families,⁴ a much higher portion of similar Peruvian executives -- 8.5 per cent -- comes from a military background. This evidence tends to substantiate speculations, such as Kling's, Ballinger's, and others,⁵ that the military in some parts of Latin America offers one of the few open routes for upward social mobility in a relatively hostile social environment. For the group of officers, the representation of the military is even greater, reaching 12.8 per cent. The smallest number of executives from military families is found among the independent sector group, where only 2.8 per cent have military fathers.⁶ The data here suggest, in part, that perhaps a father's military career has opened new paths of upward social mobility for the son.

One further important difference between American and Peruvian executives concerns the representation of officials having been fathers in the professions.⁷ The American Federal Executive⁸ indicates that 18 per cent of American executives come from families of professionals.

³It will be seen in Chapter V below how the motivation of "classic executives" corroborates this.

⁴Walter Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Instability in Latin America," Western Political Science, 18 March, 1954, 71-86; L. B. Ballinger, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," Journal of Inter-American Studies, III (July, 1961), 340-358; Walter Kling, Army and Politics in Latin America (New York: New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), Ch. 5 and passim; and Robert J. Alexander, "The Army in Politics," Governments and Politics in Latin America, ed. Harold A. Davis (New York: The Knopf Press Co., 1954), pp. 123-124.

⁵Warner, op. cit., p. 29.

In Peru, it was found that 26 per cent of the senior executives came from families in the professional class. Approximately the same percentage holds for directors, sub-directors, and independent sector executives, although the middle management group includes only 20 per cent in this respect. Another instance of strong difference is seen in the representation of legal backgrounds. Nearly 12 per cent of all senior executives had legal training. Again, in the case of middle management, the situation is different -- only 2.2 per cent of this group has such antecedents. An interesting question arises in view of such differences. How have middle management people reached their upper limit of achievement in the bureaucracy or do they herald significant changes in types of personnel and patterns of mobility in the Peruvian government? At this stage, the evidence does not offer an answer; however, a long-term study might reveal important trends in mobility in the Peruvian society.

Differences in the Peruvian population.--Comparisons of these proportions with those of the general population are difficult because available statistics from Peru provide only broad estimates of employment by industry and occupation and census data reflect only the economically active population in broad economic sectors, such as agriculture, mining, service, etc. Such categories do not permit comparison with the detailed occupational data presented in Table 23.

However, some clues or suggestions for comparison may be obtained from consideration of the results of a 1942 survey of occupational distribution in the Lima-Callao area, covering 408 manufacturing establishments. The survey indicated the following distribution of occupations. It can be appreciated from this report that features of the executive group of the present study differ radically in their occupational

TABLE 24

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION IN LIMBO-CALLO INDUSTRIES, 1943

Occupation	Per Cent
Administrators	5.2
Professionals, technicians, and engineers	3.4
Office workers and workers in related occupations	13.7
Foremen, supervisors, and personnel in similar occupations	3.4
Skilled and semi-skilled workers	55.9
Unskilled workers	54.7
Apprentices	7.3

Source: Prof. Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Indígenas, Informe sobre la Participación del Ministerio de Trabajo en el Desarrollo Económico y Social del Perú (Lima: October, 1943), p. 5, as quoted in U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor in Peru, BLS Report No. 282 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 37.

distribution from the population considered in the report. Altogether, 76.4 per cent of the 28,718 persons surveyed fell in the laborer class.

Such evidence suggests that the social variations of the Peruvian government, and the middle management group as well, are far from being representative measures of Peruvian society. Such a finding was not unexpected. However, it assumes greater significance when compared with Warner's findings in this respect. The American study showed that a large portion of the American executives came from laborers' families (31 per cent),

as compared with 48 per cent of the United States adult male population in 1930.⁶ Only 1.1 per cent of the Peruvian senior executives have Indian fathers, and as indicated by the study which was quoted above, a very high percentage of the whole population is of the Indian stock. "The disparity, or 'unrepresentativeness,' of Peruvian private and executive class is evidently more apparent than that of American Federal executives."

The Third Generation

From the third generation to the second.—To this point the consideration of family influence on government executives was concerned only with the generation. The executive groups have been assigned by occupational distributions of the fathers -- the second generation only. As Warner points out,⁷ occupational mobility may take longer than the generation, and for this reason a more encompassing study is required to determine family influence. If such evidence of occupational mobility be apparent in the United States society, there is every reason to expect less and slower mobility in Peruvian society, where numerous factors operate against fluid movement.

The purpose of Table B is to indicate the nature of occupational mobility from the third generation to the second. Much the same approach as that used by Warner in the United States was used for the Peruvian executives. In order to derive as much insight as possible from the data concerning Peruvian military men, this category was added to the

⁶ Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 71.

list of grandfathers' occupations as used by Kerner.⁸ Although all the occupational categories used elsewhere are not included in Table 26, it is apparent that there have been major overall shifts in occupations between the two generations. Furthermore, occupational continuity within the same family shows significant breaks.

To portray the latter point more clearly, a different approach from that in Kerner's study was used. In the American study, ratios of continuity were calculated using the proportion of fathers in each occupation and the proportion of grandfathers in the same occupation.⁹ This approach is considered deficient in that it fails to show changes within families. Changes in occupations of a particular individual's forebears could easily be concealed through the use of such overall ratios. Therefore, in Table 26, the proportions shown in the third right column represent the percentages of individuals whose fathers and grandfathers had the same occupations.

The results are quite surprising. Outstanding are the major declines in fathers following the farming occupations and a corresponding increase of fathers in the professions.¹⁰ Of the grandfathers of senior executives 25.6 per cent were farmers but only 14.8 per cent of their fathers farmed.¹¹ The change in forebears of middle management officials is even steeper, declining from 37.8 per cent farmers to 12.3 per cent over the two-generation period. Major shifts were into the professional fields and into business.

When the occupational continuity of the forebears of individuals

⁸ Ibid., Table 8, p. 74.

⁹ Ibid., Table 12, p. 82.

is considered, it becomes apparent that father and grandfather were in the same occupation for very few of the executives. The highest continuity is found among senior executives' business who were professional men, where 34.3 per cent of fathers and grandfathers followed the same occupation. The next highest continuity is among farmers. In all cases, however, for both senior executives and middle management, the rate of occupational continuity is surprisingly low. This low continuity appears to indicate a society tending towards rather significant changes in family traditions, occupational choices, and direction of development.¹² The very low continuity in the occupations of the families of middle management is one further substantiation of the hypothesis concerning higher social mobility among younger age groups in the bureaucracy.

Marriage and Fathers

Marriage and patrilty.--Barrow, in discussing the "kinship continuity and occupational mobility" of the middle class through, makes the point that a system of endogenous marriage is characteristic of a caste society.¹³ In such a situation, son and women (marrying outside control) would marry only at the levels of their occupational origin. Sons and daughters of business men, for example, would intermarry; there would be no "out-marriages."

The idea of endogenous marriage as an attribute of caste society seemed to offer possibilities for better insight into Purvian society. If it were determined that this type of marriage characterized the society of these bureaucratic nationalists, would this mean that the

¹² ibid., pp. 35-36.

possibility of mobility by marriage is illustrated. The degree of stability in marriages and the extent of exogenous marriages are vital to the detection and understanding of trends toward greater mobility in Peruvian society, at least among Peruvian government executives.

To arrive at this insight, a slightly different arrangement of data was used. The three groups for analysis are directors and sub-directors, independent sector executives, and public management. In Table 26, the principal question is: What percentage of external and paternal grandfathers were in each occupational? The comparison is between the mothers' fathers and fathers' fathers to determine the extent to which exogenous marriages are characteristic of the executives' families.

External and paternal occupational lines---In general, more significant differences appear between the mothers' and fathers' lines by occupational background than were evident in Myers's study. In all three executive groups, there is a close correspondence of percentages of families in maternal and paternal lines from the farming class and from the laborer class. But in the white-collar category for directors and sub-directors, the percentage for the mothers' fathers is double that of the fathers' fathers. In white-collar workers appear among public management fathers' fathers but 6.7 per cent are found in the maternal line. Substantial differences are found also in the lower official category, where maternal and paternal lines differ by a factor of two for the independent sector and public management. Other differences are readily apparent in Table 26.

Results of this aspect of the study were somewhat surprising. It had been expected that the society from which these Peruvian executives

Table 26

COMPARISON OF OCCUPATIONS OF FATHER'S, FATHER AND MOTHER'S FATHER

Occupations	Director's and Sub-Directors		Independent Sector Employees		State Employees	
	Father's Father	Mother's Father	Father's Father	Mother's Father	Father's Father	Mother's Father
Labourer	1.45	1.45	-	-	4.48	6.75
Farmer	26.4	55.5	26.28	26.28	27.8	18.5
White-collar worker	3.5	7.5	5.1	5.1	-	4.7
Major occupation	4.2	5.1	-	-	-	-
Minor occupation	2.5	4.2	2.5	2.5	4.4	2.2
Business owner	8.2	11.8	14.7	14.7	8.9	17.8
Professional and	23.2	25.7	6.8	6.8	25.0	23.2
Armed forces	7.7	4.5	5.5	5.5	8.5	4.5
Other occupations	5.7	1.4	2.5	2.5	2.2	8.7
No income	20.1	31.8	26.2	26.2	12.2	12.2

descended would be much more strongly independent than that of the United States. But the frequency of significant differences suggests a more fluid situation. These results may be partly due to the relatively small numbers involved in the study, making small differences in size (as well as in sex) significant when presented in relative form. It is also noteworthy that a larger-than-usual number of executives failed to respond to questions relating to family background. The missing data from these non-responders could be another factor introducing differences into the picture. However, if the American executives' background is judged on the basis of these data, it can be said that the two lines of descent are not nearly as similar and constant as those found in American Federal executives. Existing data on the middle management group to hypothesis 8-4 on social mobility, it can be said that even more substantial differences exist between the national and paternal lines for this group. But these data also should be interpreted with recognition of the small number of executives involved. In any case, the general results of these independent comparisons are the opposite from those expected. But the hypothesis relating to social mobility of middle management personnel is sustained.

The Role of Foreign Services

At the time of the research, 33.3 per cent of the American executives were married. In the different groups, the percentage of those who were married varied widely: from 2.5 per cent of the independent sector executives to 55.5 per cent of middle management. Because the data about spouses are overwhelmingly about wives -- only two of the executives are women -- the spouses will be referred to as the wife in the discussion.

Once again, as in the consideration of maternal and paternal occupational class, the main emphasis is on occupational association and stability. We are concerned with the social and economic backgrounds of the women married by the executives, who their fathers were, and what were their fathers' occupations. To what extent did these future leaders marry wives from their own occupational level?

Table 27 shows a χ^2 statistic decrease in all three groups from the percentages of mothers to wives who are farmers' daughters -- the same situation noted by Warner in the United States. This drop is offset somewhat for independent social sensitivity by the larger number of wives whose fathers were in the professional class (29.4 per cent) over mothers originating from that class (8.8 per cent). The same situation prevails, to a lesser extent, among the middle management group. It can be seen in Table 27 that mothers and wives of directors and sub-directors tend to have similar occupational backgrounds to a much larger extent than do the other executives' mothers and wives. This higher occupational stability would appear to provide further evidence indicating greater social stability in the younger age groups, as was hypothesized above. But again such judgments must be tempered by taking into account the limited size of the study group sample and the large percentage of executives who did not answer questions relating to family background.

Summary

In this chapter, the focus of interest was upon the families of the government executives and the degree of similarity which characterizes the group.

TABLE 21

OCCUPATIONAL ORIGIN OF THE EXTENDED¹ FATHERS AND MOTHERS

Occupations of Spouse's Father	Shareholders and Sub-Shareholders		Independent Sector Executives		Middle Management	
	Men	Wife	Men	Wife	Men	Wife
Doctor	1.4%	0.7%	-	-	0.7%	0.4%
Farmer	22.5	11.5	26.2%	5.3%	26.4	6.7
White-collar worker	7.5	9.5	5.9	14.7	6.7	6.4
Major executive	5.1	6.5	-	-	-	2.2
Minor executive	4.3	7.7	2.5	6.8	2.2	4.4
Business owner	11.2	14.8	14.7	14.7	17.2	8.5
Professional man	29.7	25.4	5.5	29.4	15.9	22.1
Military	6.2	2.5	12.5	5.9	4.4	6.7
Other	1.4	1.4	2.5	5.9	6.7	2.2
No answer	25.5	14.5	26.5	14.7	12.5	4.4
Unskilled occupations	7.0		2.5		25.5	

¹It was learned that, in general, Finnish government executives derive from a higher socio-economic level than American federal executives. Especially evident are the high representation of fathers in the professions, the large proportion of public service backgrounds, and the very low number from the laboring class. Further, a higher degree of social mobility was suggested for the middle management group.

Considering the third generation background, it was apparent that

major shifts have occurred between the third and second generations, and that occupational continuity within families shows significant breaks.

Study of maternal and paternal occupational lines suggests a more fluid situation than existed in the United States. The two lines of descent are not nearly so similar and consistent as expected.

Consideration of the wives of executives shows a large decrease of mothers to wives from fathers who were farmers and a larger number of wives whose fathers were in the professions.

In Chapter XII and IV, the research focused on the executives from the perspective of their own backgrounds and their families. But such data do not provide the executives' own conceptions and ideas about themselves and their careers. For that insight, the next stage of the research employed personal interviews.

In the following two chapters, attention is turned to the attitudes of foreign government executives as these were revealed by means of personal interviews.

CHAPTER V

THE PERUVIAN PARLADOL AND HIS JOB: AN INTERVIEW

The Analytical Approach

The interview phase--From the analysis of data on the group of Peruvian government executives, the student of Latin American public administration can discover much about the culture, the composition and structure, and the career paths of these strategically located officials. The sampling data have revealed most of the well hidden which the government officials of this Latin American nation operate. The main body of statistical data was derived from a cross-section of the highest level of civil service administration of the Peruvian central government and representative corporate activities in the Independent Public Sub-Sector.

But statistics derived from factual questionnaires such as those employed in this study, even when analyzed against the administrative and statistical statements, cannot reveal adequately how the bureaucrat perceives his role. For this type of insight into the world of the Peruvian government executives, the personal interview was used. To complement the statistical data, 10 per cent of the study group was selected for depth interviews. The purpose of these personal interviews was to probe attitudes and main expectations of civil servants and managers. Emphasis centered particularly on identifying the ideals and career ideas of the group, their image of themselves, and their values and aspirations.

Included in the sample of executives interviewed were officials in all the civil service activities and in four important activities in the

Independent Public Administration. About 60 per cent of the persons interviewed at the level of director, the rest were sub-directors or equivalent grades. Interviews were structured only to the extent necessary to cover in general the particular interests of this study and to supplement the specific data of the questionnaire. Each interview was developed and conducted as the situation seemed to demand. No notes were taken during the interviewing process, immediately after completion, results of the discussion were transcribed. No attempt was made to follow precisely an interview guide. Every effort was made in each interview to achieve rapport with the executives of the group so that the interview could proceed virtually as conversations. The use of open-end questions permitted much latitude in the development of the interview. In Appendix C is the interview guide which was followed generally.¹

Analysis of the interview results is presented in the form of a synthesis of attitudes and views which were revealed during the conversations. This synthesis is arranged to offer the provincial view of the group in regard to various important aspects of public administration and the civil service career -- motivation of the public servant, reward/punish, career satisfaction, and self-image.

Summary.--It was discovered, as the interviews progressed, that senior executives of the Province government demonstrate certain characteristics in a manner that suggests fairly clear-cut types. Even from the relatively small number of executives which were interviewed, it becomes obvious that it is difficult to generalize validly about the

¹A number of questions used in the Province study were adapted from Bergan's Cooperative study. See Herman Bergan, Intelligence and Initiative in Modern Bureaucracy: A Study of the Higher Civil Service.

Latin American government executives. In particular,² it was discovered that significant variation exists in the nature of motivation. At the same time, various features indicate the existence of patterns of motivation. As these trends began to repeat themselves with a larger number of interviews, several types of motivation emerged.

At this stage a terminology was considered which would facilitate the presentation of the findings and better illustrate variations among officials. For example, Freetham's hierarchical types -- the "upward-motives," the "indifferents," and "individuals" -- offered one possibility.³ Freetham had as a major objective to show how people accommodate themselves to the "unpleasant realities" of big organizations, and his typology describes these types of accommodation. The "upward-motives" represent those persons who find positively in the bureaucratic situation and remain in it. "Indifferents" are the uncommitted majority who view their jobs merely as means to obtain sufficient satisfactions. The "individuals" are the isolated, disturbed minority who want status and power but are not willing to play the disciplined role necessary to achieve these rewards.

Such a classification, although it might serve to certain purposes in categorizing the executives, does not capture the differences in objectives and motivation which are believed to exist. Although Freetham's typology describes well patterns of accommodation to bureaucracy, its further usefulness is limited. Thus, to illustrate these variations a typology was formulated and is used throughout this chapter to describe three types of executives.

²Robert Freetham, The Bureaucratic Society: An Analysis and a Theory (New York: Knopf, 1940), passim.

The three types are termed the classic executive, the grizzled, and the junior executive. No attempt will be made to define rigorously these three types of officials. However, the typology will be maintained in the discussion of various aspects of the government career. In this manner, characterizations appropriate to each type will emerge from the treatment of each aspect.

Definition of the Classic Executive

Definition of classic executive.—In terms of motivation, a number of senior executives were found for whom the public service signified virtually a calling. For these men, who are called classic executives, the public service is the natural thing to do. They look upon government service as essentially a duty deriving from their unique antecedents, and would find it strange to follow any other career. They are unashamedly proud to be civil servants, so that their careers become a way of life rather than mere jobs. They respect the high calling of public service and feel completely at home in the position.

One of these classic executives, who obviously practices his service with gusto, follows the public service as a family tradition to which he takes much pride. Son of an ex-minister of state who died in office while planning work of the transportation network of Peru, he developed a great love for the ministry for which he has worked over 30 years. It is his first love—for sentimental reasons, for the challenge it presents, for his belief in the work it does. Carrying on a long family tradition of government service, this classic executive has followed the high standards set by his forebears in government.

Others were found who fit the type of classic executive, such as a former diplomat who entered the public service on the recommendation

of friends and his family, which has a long history of public service. His motivation was fueled by the necessity of making several months in the beginning of his career self-sufficient, without pay, and by working extra hours to compensate for this taken to study for a law degree. Now, after 40 years of service, most of it abroad in the Peruvian diplomatic service, he maintains his enthusiasm, feels he has done his job well, and anticipates more years of service.

In the ranks of all the officials classified as clerical career there, a striking aspect was an obvious love of Peru as their country, a deep desire to serve and a strong sense of duty to the nation and a feeling of responsibility to represent the government and the public service well.

Selection of recruits.--Motivation of the executives which are called grupos is in a number of cases similar to that of the clerical executives. The term recruits is used to designate officials who entered the public service especially to perform a particular function for which they were well fitted. In most cases, they entered as a public career with little or no experience in government, and usually began their public career at a high level.

A dominant characteristic of this type of executive, the manager, is his impatience to get the job done. Often coming from another position where he experienced more freedom of action to change and innovate, he finds the bureaucracy somewhat restrictive and unresponsive. In his eagerness to improve the situation, whether it be within the government apparatus or in society as a whole, he experiences a certain frustration. Without his reaction to the new environment of government bureaucracy, the manager keeps foremost the challenges presented by his

responsibilities. He attempts to take an imaginative approach to the everyday problems of his position. In general, the frankness with which the manager type expressed his opinions was most revealing.

Among the manager type, the emphasis is on change--the need to bring innovation to the bureaucracy, to achieve universal education, to check the red tape of government, etc. Motivations range from a simple belief that one is capable of doing the job better by means of improved methods and administration to an almost visionary zeal to raise the quality of education in the nation. Not little or none of such motivation stems from religious attraction. All of the Purvian executives called managers are idealists, aware of the magnitude of their responsibilities and of the obstacles besetting their fulfillment.

Attitudes of career executives--The group of career executives named career executives in the present study seems to form the backbone of the policy-making segment of the Purvian government. Motivations of the group of career executives ranges widely in intensity, but considered as a whole, career executives look upon their positions as perhaps more than livelihoods but less than callings or a way of life. The career executive sees his job as practically a calling; the manager type approaches it as a more or less temporary challenge which he is specially equipped to meet. The career executive views his position as a job which he is qualified to handle, in which he gives his best efforts, and in which, as a rule, he is involved intimately. Many career executives consider themselves specialists in their particular field, as a result of many years' experience in the area. Their motivation becomes more a natural desire to bring themselves through regular promotions. But such motivation is more than a utilitarian ambition, being accompanied

often by an intense involvement in the responsibilities of the position.

It was found, as a rule, that the career executives began their service in the Peruvian government for primarily economic reasons. The public service in many cases offered the only decent opportunity in a country under-developed, with scant opportunity for persons trained in technological fields. Often these engineers, medical doctors, and other professionals transferred to a government career after having experience in private industry. In a number of cases, the primary reason for such changes was the lack of opportunity for further advancement; this was true in several instances where foreign-controlled industries staffed their higher positions with non-Peruvians. Many other career executives decide on a government career because of the diverse stimulants of the capital city, Lima. William F. Smyth describes this aspiration of Lima with

Lima, like its social and cultural capital of the country in spite of the fact that some privileged classes have adopted a certain pride in identity independently of Lima, and have adhered strongly to their established upper class, there remains always the general feeling that Lima is the place for all who have social and professional aspirations.¹

Thus many of the career executives, in seeking the field of promotion opportunity in private industry, or upon facing the challenge of supporting a family in the provincial areas, chose government careers to take advantage of the opportunities of Lima. Married and professional obligations, as well as family needs, seem to be important factors in the motivation of this group to follow public service careers. Availability

¹William F. Smyth in collaboration with Gertrude Flores, *La Vida en Lima de 1821 hasta el 1915* Lima: Division Nacional de Investigaciones Históricas, 1964, pp. 25-26. Translation of the author.

of employment in the public service or improvement in desirability of government work influenced a number of the career executives in their decision. For example, several members of the diplomatic service of Peru decided to follow that career after various protection laws improved the opportunity and job security in the diplomatic service in the 1930's.⁴

Generalizing about the motivations of the career executives, it may be said that this type undertakes the public service career much as he would any other job, as a means to an end. But it would be unfair to attribute only a materialistic motivation to these career executives. They are of the bureaucracy perhaps more than the manager types, who are in the bureaucracy. As such, they often exhibit an intimate involvement in their work, and for the most part, seem to invest their best efforts in their responsibilities.

Elite Recruitment in the Peruvian Government

Several forms of recruitment were discovered among this elite segment of the Peruvian government. From the evidence available, there is no reason for not assuming that these patterns of elite recruitment are typical. To illustrate these patterns, the three types of executives will be used as before.

Classic Recruitment.—The classic executives of the Peruvian government, whose careers have been described as virtually callings, appear to have been classic natural candidates for important positions in the public service. Trained for public careers by the example of their families, accustomed to the world of government, probably often initiated by the

⁴For example, Ley No. 1800 of April 1, 1939, reorganizing entrance and promotion requirements for the diplomatic service, and Decreto-Ley No. 7875 of October 22, 1931, integrating the diplomatic and consular services.

Influence of family and friends, they understand a civil service career as the normal way of life. Unfortunately, it was not feasible to substitute the assumed existence of family and friends in the recruitment of the classic executives. The assumption is based on their connection with high operative and clerical officials of the Mexican government (in many cases, familial relationships) and the almost inevitable effect such relationships will have on a government not possessing a developed and functioning system of competitive recruitment based on merit.

In any case, the attitudes of these classic executives toward recruitment almost universally oppose selection of personnel on grounds other than dignity, education, and experience. Without exception, this type believes that factors such as family connections, political sympathies, and social and economic position should not intervene in recruitment. All these executives believe that there has been a steady improvement in the selection process, especially since the promulgation of the civil service law in 1963.³

Manager---While prevalent in the case of the manager type of executive reflects the nature of their role in the public service. The term manager has been used to set apart the type of executives who entered government service especially to perform a particular function for which they are well fitted. 'As a rule, the manager began his service to the government as a result of a request from the president or another high official. One of these manager types confessed that he was not really sure why he was asked to take a position in the government.

³Decreto-Ley 11277 (Statutos y Reglamento del Servicio Civil), May 28, 1963, and Decreto-Ley 122 (Reglamento del Estatuto y Reglamento del Servicio Civil), July 26, 1965.

However, some of his other remarks indicated that the appointment was the result of friendship, combined with knowledge that the prospective appointee had done an excellent job of management in a private transportation company.

Another of the executives classified as a manager type occupied a civilian executive position after twenty-five years of service in the Peruvian Navy. Apparently, this executive appears to have been selected for his position -- one requiring technical proficiency in port operations -- because of his previous experience. Certainly, knowledge of his background by responsible officials influenced his appointment; probably, political dimensions played little or no part in the selection.

Included in the interviewees were other manager types who entered government service because of special interests or accomplishments in a particular field. One of these executives admitted that he was quite reluctant to undertake government service until he had the opportunity of working in the special area that interested him; in fact, he rather looked down on the public service as a career. Now, working on the problem of integration of the aboriginal population of Peru, he has found a generally satisfying career. Another high executive in the field of education, which is largely controlled by the national government in Peru, was called to serve by the government as a result of obviously outstanding and brilliant service in education and in other areas. This particular executive -- a woman, and one of only two women at so high a level in the Peruvian government -- exhibited many of the characteristics of the classic executive. With a visionary goal, she sees the problem of education as almost a personal burden. She is included in the manager type primarily because of the circumstances under which she entered the government.

examples. An intellectual, a serious scholar of astronomy and military history, an educator, a charity worker, and military honor-recipient, her activities and attainments undoubtedly brought her to the attention of high government officials and led to her appointment.

Another variant in recruitment of the manager type of executive appears in the political appointment. There was the executive who frankly stated the political nature of his appointment, although, on the other hand, a large number strongly disclaimed and regretted the effect of political influence in the selection of executives. One of the exceptions, a founder and military member of *Avrûka Populer* (the party now in office) was invited by the president to take over an executive position in the Ministry of Public Health. A physician by profession, this official had been elected to the Congress from a successful department in the elective elections of 1945, but was unable to assume the office because of the military grip. He accepted the invitation "as an opportunity to serve the nation and help the President, as desired."

In terms of attitudes of the manager type toward the role of politics in the recruitment process, a significant difference was discerned. It will be recalled that the classic executives consistently opposed the intervention of political influence, positive or negative, in personnel selection. In the case of the manager type, however, there was found a much greater readiness to accept the need on one hand for party loyalty in certain posts, and on the other hand, to recognize the negative effect of party activity prejudicial to the government. It was their view that government party loyalty may be a requisite for certain posts while opposition party military may be a valid reason for nonrecruitment. One of the manager types related his experience in assuming a directorship

without having any previous professional experience. There was much speculation among his subordinates as to what his "connections" were, which "perhaps" he tried to remove the problem. Incidentally, this particular executive professed to have had no such political influence.

At the same time, other executives of the manager type, indeed one of the most professionally oriented of this group, most forcefully objected to political pressure, positive or negative, in recruitment. One of these showed the author several letters from ministers and deputies asking appointments for political positions, and he indicated that he was subjected constantly to political pressure in personnel selection. This particular executive was singular in that he was the only person who believed that political influence in selection was stronger under the present administration of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry than it had been in the past. He had worked under the governments of General Manuel Odría, Manuel Prado, and the Military Junta of 1962-63, and believed that Belaúnde's regime had returned to politics its restrictions more than the other administrations. The other very professionally oriented executive, asked about this, replied that the situation under Belaúnde had improved "only a gambito."

Career executives.--Members of the group of career executives, which forms the largest segment of the policy-making level, with some exceptions takes two principal forms. Either these executives began their career as Politéc entry type in low positions in the Ministry and gradually worked their way up, or they moved into higher level government work at a later period of life after considerable experience in private business or other fields. In both forms of entrance into the public service, this career executive type was discovered to have served for a

relatively long period of years.

The conclusion from the data on career executives' recruitment mentioned above, relating to stability in government, constitutes one of the most significant findings of this study. The matter of stability was discussed in detail in Chapter III, where data on the entire policy-making segment are reported.

The career executives, virtually without exception, declared the part of politics and friendship considerations in the recruitment process. Several executives of this type, including one in connection to the Independent Public Sub-sector, had been victims of political appointments at some time during their careers and were especially sensitive about the problem. Practically all the group believed that education, experience, and ability should be the only factors considered in recruitment. However, one executive in a very high position in the civil service system stated that "it's only human" to consider a nephew or niece, or a distant, or a friend's relative, if he is capable of filling the job. This executive also observed that it would be foolish for the government to hire a militant member of the opposition, who could manipulate his position and access to information against the government. He applied this reasoning not to ordinary members of opposition parties but only to militants. In a sense such an attitude is consistent with the civil service law which prohibits public employees from practicing political activities.⁴ At the same time, his view concerning special considerations of relatives and friends are inconsistent with Article 22 of the same law which requires competitive examinations for normal entry into

⁴Art. 14, Decree-Law 1197 of May 25, 1955.

the civil service.⁷

Beyond the almost universal criticism by the career executive group of political and familial considerations in recruitment, there was a consistent expression of opinion that such influence in the Peruvian bureaucracy has decreased considerably, especially since 1960. Particularly noteworthy expressions of this improvement were found among members of the diplomatic service of Peru. In the case of the diplomatic service, the years 1960 and 1961 mark a decided improvement in controlled recruitment on the basis of merit and greatly enhanced job security. The Academia Diplomática is the only means of entrance to the diplomatic service, and appointments in the Academia is through competitive examinations. Emphasizing this, the Minister of Foreign Relations in a recent speech to graduates of the Academia stated that his office "would take into account only merits, not recommendations of a political order, come from where they may."⁸

Nevertheless, there are many reasons to believe that the effect of recommendations from family and friends remains a strong factor in recruitment in the Peruvian government. The absence of a functioning, viable central control over the civil service leaves the heads of various agencies, offices, and ministries free to establish virtually whatever system they prefer. Thus the intensity of the head's political militancy may be reflected directly in the recruitment of an office staff, especially when

⁷ Posts of directors, superintendents, managers, and specialized technicians are not required to follow the normal path in advancement. Art. 20, Decree-Law 51571.

⁸ La Opinion, Lima, January 13, 1965, p. 13. Translation of the author. Of course, occasional political appointments to high level posts such as ambassadors continue.

the need for a large expansion of personnel leaves his much latitude in selection. The author closely observed for some time one organization whose head was a militant member of the party in office, and saw how the political sympathy of prospective employees was one of the most important factors in selection. Where politics did not intervene, familiar and considerations often played a large part. "Good family" connections as well as nepotism overruled obvious lack of ability.

Exclusion by group or class -- Only one indication was detected suggesting that a group or class of people should be excluded from recruitment. The career narrative expressed his opinion that the low level of education and poor moral upbringing of much of the Peruvian population -- the Indian population -- made it essential that a person's moral worth be evaluated carefully in addition to education and experience.

The absence of such indications from the narratives interviewed should not obscure the fact that few members of the Indian population enter the Peruvian government service. Riggs' notion of "classics" and the exclusion of tribal or racial groups from governmental administration is particularly empty would have offered us insight into this aspect of the public service. Unfortunately, it was not possible to secure reliable data concerning this element of recruitment.

However, the author's experience as a participant-observer in the Peruvian government provided reasonably convincing assurance that the classics exclusion prevents entry of Indians into the public administration. That such exclusion is not systematic makes it no less real. It is a task of Peruvian public administration that few Indians are members of

the public service.⁹

Of course, in considering the participation of persons of certain racial groupings, one needs to define the racial groupings according to the identification methods used in the particular environment. Indians of Peru, in a pattern common to much of Latin America, tend to lose their identity as they adopt "western" behavior, learn to speak the Spanish language in place of their native Quechua or Aymara, and wear "western" clothing. An Indian, then, may escape his "Indianness" by taking on, at least outwardly, the behavioral patterns of his white countrymen. Classifications thus tend to be based upon behavior more than race. Fortunately, the Peruvian Indian is not "visibly bound" by obvious physical characteristics such as very dark skin. The conclusion relating to Indian participation in the Peruvian public service should be interpreted in this light.

Another career executive frankly recognized that persons with mere "connections" are more likely to be selected. Yet in his own office, involved in irrigation projects and similar civil engineering work, a prospective employee's scholastic record and thesis work are considered most important. Other career executives stated that probably the majority of people obtain their jobs through connections and recommendations. Unofficial influence was criticized as the major cause of the poor quality of many civil servants. People come with letters of recommendations for

⁹One might wonder, however, as some anthropologists have, whether Peru's plan of integration of the aboriginal population is not actually a deliberate process to Americanize the Indian by incorporating actually as "western" norms. In this context, exclusion might be considered appropriate. See, for illustration, Peru, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Plan Nacional de Integración de la Población Aborigen (Lima, 1954), Elaboración (Lima, 1954) and Plan (Lima, 1954).

ports for which they are initially unqualified. The current executive who said this (a relative of one of Penn's former presidents) obtained his first job, a minor managerial post, without even having seen a typewriter. But he worked without pay, pay monitoring, while he learned the type. Since then he had advanced steadily over a period of thirty-seven years to his present executive position.

The Relation of Ministry Orientation and Recruitment

The Hypothetical Interest.--In Chapter II, the following hypothesis was presented: "There is a direct relation with the degree of professional orientation of the organization, ranging from rejection to non-professionally oriented organizations to subscription methods of selection in more professionally oriented ones. A preliminary determination was made in Chapter II of the type of orientation of ministries, as follows:

Professionally oriented

Development and Public Works
Public Health and Social Assistance
Public Education
Foreign Relations

Non-professionally oriented

Government and Police
Justice and Worship
Agriculture
Treasury and Commerce
Labor and Indigenous Affairs

Considering the manifestations of this hypothesis the phenomenon was noted in which the executives of each ministry usually believed that the situation in regard to recruitment was better in their ministry than in the others. The exception to this general rule was the Ministry of Public Education, where consistently pessimistic notions were exhibited and deplored by all the executives interviewed, including those in their

ministry. This ministry and the other eight civilian ministries are discussed elsewhere in considerable detail in relation to the aspect of stability. The chief concern at this point is the attitudes of the executives of each ministry and consideration of the extent to which these attitudes appear to be founded realistically.

Recruitment is professionally oriented ministries.--From this perspective, it was immediately apparent that the hypothesis relative to norms of recruitment apparently not yet confirmed in the Ministry of Public Education. A decided provision was found among the executives interviewed in the ministry and among others with whom various contacts were made during this period, as well as an attitude of frustration in regard to the education problem of Peru. Analysis of questionnaire responses to the query relating to norms of entrance to the public service indicates that "the large majority of executives in the Ministry of Public Education were named to their posts directly without any form of competitive examinations." This ministry does not have one of the highest rates of ministerial turn-over in the central government,¹⁸ but the highly political nature of the education problem of Peru -- a challenge that has led to the downfall of many Ministers of Public Education -- apparently has made executive posts in the Ministry quite political as well. Thus one finds a ministry which one would expect to be more professionally oriented exhibiting many of the attributes of a non-professionally oriented organization. At the same time, some organizational segments of the ministry are making valiant efforts to raise the standards of recruitment and other personnel practices, even though some

¹⁸See Table 14, Chapter III.

of the norms appear unrealistic in the claimed degree of free discrimination in selection.

In the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the hypothesis is confirmed by extensive formalization of recruitment and entrance procedures and granted career protection and job security. This conclusion rests not only on the information derived from the personal interviews of diplomatic personnel, but also on discussions with candidates for the diplomatic service who were visitors in the Academia Diplomatica. There was consensus that recruitment in this area is largely uncompetitive and generally free of familiarist considerations.

Interview findings relating to norms of recruitment in the Ministry of Development and Public Works support the conclusion that the professional orientation of this ministry is reflected in its recruitment practices. In this respect of the bureaucracy, where a large majority of senior positions is composed of men holding professional engineering degrees, the evidence of professional recruitment procedures is conclusive. Despite the stated intention of some officials in the ministry that candidates with "contemporary" upper stage college degrees of sciences, the prevailing attitude was one favoring reliance upon substantial achievement and professional competence of candidates.

The findings relating to recruitment norms in the Ministry of Public Health and Social Assistance are not sufficiently conclusive to enable us to approve the hypothesis. The professional character of much of the ministry, staffed in most of its higher positions by medical doctors, must be evaluated in connection with the obviously political character of some of the senior executives. The absence of formalized

recruitment standards was acknowledged readily by several executives. At the same time, the Ministry of Public Health was instituting a comprehensive personnel administration system which was expected to improve personnel practices markedly in the ministry.

Recruitment is non-professionally oriented ~~ministry~~ ^{Ministry} -- According to consideration of those ministries which have been described as non-professionally oriented, it is apparent that a wide range of recruitment needs exists in these ministries. Five civilian ministries -- Government, Justice, Agriculture, Treasury and Commerce, and Labor and Indigenous Affairs -- were categorized as non-professionally oriented.

¹Interview findings strongly indicated that under developed recruitment standards prevail in the Ministry of Government. The ministry was described repeatedly by executives interviewed and officials in other government offices as highly political with very poor job security. The Ministry of Government, functioning closely with the President in administrative matters such as internal security and maintenance of law and order in the centralized system of Peruvian government, is perhaps regarded as a result of its role. However, it was concluded as a result of the interviews that merit recruitment would be employed in instances where job responsibilities for certain technical positions demanded professionally qualified incumbents.

²The Ministry of Justice and Religion, it was concluded from the interviews, has not adopted recruitment needs based on merit to an extent that the hypothesis should be unsupported. ³The pattern of responses from the interview subjects reveals that the ministry remains strongly subject to political influences in personnel selection. In the opinion of the executives interviewed, this has been a major cause of the poor quality

of many civil servants. Now, if not next, progress rates on the basis of various types of recommendations, although the use of competitive examinations is increasing.

A reasonable expectation would be that the Ministry of Justice, because it is the parent activity of the Bureau of the Civil Service and also is staffed at the upper levels principally with lawyers, would exhibit stronger signs of professionalism in its recruitment procedures and standards. Nevertheless, the interviewers indicated the opposite tendency. Indications of this tendency were least apparent because of the fresh admission of an executive high in the Bureau of the Civil Service itself than it existed.

The evidence available for the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Treasury and Commerce is considered insufficient to substantiate an evaluation of either recruitment norms. The statistical analysis of vacancies in the Ministry of Agriculture reveals a heavy representation of personnel holding professional degrees, especially degrees in agronomy. It might be inferred from this fact that recruitment norms would tend to be professional and based upon merit. However, except for this inference, it is not feasible to make a more conclusive judgment.

For the Ministry of Treasury and Commerce also, it is necessary to forego a conclusive evaluation of the character of recruitment norms. A consensus was found during the interviews that there is still much political and familial influence exerted in selection of employees. An applicant without recommendations will likely have not to see with them. When ministers or other high officials have political obligations, people they recommend are likely to get the jobs, with little attention to other

qualifications. There is still much selection on the basis of "pull," training, and similar factors, although this appears to be changing slowly but surely.

[The weight of evidence concerning recruitment moves in the Ministry of Labor and Indigenous Affairs does not support the hypothesis for that ministry. Information derived from the interviews indicates the existence of an awareness of the need for professional recruitment standards and of the application of such norms to actual practice. There was evident an apparently positive effort to recruit on the basis of capability and experience. There was no absence of complaints regarding political and familiar pressures which characterized other government ministries. This factor appeared significant in view of the fact that one of the executives interviewed had been the victim of political job transactions in other ministries. The interviewees in the Ministry of Labor attached strong importance to professional qualifications and expertise of personnel in the ministry. The need for Labor Ministry personnel to work under negotiation and company lawyers on equal terms was stressed by several officials. As a result of these findings, it was concluded that the hypothesis was not supported for the Ministry of Labor and Indigenous Affairs.

Summary.--In general, it must be recognized that the results of the hypothesis relating to state involvement are somewhat inconclusive. Part of the difficulty derives from the problem of making the distinction between professionally oriented and non-professionally oriented organizations. To a large extent, this division was arbitrary, based on reasonable expectations of the effect of a ministry's role on public administration. Secondly, the relative nature of the studies seeking free negotia-

It was not true in nonscriptive methods of selection as the other did not lend itself to precise measurement. Finally, the conclusions are based largely on the attitudes of executives involved and on how they perceive of their responsibilities in their activity.

In summary, compiling the histories of the tasks of this hypothesis, it is considered that the hypothesis was contradicted in the Ministries of Development and Public Works, Foreign Relations, Government and Police, and Justice. The hypothesis is considered unsupported in the Ministries of Public Education and Labor and Indigenous Affairs. There were inconclusive results for the Ministries of Public Health and Social Assistance, Agriculture, and Treasury and Commerce.

Career Satisfaction in the Brazilian Bureaucracy

By means of a series of probing questions during the interviews, an attempt was made to determine the degree of satisfaction which this group of senior executives derives from the public career. This probing was designed to find out what these executives like and dislike about government service and what the public service means to them. As in the preceding sections of this chapter, the three types of executives which have been used for illustrations proved to be appropriate.

The classic executives. Among the classic executive group, an extremely high degree of career satisfaction was obvious. This group of executives plainly has enjoyed their many years of service, and took pride in reminiscing about their career. All of the classic executives were fully aware of the negative aspects of Brazilian public service, but they chose to downplay or ignore them in favor of the positive satisfactions. Such an attitude reflects an earlier assessment that the careers of this group signify much more than mere livelihoods.

One of these executives remembered with satisfaction the period he had spent in the United States in the diplomatic service and especially the work he had received for work in inter-American cooperation. Another spoke of the opportunities he had been offered to represent Peru at international transportation conferences. These kinds of rewards, in the minds of the classic executives, were then comparable for the low financial remuneration in the Peruvian public service. Closely related to satisfaction of this group of executives is the satisfaction they derive from the opportunity to serve Peru.

The manager—The manager type of executives gained career satisfaction from two principal sources. They either considered satisfying the challenge that their positions offered them, probably a temporary challenge, or they had an intrinsic interest in the particular field of work in which they were involved. Several of the latter type enjoy the specialist's involvement in their work despite in some cases their annoyance of the political pressure to which they are subject and the bureaucratic restrictions surrounding them. Some of this group expressed some dissatisfaction about working in the private sector, free from such disturbances.

All of the manager executives complained about the low pay scale in the public sector. However, almost all indicated that they managed to live decently on their government salary. Every one of the executives of the manager type had taken salary cuts to undertake government service. A number indicated that they had been offered employment in private business at considerably higher salaries, but that such positions would not permit them to continue work in their particular interest or on the scale of government projects. There was definite appreciation in private business because often there was greater movement from the relative luxury

of class in the provincial areas. Government salary scales are lacking seriously in uniformity despite the basic salary ranges established by the Civil Service Law. Over a period of years, the salary scales, because of varied adjustments and parallelism, for various reasons, have become seriously unbalanced. This disparity is a cause of much dissatisfaction among government executives. It is also one of the reasons cited frequently by management personnel in the Independent Public Sub-Sector for their preference for positions in that sector.

¹¹The government corporation officials considered the major attraction of these entities to be the higher salaries offered.¹¹

Some of the manager types seemed to derive much satisfaction from their accomplishments in improvements in time-saving but inefficient methods. At the same time, some of this type showed frustration from the repeated encounter with obstacles which, in their opinion, should have been eliminated long before. The manager type exhibits perhaps a stronger feeling of insecurity of position, owing probably to his usually rapid ascent coupled with the failures of short political careers in the government.

Generalizing for the manager type of executive, it may be said that most gain their greatest satisfaction from the nature of their work itself -- from the opportunity to work in their special interests -- be it education of children, shipping and port operations, Indian affairs, or otherwise. These managers without particular specialities seem to be attracted by and gain satisfaction from the administrative challenges

¹¹Some salaries in the Independent Public Sub-Sector are governed by regular government salary scales, and upper limits on salaries in the sub-sector were set recently. Law No. 19664, 1965.

offered by a generally "paper-lagged" bureaucracy.

Career Satisfaction.—The career executives expressed a wide variety of career satisfactions. These ranged from the comfortable security they derived from the regular, dependable routine of bureaucracy to work satisfaction that the executive "could work without pay to have the opportunity." On the other hand, the career executives expressed many dissatisfactions with the public service -- from a virtually universal complaint over inadequate salaries through job insecurity to political interference in administration. In general, the average career executive was stressed as a competent civil servant who does the best job he can without thinking any real status to the work. As such, it might be expected that his satisfactions and dissatisfactions would be of generally uniform nature. For example, the career executives object to political interference especially when it affects their work. Often it affects them directly in the form of people which are recruited under such conditions. As one career executive said, "I ask for a typist; they send me a baron."

Many or most career executives expressed unhappiness over the low salaries in the public service, although in general they considered that a person could live reasonably decently on a government salary of their level. Some executives admitted that it is not easy to live on their salary from the government. One member of the diplomatic service told about certain diplomatic personnel being forced to sell possessions in order to represent their elegantly abroad. On the other hand, a few career executives who have come from private positions stated that they make more in the civil service than they earned in private life. An executive in the Independent Public Sub-Division expressed dissatisfaction

that things had been placed reasonably on the salaries which employees in that sector would draw, feeling that this would change incentives.

Among career executives considerable satisfaction derived from the opportunity to live in Lima, in much the way that life in the capital was described as a motivational factor. A number of this group had given up or rejected opportunities for better-paid positions in order to be able to work and raise their families in Lima.

Job Insecurity.—A degree of considerable dissatisfaction among career executives was job insecurity, such as was found to exist among the manager types. Several persons indicated that the critical dividing line was between the level of sub-director and director. The general opinion among this group is that directors occupy posts much more 'political' than sub-directors and because of this they suffer from greater job insecurity. Several sub-directors of the career executive type stated that they had no aspirations for promotion to director because there was too much political instability at that level. A director in the Ministry of Government and Police, generally considered to be one of the most 'political' ministries, indicated that directors are frequently victims of politics. He himself has made a practice of submitting his resignation to each new government during his eight years of service as director, although none has been accepted. In addition, he plans to resign early to avoid being asked to leave his post when the government changes again. Another director, with eleven years of service in the post, believed that in most cases there were adequate reasons for changes of directors, either for lack of ability, for personal reasons, or for reasons of confidence. This career executive has served under the governments of Ochoa, Prado, the Military Junta of 1962-65,

and beliefs, and he concludes that all four attitudes have shown the utmost respect for his office and have not been influenced or applied pressure in any way.

In general, the career executives believed that there had been increasing stability, especially since the 1950 civil service law. Fewer people are subject to subrogation for personal del. service. The enhanced stability law, in the opinion of this group, mitigated one of the major sources of job dissatisfaction.

Of interest in this report is a comparison of the attitudes exhibited by the group of executives interviewed with the statistical data on misdelivered and executive stability, derived from both questionnaire data and from official sources. How does the "beliefs" compare with the record of stability? Relating the data in Chapter III to the interview results, it is found in general that the beliefs of the executives are somewhat more pessimistic than the evidence of actual stability would warrant. It will be remembered that the overall average number of career interruptions for the executives is 3.4 per person and that the average length of service years is over 34 years. Furthermore the average executive had been in his present position over four years. The record as considered above appears to indicate that the "beliefs" is somewhat less than reliable.¹²

Beliefs of the Executive Government Executive

Beliefs of the group's association.—Gordon D. White conceptualized as a presumption of his notable "prestige studies"¹³ that the

¹²See above, Chapter III, Tables 15-18.

¹³The Executive Value of Public Employment in Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941) and Public Service in the American West of Public Employment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

attitude of any group is affected by the group's concept of the social evaluation. An individual's concept of the value of his work is deeply affected by what others think of it and by what he thinks others think of it. One of the important points of White's studies, directly related to this work, is that the prestige of a job affects motivation for the job. To attempt to gain some appreciation of the self-image held by the Peruvian government senior executives, a number of questions were included in the interview guide for this purpose. For example, the executives interviewed were queried as to how the general public, in their opinion, rated various parts and occupations, ranging from factory workers to bank directors and government office directors. The objective was to determine whether this group of senior executives believes that the Peruvian people have sufficient interest in activities of the government and whether this interest has much effect on the government and how it operates. Other questions were included to elicit their opinions as to whether he respects the civil servant.

The responses of these senior executives to queries on self-image followed a pattern different from the results obtained from other questions. In all of the questions relating to other career groups, the same type of executives, in general, offered responses which were or less not this sort or type. However, in all of the questions concerned with self-image, we found completely consistent patterns of response become apparent. All the officials -- chronic executives, managers, and senior executives -- responded in virtually the same way, with few exceptions.

General attitudes. -- It was found, not unexpectedly, that the senior government executives of Peru believe that the civil service is

looked down upon by the average Farsiwan. They believe that the average citizen has little respect for government workers and the civil service. They regard that there is little interest in and appreciation of the work of the government. Particularly all the executives believe that the public would rate private businessmen higher in terms of prestige than government workers and executives.

Surprisingly, on the other hand, a number of these Farsiwan executives mirrored the attitudes of the general public. This reflection of public opinion was evident in some officials in both the manager type and the career executive group, but not among the classic executives. One manager admitted his negative opinion of the public service before he entered a government position, and many of his comments indicated a certain persistence of such attitudes. Several career executives, in a direct reflection of the image of the civil service as they see it, bluntly stated that they would not recommend the public service career to a young man. However, most of the executives, despite such attitudes, would recommend a public career.

In general, all the executives believe that the public service is disparaged by the general population of Persia. The civil service is viewed by the public as a place for an easy living, with little work and a sure pension; the civil servant is paid for doing nothing -- he is an unproductive parasite. Much of such feeling, according to these executives, is justified but a great deal of it stems from ignorance of what the government does. A somewhat different perspective was noted in the case of executives of the Independent Public Sub-Sector. These executives agreed with those of the central government in their assessment of public opinion here about the civil service. At the same time, however, they believed

that the public considers employees of the institutions in the Independent Public Sub-Sector to be of a higher caliber than those in the regular civil service. Such employees are viewed as employees of private business rather than as government workers. These executives believe that this better image results in the attraction of higher quality employees.

Some executives felt, probably correctly, that the average Peruvian has interest in the activities of the government only when he is affected directly by them, especially in terms of salary, housing and cost of living. The government is criticized with good work only when the results are difficult and tangible. Rarely, however, does the public of "the government" extend its praise of government employees and executives.

Most of the executives believe that much of the negative public image of the civil service is often a result of the public's experience with government and its laws and bureaucracy. One executive described an application which required 42 separate steps for completion, with several weeks or more necessary in the process. The public became that practically nothing is automatic; everything requires expediting and personal checking by the applicant at each stage. Such delays inevitably during the time of the civil servant. The executives subjected a full awareness of such inefficiency as well as a certain sensitivity that is evident. This kind of contact of the public with the civil service has created distrust of the government worker. Some executives feel that the prestige of the civil servant varies with different economic classes of the population. Three officials believe that the middle and upper classes have much more respect for the civil servant than do the lower classes. The latter complain of the laziness of public employees because they cannot always get instant service; they do not

understand the problems of government, according to this view.

Speaking generally about the self-image of the Peruvian government executives, it can be said that they believe their image is poor in public opinion. Even though many of these executives consider their positions are unusually important because of their service to the nation, they are conscious that the Peruvian people do not respond of civil servants as any kind of social group. During the interviews of senior officials and during other experiences as a participant-observer in the government, the author found a general depression that such awareness probably contributed to the defensive behavior often observed in Peruvian bureaucrats. Such behavior ranges from evidence of over-compensation possibly because of inferiority feelings (especially in dealings with foreign government personnel, for example) to suggestions of masochistic behavior of the kind described by Thompson (especially in relationships with subordinates and the general public officials).¹⁴

Summary

In this chapter, a characterization of the major Peruvian bureaucrats has been presented. Based on a series of personal depth interviews, this principal focused on various aspects of the government career. By questioning the executives about their ideas and views on motivation, recruitment, career satisfaction, and self-image, the interviews kept the emphasis on the executives' own interpretations.

The patterns of response emerged in such a way as to create the need for a typology which was used to divide the executives into three

¹⁴Victor A. Thompson, Malice Organizing (New York: Knopf, 1960), passim.

groups -- classic executives, managers, and career executives. This typology served to organize the different aspects under discussion.

In the following chapter, the analysis continues in regard to executive prices and consideration of reaction to institutional and developmental changes.

CHAPTER II

VALUES AND CHANGE IN THE PERUVIAN BUREAUCRAT

Background and Rationale

The general approach.¹ In recognition of the potential insights which role analysis might contribute to the study of executives, an attempt was made to formulate from the interview findings a general statement of role expectations of the executives. Such generalizations must suffer from incompleteness because the main thrust of the analysis is directed elsewhere. But they can serve a useful function as one further source of insight into the world of the Peruvian bureaucrat.

As Greco and his colleagues demonstrate in their school executive studies employing role analysis,² role expectations may be derived either as the expectations others have toward one and one's job or the expectations one has about himself in his job and the perceptions he has of the expectations of others about him in his job. In contributing to the latter aspect, in effect the personal orientation of the individual would be used as the focus for analysis.

The approach employed in the present study of Peruvian bureaucrats and the primary concern of the personal orientation at this stage was to determine expectations which the executives held for others as well as their expectations of their own roles. The decision was made to mirror the interview findings regarding role expectations in a four-way

¹Wend Greco, et al., Expectations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendent (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969).

presentation. Role expectations of the classic executives, managers, and career executives will be described as follows: (1) toward their superior and subordinates; (2) toward their colleagues (other directors and sub-directors); (3) toward their subordinates; and (4) their expectations of their own role, that is, what they perceive of their own expectations. This particular approach, then, emphasizes the expectations the executives alone have of themselves and of others as they direct or coordinate with others.


Role Expectations

Expectations toward superiors.—A surprisingly strong expression of confidence in and loyalty to superiors was discovered from all three types of executives. In general, the political character of the job of minister of state was recognized and the primacy of the political function was acknowledged. There was not only general recognition of the political function of ministers, but there were also positive statements of values that this should be so.


The manager types and the career executives spoke highly of the pomp, capable political ministers such as Charles Frederick Bennett, Minister of Justice, and of Bennett's appointees. In general, ministers were looked upon by their directors and sub-directors as professionals with much experience and ability. Some of the manager types spoke of great confidence in President Bennett as an inspiring, dedicated leader. Such expressions were not detected among classic executives or career executives. Possibly this indicates a greater dependence of manager types on presidential appointments, although there is no evidence to support such an explanation. From the group of managers, there was only one negative expression directed toward ministers. One manager felt that

The minister failed to give adequate time to the manager's problems; he occupied himself (spent or left out). At the same time, he recognized that the minister had pressing demands of a political nature which it was not possible to ignore.

One career executive, who is considered most typical in attitudes and general perceptions, evaluated some ministers as "terrific." This executive singled out particularly the previous Minister of Education, whose political handling, he believed, had almost ruined that ministry.

Generally unanimously, sub-directors view their superiors, especially the directors, as experienced and capable men. They were looked on very  well as sympathetic objects and spend much time in advising their sub-directors and are underserving of administrative problems.

However, there was a widespread feeling among sub-directors that the position of director is too political. For this reason many sub-directors did not aspire to the post of director; job-security decreased rapidly to that level, according to their view. Some sub-directors pointed out the difficulties plaguing the first few months of a new administration, when new directors are still unfamiliar with their jobs.

Executive's general view.—In considering attitudes and role expectations of the executives toward one another, there was noted a  generally consistent tendency to discuss work years. This reluctance was obvious not only during the personal interviews, but also in the many conversations which the author had with executives during his experience as a participant-observer in the Forensic Department.

The very rare exception to this rule was represented by some career executives who had various comments against colleagues or against the system. One of these, for example, pointed to a director

In another instance who had succeeded him in a politically-inspired replacement, and indicated that the other director instigated the change.

Relationships among executives in the Peruvian government suffer in many cases from faulty communication. Quite often, bureaucratic inter-relationships appear to take various forms of defensive behavior, based partly on lack of knowledge about the other party's power base and partly on insecurity about one's own position. Aspects of this form of behavior bear much similarity to that described by Thompson as "bureaupathic." He saw the need to portray the rigid and ritualistic performance of roles as a means of escape from insecurity.² In this situation, the bureaupathic official would stress the rights of office rather than abilities. Several cases were observed at close hand among the Peruvian executives which fit this description closely. The important point here, however, is not bureaupathology itself, but the manner in which such problems impede communication in the bureaucracy.

Expectations toward subordinates:--Effectively all executives of the study group were willing to discuss freely their attitudes towards subordinates and the role expectations they held for them. Each will-impress contrasts with their general reluctance to discuss their peers and perhaps it is to be expected.

All three types of executives are legally in the state of a prime expectation for subordinate employees. The second most frequently expected quality named was obedience to duty, followed by ability. Among other traits expected were honesty, efficiency, responsibility, objectivity, honesty, and professionalism. There was general agreement among the three executive types on this array of expectations.

²Thompson, MANAGERIAL COMMUNICATION.

However, significant differences were apparent in the judgments of the executives about the manner in which subordinates had fulfilled their role expectations. These differences take on added meaning when considered against the executive typology.

First, there emerged a reasonably clear-cut set of attitudes according to executive type. "The classic executives were much more apt to express satisfaction with performance of subordinates. Their employees, in their opinion, had in general lived up to the prime expectations of loyalty in the crisis and criterion in duty. At the same time, the need for such training was recognized clearly." Manager types, in their judgments of subordinates, probably expressed unconsciously much of their anti-governmental coloration. Their basis of evaluation appeared to be largely efficiency. "They found many subordinates lacking in training as well as willingness to work. Many government employees were 'kick-in-the-butt.'" Although there were divided opinions among career executives, in general they expressed more dissatisfaction over subordinate employees' performance. Of these evaluations are valid, the greatest need of the Persian civil service is more and better training. Practically all career executives were critical of employee preparation and training. Much of the difficulty stems from inadequate and overly political selection methods.

Heightened training deficiencies, many career executives pinpointed a simple lack of desire to work among government employees. Generally, the civil servant is lacking in skills, education, and energy. In summary, the average career executive does not regard the average administrative employee very highly.

The second outstanding difference noted is regard to fulfillment.

of role expectations concerns the evaluations by executives in the independent Public Sub-Sector. Such executives, all of whom were classified as senior executives, expressed consistently favorable attitudes towards subordinates. The average employee in the Independent Public Sub-Sector, in their judgment, is superior to those in the central government. Most employees know their jobs well and are able and efficient. All these executives of that sub-sector attributed such performance primarily to the high spirit of subordinates which prevails in much of the sub-sector. This finding tends to demonstrate not only a different type of employee in the Independent Public Sub-Sector, but also suggests a different viewpoint of senior executives and a better self-image of this group of executives who are removed in varying degrees from the bureaucracy of the former central government.

Personal role expectations. --In regard to personal role expectations of the former executives, a broad range of expressions was found, some of which are related closely to motivational factors discussed in another section. Role expectations of these people are conditioned strongly by a host of factors, among the most important being their own self-image and the real or imagined public image of the government bureaucracy.³

Again, as in the previous discussion, distinguishable patterns emerged according to the executive types. The classic executive is likely to see his roles as those of a guardian of the bureaucratic image, a "kash bazaar" for the better side of government, an epitome of the high calling of public service. The manager type tends to interpret his roles to be those of a "dewan," a man with a mission and a job to be done. He is thus job or task-oriented, and makes his judgments and measures his fulfillment of role expectations on that basis. He is likely to look upon

³Compare with the discussion in Chapter IV.

himself as particularly qualified -- certainly better equipped than the average bureaucrat -- to perform his roles.⁷ The career executive perceives his roles to be different from those of the somewhat idealistic clerical executives and the "go-with-the-flow" managers.⁸ Perhaps it is best not to fail to describe his perceived role expectations as those of the "man who keeps the fires." Nevertheless, of course, approach their tasks with different degrees of enthusiasm, and the same was found to be true of career executives.⁹ But most of them considered their roles to cluster around simply performing the routine jobs of keeping the bureaucracy functioning. Such a view of role is quite consistent with the motivational factors observed in this group of executives. Although such role expectations do not preclude idealism or varying degrees of energetic activity, certainly they favor non-dramatic, stable, business-like behavior.

Change in the Bureaucratic Environment

The Hypothetical Situation.--The first factors to be considered are the general attitudes and reactions of senior executives of the Peruvian government as seen in the context of rapid change in the bureaucratic environment. The effect of change was of particular interest during the field research of the study, involved as the author was in planning/over-type programs of public administration reform in Peru. There were political as well as theoretical reasons for observing, measuring, and understanding the effects of such programs.

⁷ It was hypothesized fairly early in the study that the effects of adaptive incorporation of administrative changes (non-primitive changes in Higgs' terminology,⁸ especially poly-centralization, would tend to be

⁸See, Administrative Involvement Conditions, p. 277.

stronger in domestically oriented and non-professionally oriented organizations than in foreign-oriented and professionally oriented organizations. Because much of the impetus for such change in Persia originates outside the country, in the numerous form of changes described by Riggs for his model of the prismatic society, there was a natural interest in observing its effect in practice. In this respect, as in the other elements which have been considered in this chapter and the preceding one, the emphasis lies on the attitudes of these officials. The main interest, then, is how these senior executives react to change in the bureaucratic environment. Continuation of the executive typology can aid in relating the discussion in this section to other elements considered above.

The acceptance of Persian administration. In general, there is agreement among the three types of officials -- classic executives, managers, and career executives -- that the "traditional" principles of public administration from British and American practice are desirable goals to pursue. As a whole, the executives feel no particular conflict, despite their recognition of the great difficulty inherent in the application of such principles -- just because they are foreign but because they are wrong.

² In this often repeated evaluation is revealed a fairly general belief of these Persian government executives that Persian public administration is not especially distinctive or unique -- it is simply chronologically behind more advanced developments such as those which have taken place in Great Britain and the United States.³ The significance of this

³In this connection, see, for example, Vera Michaelson Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western World, and her discussion of almost total lack of technological capability.

attitude is large in terms of both theoretical considerations and in practical programs of administrative reform. If Peruvian public administration is not unique, but is simply mechanistic, ways to think about it and to change it may need to be altered radically. In the same way, if Peruvian officials think their public administration problems are not unique, their interpretations -- right or wrong -- may have a direct effect on the direction taken by reform efforts.

Tradition and formalism.—However, the interviewees leave grounds for questioning, at least partially, this interpretation of the simply mechanistic nature of Peruvian administration. Other comments by the executives indicate that many changes in administration -- that is, attempts to increase the chronological lag -- are being changed only, not total alterations of the system.¹ Much the same kind of administration seems to persist in spite of reform efforts. Despite many attempts to modify procedures, for example, the majority of the public is dealing with the government with a friend or intermediary to expedite matters. They simply do not find feasible the idea that applications and handling of various kinds can be, or should be, processed routinely without constant expediting. They do not trust such "automatic" procedures because they have learned through long experience that paper flows haltingly in the Peruvian bureaucracy.

A number of the manager types expressed frustration about their efforts to institute regular, automatic procedures in the bureaucracy. Too many people persist in using various types of intermediaries, so that such streamlining efforts go for naught.

Practical reality.—In such a situation, a likely result is a policy consequence similar to that of Eliza's and intermediary of primitive society.

On one hand, we find a tradition-based public, conditioned by experience to approach the bureaucracy in a certain way. On the other hand, the bureaucracy (which has been subjected to varied and continuing attempts at reform, chiefly in Riga's response to its pays at least lip-service to efficiency and rationalized procedures. In some instances, bureaucracy continued to reform appears quite strong. In other ministries, a wide variation exists in the intensity of commitment to administrative reform. In another case, a ministry finds itself divided internally: one section retains a traditional reliance on bureaucratic means and procedures, resisting efforts at change; another section, necessarily subordinated in the matter of fiscal reform, makes strong attempts to enter the traditional system, but with questionable success.

These mixed approaches to administrative change, involving an unspecified blend of traditional means systems, tend to contradict both fundamental premises and their objectives with a prejudgmental effect. The degree of frustration probably tends to vary according to the intensity of dissensus existing in the particular ministry.

In general, relatively little dissensus was apparent among senior executives as to the desirability of administrative reforms. Further, most officials readily accepted traditional British-American public administration principles as a basis for change. If such principles were questioned it was a rather superficial questioning based on the chronological appropriateness -- the timeliness -- of such changes. Never was inherent unsuitability of the principles pointed out as a problem.

Such generally unquestioning acceptance of traditional public administration principles is not surprising, when one considers the type of public administration training which most of these Latvian executives

have emerged. Both in the few Egyptian universities which offer such courses and in foreign-sponsored administrative reform programs such as UNDP's, the curriculum of courses offered consists of traditional principles. A number of executives interviewed stood quite prepared to discuss the work of Fayol and Taylor, for example, but with great difficulty in admission that public administration theory and practice have advanced beyond this pioneer stage.

The other major finding revealed during this phase of the interview is a rather common belief among executives that such formalism exists in the Egyptian bureaucracy. Numerous examples could be cited to substantiate the belief and to demonstrate that it is well-founded. Perhaps the most striking law⁸ itself is a prime example. Since 1945 the law has provided for competitive examinations for recruitment, merit promotions, standard compensation scales, and various other modern civil service forms. Yet after 15 years the law has been implemented only in a very limited extent, and a somewhat elaborate rationale has grown to explain the failure to carry out the law's provisions.

Other civil servants.—The existence of such formalism in the Egyptian bureaucracy, recognized and acknowledged by the executives, is related closely to other attributes of Elgazzar's model. Formalism is characterized further by "buckled-in" and "buckled throughputs." In the "buckled-in" situation, laws provide for one policy although in practice a different policy prevails. Rules are announced formally but not effectively enforced. In the case of "buckled throughputs," adverse formal rules serve simply to set up obstructions to be bypassed in

⁸Decree-Law 11377 and Decree-Law Supreme 523.

provision.⁵ Many examples could be cited to demonstrate the presence of these characteristics in the Peruvian governmental system. A study in greater depth employing the role model might be quite productive.

Most of the executives were well aware that there exists plague Peruvian public administration. The reaction of these officials to these problems was the main interest, and in this respect the interviews lead to a conviction that they have resigned themselves to living with the situation. Their generally conscious compliance remains not as much hopelessness as realism. Whether this is an indigenous reaction or simply cultural conditioning the author is not prepared to determine.

Conclusions

The characterizations in Chapters IV and V of the various Peruvian individuals were intended to present an impression of motivation, morale, work, career satisfaction, self-image, role expectations, and readiness to change among the group. To the extent possible, the impressions have been based on the attitudes of the executives themselves as they expressed them. The principal conclusion that may be drawn is that it is invalid to refer to the Latin American or the Peruvian bureaucrat, because he exists in many forms. The typology employed here represents at best an initial and rudimentary attempt at analysis of executive types in Latin America. Hopefully, it may suggest areas for further study.

In regard to reaction to administrative change, a mixed situation exists. Although in general there is a broad commitment to the necessary

⁵Stove, Administration in Developing Countries, pp. 281-282.

alternatives for the transition to "modernity," there are also inherent divisions in the bureaucracy. Many, if not most, of the executives believe that Peruvian public administration is more anachronistic than it is unique, and that their problems derive mainly from the imperfect adaptation of modern administrative practices. In this view, then, it is merely a matter of time before a successful transition is achieved.

In the concluding chapter, the principal findings of the research are presented in summary form, along with some possibilities for deeper study.

CHAPTER VII

THE PERSONAL BACKGROUND IN PERSPECTIVE

The Study Is General

Theme of the study.--This study is founded on the thesis that knowledge of social origin, education, mobility, and similar factors relating to the backgrounds of executives is necessary for full understanding of their roles. Because people in organizations condition these organizations and environments to them to a large extent on the basis of their backgrounds and values, it behooves the student of administration and bureaucracy to understand these attributes.

When the paucity of data relating to these and similar factors hinders advances in comparative and theoretical studies, it becomes doubly important that valid techniques for such studies be developed. In a study of cities of the world, incompletely developed biographies have slow the progress in sociological work. Of course, the needs are individual. As Riegs points out,¹ the area specialist is in as much need of the sociologic generalist as the theoretician is in need of concrete case data. An increasing appreciation of the complementary nature of the two types of work is likely to improve the significance and utility of further investigation in public administration.

The approach.--In this study, an attempt was made to combine the

¹For example, in Comparative in the Study of Comparative Public Administration and Local Government, Studies in Public Administration No. 21 (Champaign: Public Administration Clearing Service, University of Florida, 1941).

two approaches. On the one hand, because of a virtual absence of solidly based data on Latin American government executives, it was considered justifiable to orient the study largely toward the production of a foundation of biographic data. On the other hand, the fortunate existence of models, both of the "unstructured" and "rural" types, suggested the advantage of introducing these into the research. Thus the work was arranged according to certain testable hypotheses drawn from a conceptual framework which included at least some aspects of available theoretical models.

The work of R. Lloyd Munroe and his colleagues in the United States provided the real model and much of the orientation for the first aspect of the study. At the same time, the constructed case model of Fred R. Biggs, which appeared to correspond considerably to the presumed functional society of Peru, served to orient some of the hypotheses in a comparative sense.

With these two works providing theoretical guidance in conceptualization, the research was directed toward two primary ends. First, through the use of questionnaires and other sources, a study was carried out of backgrounds, characteristics, and origins of the Peruvian government executives. This research, for added significance, was oriented by hypotheses based on certain independent variables and each of these hypotheses was tested. The results of these tests are discussed in summary form below. Second, the main thrust of the other major phase of the research, based upon a series of personal depth interviews and limited field ethnology, was toward characterization of the Peruvian executives and understanding of their roles and reactions to change.

Political Function Relative to the Executive

Much was learned about Peruvian government executives during the course of the research. Much of the history and ethnography surrounding these officials was learned. By way of recapitulation, the principal findings of the study are summarized below.

Geographic origins.--Considered in terms of geographic origins of executives, the data indicate a pattern of productivity rather than Peru which corresponds quite closely to the general redistribution of population and economic activity. The dominant central region of Peru produces a percentage of government executives out of proportion to its share of the population.

In general, the executives are quite likely to remain in their area of birth to pursue a career. With the exception of the white foreign-born group, which exhibits a strong propensity toward interregional mobility, most executives stay in the same region in which they were born.

Although the executive group as a whole is overwhelmingly native Peruvian, it is also evident that the foreign-born are overrepresented in the Peruvian bureaucracy and that native birth is not absolute, when that factor is considered in isolation.

Education.--The research indicated that college and university training is a virtually essential stage in the careers of most Peruvian bureaucrats. An extremely large majority of the senior executives has at least some college training and nearly three-fourths are college graduates.

In this respect, as in others, the senior executives of modern Peru stand much apart from the rest of society. The high level of educational

of well-educated persons among government executives is evident, and this group is literally worlds apart from the great mass of illiterate Indians of the country. Of course, this finding was not unexpected. A similar criticism characterizes American federal executives, but Peru is somewhat deficient in the general absence of many competing elite groups such as those existing in the United States.

The data indicate a strong persistence of traditional specialization in the law. However, there are also signs, especially among independent sector executives and middle management, that a traditional education in the law no longer suffices for the developmental needs of Peru. Apparently for this reason increasing emphasis goes to engineering and other applied fields of specialization. An accelerating development demands people trained in a wide variety of new fields. One of the important areas, only lately gaining wide recognition, is the study of public administration.

Most Peruvian government executives are products of the large public universities of Peru, the University of San Marcos, the National Engineering University, and the National Agrarian University, all in Lima, the capital. The only private university producing large numbers of government executives is the Catholic University, also in Lima. Other schools in Peru play a relatively minor role in preparing future government officials.

It was hypothesized that significant differences would exist among officers and ministers in the qualifications and educational attainments of executives. The expectation was that people in professionally oriented ministries and those of the Independent Public Sub-sector would exhibit higher attainments. In this respect, the hypothesis

are satisfied only partially. The professionally oriented ministries generally tend to show higher educational attainments, although not in varied degrees. Executives in the Independent Public Sub-Sector generally ranked lower than most officials in the professionally oriented ministries. Another measure of education, linguistic knowledge, shows that very few government executives have a command of Peru's indigenous languages, Quechua and Aymara.

Career life.--The research showed that about three-fourths of the executives began their careers in one of the professions or in a white-collar job. Only a very small proportion, distinct from American Federal executives, began as laborers. In the professions, engineering and the law lead by far in the numbers of executives who chose to follow them. The data also indicate that Peruvian government executives are much less inclined toward movement than their American counterparts. They are more likely to remain in one organization.

Stability.--It was hypothesized that personnel stability would vary according to the character and orientation of ministries and that personnel stability would vary also in direct relation to ministerial stability. In general, it was concluded that the available evidence does not sustain the hypothesis that the professional character of the ministries necessarily determines stability of ministers. Further, although there appears to be a somewhat lower stability in the non-professionally oriented ministries, the differences do not sustain conclusively the hypothesis. Likewise, the research does not demonstrate a direct relationship between ministerial stability and stability of ministers. There appears to be a fairly large stable core of executives remaining in

most situations (though possibly temporary) to stress as needed for continuity. Perhaps a situation similar to that found by Blansett in France exists also in the Peruvian bureaucracy.

Findings Relating to Family Influences

Because the factor of family influence was found to be of such importance in reaching an understanding of the executives, a considerable portion of the research was pointed toward the study of the executives' fathers, grandfathers, uncles, and aunts. The main findings relating to each of these are summarized below.

Fathers of executives.--Several significant differences are apparent between the fathers of Peruvian and American executives. It was found that an extremely small proportion of Peruvian executives are from the laborer class. Strong suggestions of slower upward movement are present. The largest group of executives descends from fathers who were professional men. There is also considerable evidence that a greater social mobility exists in the younger age groups, in this case among middle management officials. This finding is believed to be commensurate with an accelerating trend toward "mobility." Another strong difference among fathers of Peruvian executives is the very large proportion who were employed in the public service. The proportion is vastly larger in Peru than in the United States. Similarly, a much larger proportion of the fathers of Peruvian executives were military men.

The United generations.--It was apparent from the research that there have been significant shifts in occupations between the third and second generations. Furthermore, there have been significant breaks in occupational continuity within the same family.

Among the most important shifts are a major decline in fathers

following the farming occupations and a corresponding increase of fathers in the professions. At the same time, it was apparent that fathers and grandfathers were in the same occupations for very few of the individuals. The rate of occupational continuity was surprisingly low. This last observation is further evidence that higher social mobility exists among lower age groups in the Peruvian bureaucracy.

Fathers and fathers.--In considering the extent of endogenous marriages in the executives' families, more significant differences appeared between the mothers' and fathers' class in occupational background than were evident in Kupper's study. The frequency of differences suggests a more fluid situation than reported. The two lines of descent are not nearly as similar and constant as Kupper found in American federal executives. Again, even stronger differences appear in the case of the middle management group.

The class of Peruvian executives.--The principal question in this phase of the research was to what extent did these executives marry above their own occupational levels. The most dramatic change occurs in the decrease of percentages of mothers in class who were farmers' daughters. This drop is offset by a corresponding increase in the proportion of class whose fathers were in the professional class.

Findings relating to Father's Age

The phase of the research relating to the bureaucrat and his job was carried out mainly through the use of personal depth interviews. Raphaela insisted especially on understanding of the ideals and ideas of the group, particularly in terms of motivation, involvement, career satisfaction, and self-image. To the extent practicable, the findings were

organized according to a typology of three executive types. These were based on the classic executive, the manager, and the career executive.

Typification of the Peruvian public servant.—Using the typology set forth above, it was learned that fairly clear patterns of motivation existed. These ranged from the classic executive's view of government office as essentially a duty and a way of life, to the manager's view of public service as a temporary challenge, to the career executive's view of his job as something between a livelihood and a calling, a job undertaken primarily for economic reasons. To the career executive the position is mainly a means to an end.

High recruitment.—Classic executives, prepared for public service by family example, undertake civil service careers on the natural way of life. In this sense they are natural candidates. Perhaps this devoted position contributes to their opposition to personnel selection on grounds other than capacity, education, and experience. The manager, on the other hand, because generally he is chosen to perform a particular job, tends to see less objection to selection of certain applicants on the basis of purely loyalty. Most career executives either began their careers at fairly early ages and worked their way up or moved into higher level government work after considerable experience elsewhere. Almost without exception, they deplored the part of politics and familiar considerations in the recruitment process.

In general, because of the absence of a functioning, strictly control system over the civil service, the heads of various offices, agencies, and ministries are free to establish virtually whatever system they please.

Hypothetical No. 2, relating career of public servant to the degree

of professional orientation of the organization, are considered contained in the Ministries of Development, Foreign Relations, Government, and Justice, unsupported in the Ministries of Public Education and Labor, and Immigration for the Ministries of Public Health, Agriculture, and Treasury.

Career satisfaction.--An extremely high degree of career satisfaction was found to exist among classic executives. This held true even though the group was fully aware of the negative aspects of Peruvian public service. Such satisfaction stems from an appreciation of the opportunity to serve Peru. Managers appear to derive their chief satisfactions from the challenge offered by their jobs or from intrinsic interest in their particular field of work. The satisfactions and dissatisfactions of the career executives tend to be of a generally mundane nature, i.e., pay, security, living in the capital, and similar factors.

Self-image.--The senior government executives believe that the civil service is looked down upon by the average Peruvian. They believe that the average citizen has little respect for government workers and the civil service and in general disparages the public service. Much of this feeling is believed to stem from the executive's view from the public's ignorance of what the government does. Despite their realistic appreciation of public attitudes, most executives maintain a reasonably firm belief in the importance of their own service to the nation.

Employee Relations to Self and Group

In this division, the emphasis was directed toward the supervisor: how the executives view of themselves and of others as they supervise or communicate with others.

Expectations toward superiors.--Most executives recognized and approved the primacy of the political function of ministers of state. As a general rule, superiors were viewed as experienced and capable men. However, a number of sub-directors did not aspire to the post of director because of the political immunity attached to the job.

Expectations toward peers.--There was a general hesitancy to discuss one's peers, except for some executives who had reservations against colleagues or against the system. In general, relationships among executives in the Canadian government suffer from faulty communication. Often bureaucratic interactions appear to take various forms of defensive behavior.

Expectations toward subordinates.--The prime expectation for subordinate employees is loyalty to the state. This is followed closely by attention to duty and ability. The three types of executives appeared to evaluate subordinates and hold expectations for them according to type. Clerical executives stressed loyalty and attention to duty. The managers emphasized efficiency as an expectation. Career executives were, in general, most dissatisfied with the performance of subordinates. This type emphasized the greatest need to be more and better training.

Personal role apprehensions.--Strongly motivating personal expectations are the executives' own self-images and the imagined public image of the bureaucrat. The classic executive pictures himself as an agent of the high calling of public service. The manager, being task-oriented, looks upon himself as a man with a mission and a job to be done. Most career executives see their roles fluctuating around performance of the routine jobs of keeping the bureaucracy functioning.

Realities in change in the bureaucracy.--In general, Peruvian executives caught up in rapid administrative change perceive as critical conflicts, even though they recognize the inherent difficulty in the implementation of changes. The difficulty is seen to come not from the "hardness" of change, but rather from its chronological inappropriateness. However, there is considerable evidence that many changes in public administration are formal changes only, not real alterations of the existing system.

An overall polycentric situation is a likely result in these circumstances, and indeed appears to have occurred in some instances. This is apparent in some ministries where a wide variation exists in different sections in regard to acceptance of administrative reform.

Conclusions

The Peruvian government executive.--This study leads to a clear conclusion that the government executive of modern Peru exists in many forms. In a preliminary attempt at classification, three broad types were depicted. All the evidence of the research denies the validity of any simplistic "Latin American type," and suggests that a country and its bureaucracy as caught up in a transitional state must contain many elements of diversity. One of these elements most directly affected by transition is the government bureaucracy, who often must function as a catalyst in the process of change.

Although it has been shown that a number of characteristics of the state may be detected in the Peruvian bureaucracy, it is equally important to note that these aspects are controlled by the executives generally to be found. The prevailing commitment is to elimination of these fixed aspects in the general transition to modernity. This commitment, combined with numerous tendencies indicating transition along

the lines of workers, industrialized activities, would appear to the author to limit somewhat the applicability of Hogg's scale noted in the case of Peru. However, his value as an analytic device cannot be denied, and it calls for tests to greater depth.

The executives with whom the study has dealt stand apart noticeably as an elite group in Peruvian society. They are set apart by family background, by superior education, and by experience. While such qualities might foster optimistic hopes for the long-range prospects of Peruvian bureaucracy, at the same time the extreme cohesion of the group could foster equally well the possibility of a tutelary administration under some guise of "guided democracy."

Suggestions for further study.--During the course of the investigation, several aspects of the bureaucracy were suggested as fruitful research possibilities. Among these are the obvious need for a comparative study which would introduce other groups such as the military and business leaders. The middle level government worker, who is treated in a very limited way in this research, requires deeper study and analysis. If it is concluded that the senior executives studied herein comprise a fairly cohesive executive group, an important question arises as to the source of the inefficiency of the Peruvian bureaucracy. A thorough probing of the values of public employees could be most revealing toward an understanding of public administration. A careful study of interagency communication could shed some of the lack of knowledge about decision-making in the Peruvian government. The author would also welcome a replication of the present study, with more extensive cross-checks included in the research design. It is entirely possible, for example, that the interview approach used in the research provided a bias

than completely free perception of executive attitudes. A different approach might determine if Peruvian executives are just followers but not "sheep." The technique of this analysis could be of great value in understanding of Peruvian bureaucracy. There is a real need for deeper, systematic studies in virtually all areas of government.

In many respects, this research had a number of attributes of a pilot study. Parts of the study defined later areas which generally have been explored by students of Latin American government and politics. Hopefully, this research will be of assistance in building acceptance of such techniques in the Latin American environment.

APPENDIX A

OFFICIAL NATIONAL DE NATIONALIZATION Y CAPACITACION DE LA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA

Este estudio sobre las elites ejecutivas del gobierno peruano es un proyecto conjunto de la Oficina Nacional de Nacionalización y Capacitación de la Administración Pública (ONCAF) y del Instituto de Administración Pública de Nueva York.

El papel que va a ser importante del gobierno y su impacto en la sociedad del Perú dirige naturalmente la atención hacia los miembros del gobierno que ocupan posiciones de elevada responsabilidad. Dichos directivos juegan una parte vital en la planificación y desarrollo futuro del desarrollo nacional, desempeñando la más importante función de personas capacitadas en este campo de desarrollo.

El conocimiento de tales directivos del gobierno peruano es un elemento esencial en la que respecta al entendimiento del gobierno y su papel en el desarrollo nacional.

El propósito del cuestionario adjunto es contribuir a una mejor comprensión del papel de la carrera del servicio civil por medio de un estudio de las elites ejecutivas del gobierno peruano como un grupo. La importancia de este tipo de encuesta ha sido ampliamente reconocida, siendo la presente similar a las encuestas llevadas a cabo por el Dr. Lloyd Warner en los Estados Unidos y por el Dr. Morris Janowitz en Europa, entre otros.

Dada la importancia de la información requerida, agradeceré que complete usted con honestidad llenando este cuestionario. Puesto que el estudio está enfocado hacia las elites administrativas como un grupo, y los resultados se relacionan directamente al grupo de elites administrativas, el nombre de la encuesta que le lleva es apropiado en el cuestionario. Todos los comentarios y respuestas serán mantenidos en absoluta reserva.

La mayor parte de las preguntas pueden ser contestadas sin dificultad y rápidamente por medio de un mapa Cal. Para contestar las demás preguntas tal vez sea necesario usar muchas páginas.

La información muy apreciada por la investigación y participación que le tiene usted brindando en esta encuesta.

ENCUESTA SOBRE LAS FUNCIONES DEL GOBIERNO FEDERAL

- 1) Fecha de existencia _____ 2) ¿Qué año empezó el ingreso al servicio público? _____
- 3) ¿Qué título posee en su correspondencia oficial? _____
- 4) ¿Cuál es su cargo actual? _____
- 5) ¿A qué año le empezó? _____ 6) ¿Cuál es su categoría? _____
- 7) ¿A qué año ingresó al Ministerio o dependencia donde trabaja actualmente? _____
- 8) Durante su carrera, ¿ha trabajado Ministerios o entidades del sector público independiente, empresas, o otras organizaciones particulares ha trabajado antes como empleado? _____
- a) ¿Cuántos de estas organizaciones corresponden al gobierno central? _____
- b) ¿Cuántos de estas organizaciones son gubernamentales pero no del gobierno central? _____
- c) ¿Cuántos de estas organizaciones son particulares? _____
- 9) ¿Trabaja con las áreas pertenecientes antes su propia entidad y al nivel alto o no de su organismo.
- Nombre Oficial del Encuestado
- Ministerio o dependencias independiente _____
- Oficinas intermedias _____
- En oficinas subvenc _____
- 10) ¿En qué grupo está su cargo actual? _____, Autoridad Local
_____, Estado Mayor
- 11) ¿En qué grupo está su Oficial? _____, Autoridad Local
_____, Estado Mayor

12a) ¿Qué empleo ha ocupado sucesivamente? (Indique su empleo principal con un signo en cada columna)

<u>Edades de las edades</u>		<u>Cargo, ocupación u. interés</u>	<u>5 años antes</u>	<u>10 años antes</u>	<u>15 años antes</u>
Ocupación en el momento		_____	_____	_____	_____
Ocupación especial		_____	_____	_____	_____
Ocupación, negocio, profesión		_____	_____	_____	_____
Profesión, negocio		_____	_____	_____	_____
Ocupación	Como propietario	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Como asistente	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Por su propia cuenta	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Como otros	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ocupación		_____	_____	_____	_____
Profesión		_____	_____	_____	_____
Ocupación		_____	_____	_____	_____
Empleo de oficina		_____	_____	_____	_____
Jefe		_____	_____	_____	_____
Asistente ejecutivo		_____	_____	_____	_____
Proprietario de compañía pequeña (Ventas anuales inferiores a \$7,500,000)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Proprietario de compañía mediana (Ventas anuales entre \$7,500,000 y \$25,000,000)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Proprietario de compañía grande (Ventas anuales superiores a \$25,000,000)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Profesión	Ingeniero	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Médico	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Abogado	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Arquitecto	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Químico	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Secretario	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Ministro	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Religioso	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Escritor	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Artista	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Comerciante	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Otro (escriba aquí)	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ocupación independiente		_____	_____	_____	_____
Como asistente		_____	_____	_____	_____
Empleo militar activo		_____	_____	_____	_____
Otro ocupación (escriba aquí)		_____	_____	_____	_____

13a) En cada uno de los cuatro períodos de tiempo arriba mencionados, ¿cuánto tiempo se pasó en el servicio público?

El _____ El _____ El _____ El _____
En _____ En _____ En _____ En _____

- 13) ¿A través de qué medio ingresó usted al servicio público o al Sub-Sector Público Dependiente?

Con examen de concurso _____

En calidad de suplente _____

Recomendación o cargo directivo _____

Otro procedimiento (Cual) fue? _____

- 14) ¿En qué campo ha adquirido la mayor parte de su experiencia (inter-empresa)?

Investigación y desarrollo científico _____

Reglamentación económica o control _____

Recursos humanos (administración o desarrollo) _____

Actividad técnico-profesional (con experiencia, etc.) _____

Compras, producción, fabricación, manufacturación, etc. de mercadería _____

Entrenamiento y servicios similares _____

Servicios administrativos (administración, legal, presupuesto, personal, relaciones públicas, etc.) _____

Consultoría _____

Planificación _____

Otro (Cual) fue? _____

- 16) Indique con un signo la principal actividad de cada miembro de su familia, según la oferta que se indica (El box indicadora, ofrecen indicar sus ocupaciones antes de su muerte.)

Señala de las acciones		Padre (cuando sea, control a trabaja)	Mujer (cuando sea, control a trabaja)	Mujer (cuando sea, control a trabaja)	En otro
Ocupación en actividades		_____	_____	_____	_____
Ocupación especializada		_____	_____	_____	_____
Cualificación, experiencia, profesión		_____	_____	_____	_____
Filiación, sector		_____	_____	_____	_____
Actividades	Como propietario	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Como trabajador	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Por pensionaje	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Como otros	_____	_____	_____	_____
Dependencia		_____	_____	_____	_____
Vivienda		_____	_____	_____	_____
Capital		_____	_____	_____	_____
Capacidad de oficina		_____	_____	_____	_____
Jefe		_____	_____	_____	_____
Año siguiente		_____	_____	_____	_____
Propietario de compañía pequeña (ventas anuales inferiores a \$1. 1,000,000)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Propietario de compañía mediana (ventas anuales entre \$1. 1,000,000 y \$1. 2,000,000)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Propietario de compañía grande (ventas anuales superiores a \$1. 2,000,000)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Participación	Presidente	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Director	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Comisario	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Abogado	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Controlador	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Secretario	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Asesor	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Asesor	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Asesor	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Asesor	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Asesor	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Asesor (otros)	_____	_____	_____	_____
Instrucción universitaria (como estudiante)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Servicio militar activo		_____	_____	_____	_____
Otro ocupación (cómo año)		_____	_____	_____	_____
16) Ofrezca las tres acciones de sus familiares más (o) empleados del servicio público					
		si _____	si _____	si _____	si _____
		no _____	no _____	no _____	no _____

17) Si no estás trabajado o trabajas en el servicio militar, ¿estás o estabas relacionado alguna vez con el Ministerio o alguna(s) dependiente(s) de que el mismo o está empleado?

Si _____ No _____

18) Si no estás trabajado o trabajas en el servicio militar, ¿estás en cuál de las siguientes siguientes ramas o trabajo en ellas. (Pon un signo)

<u>Organización</u>	<u>Clasificación</u>
Ministerios (Poder Ejecutivo)	_____
Subsecretarías (Poder Independiente)	_____
Comisión Nacional (Poder Legislativo)	_____
Poder Judicial	_____
Poder Electoral	_____
Gobiernos Departamentales	_____
Gobiernos Municipales y Locales	_____
Escuelas Públicas	_____
Universidades	_____
Organizaciones Internacionales	_____
Puestos Armados	_____
Otro (Cualquier)	_____

19) ¿En todo servicio militar estás? Si _____ No _____

Si en todo servicio militar estás, ¿cuáles las razones (10) a (20)?

20) ¿Cuántos años ha prestado servicio militar? _____

21) ¿Cuánto tiempo ha servido como oficial? Siempre _____
 Más de la mitad _____
 Menos de la mitad _____
 Nunca _____

22) ¿En qué Puestos armados ha servido? Ejército _____
 Fuerza Aérea _____
 Marina _____

23) ¿Cuál fue el grado más alto que alcanzó en el servicio militar? _____

- 24) Grade de instrucție de tatăl și de mamă. (Indicați, cel puțin, alături de celelalte date.) (2) propuneri de note propuse să descriească în continuare în cel mai detaliat mod de la părinți și tineri de un număr de doi generații).

	Tată	Mamă	Alții
Instrucție Primară	_____	_____	_____
Instrucție Medie	_____	_____	_____
Instrucție Universitară (Nu școlare)	_____	_____	_____
Grade de Instrucție	_____	_____	_____
Industria de Produs-Consum	_____	_____	_____

- 25) Si se selectează o singură universitate, efectuați completarea informațiilor următoare:

Universitatea	Facultate, Secție și Specializare	Titlu de Studiu	Număr al de studenți
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

- 26) Ați avut un titlu profesional? (Cum Ingerii Civil, etc.)

Da? _____ Nu? _____

- 27) Ați obținut o diplomă de studii?

Da? _____
 Cum se obținut, cum de studii, cum de studii
 Instrucție universitară _____

- 28) Ați obținut o diplomă de studii, dar nu ați avut nici un tip de diplomă de studii în administrație și guvernare?

Da? _____
 Diplomă de studii de un an și alți (Indicați
 cum de studii, cum de studii, cum de studii
 și administrație). _____
 Cum de studii de administrație și guvernare _____
 Cum de studii de administrație și guvernare _____
 Da? (Da? Nu?) _____

- 29) Ați obținut o diplomă de studii sau o diplomă de studii de studii? Da? _____ Nu? _____
 Ați obținut o diplomă de studii? Da? _____ Nu? _____
 Ați obținut o diplomă de studii? Da? _____ Nu? _____

30) ¿Ha visitado miembros de alguna organización o entidad profesional?
 (Por ejemplo, Colegio de Abogados) SI _____ No _____

31) Lugar de nacimiento del _____

	País	Estado	Ciudad	Apellido paterno	Apellido materno
Padre _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Madre _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

32) Otros: Matrimonio _____, Familiares _____

33) Estado Civil: Casado _____, Soltero _____, Viudo _____, Divorciado _____

34) Lugar de nacimiento: Matrimonio _____, Familiares _____
 Departamento _____

35) Conocimientos lingüísticos

Idioma	Español			Inglés			Otro		
	Esc.	Ent.	Esc.	Esc.	Ent.	Esc.	Esc.	Ent.	
Alemán _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
Aragés _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
Catalán _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
Inglés _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
Portugués _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
Quechua _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	
Otro (¿Cuál?) no? _____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	

36) ¿Dónde se encuentra la legación o el consulado de su país en el gobierno?

37) ¿Ha recibido interrogatorios en persona en el gobierno? SI _____ No _____
 ¿Dónde usted ha ingresado o salido de puestos del gobierno?
 (aparte de los anteriores) _____

38) ¿Tiene usted otra ocupación además de su puesto de gobierno?
 SI _____ No _____
 ¿En qué campo? (por ejemplo, educación, etc.) _____

39) ¿Hacen usted ingresos (de cualquier trabajo) fuera de su puesto de
 gobierno? SI _____ No _____

40) ¿En qué departamentos del Perú o país extranjero está o estaba usted:
 a) de primer puesto de gobierno? _____
 b) de segundo lugar al tiempo de sus actividades? _____
 c) de puesto principal? _____
 d) de presidente municipal? _____

- 4) ¿Qué día tiempo se creó el cargo en puestos permanentes del gobierno en alguna de las siguientes áreas?

Lugar y fecha: _____
 Oficina: _____
 En el extranjero: _____

Consideraciones de una utilidad cualquier otra que se crea en el cargo de esta empresa o esta empresa. Si el aspecto no fuera suficiente para las empresas, podrá utilizar el recurso de la página.

El documento debe ser devuelto a:

Dr. Jack B. Hopkins

Oficina Nacional de Estadística y Censos y Oficina de la Administración
 Oficina-Oficial

Los Angeles 900 - 40000000.

APPENDIX B

NATIONAL OFFICE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
RATIONALIZATION AND TRAINING

This study of the high executives of the Peruvian government is a joint project of the National Office of Public Administration Rationalization and Training (ONRA) and the Institute of Public Administration of New York.

The increasingly important role of the government and its impact in the society of Peru naturally draws attention toward the members of the government who occupy positions of high responsibility. Such executives play a vital part in the patriotic and challenging task of national development, constituting the most important source of experienced personnel in this nation of development.

Knowledge of each directorate of the Peruvian government is an essential element in understanding of the government and its role in national development.

The purpose of the attached questionnaire is to contribute to a better comprehension of the role of the senior civil service by means of a study of the senior executives of the Peruvian government at a high. The importance of this type of survey has been widely recognized, the present study being similar to those conducted by Mr. Lloyd Kivner in the United States and Mr. Marwan Elmaghrabi in Egypt, among others.

Given the importance of the required information, we would appreciate your cooperation with us in filling out this questionnaire. Along the study is carried out the entire functioning as a survey, and the results are not associated with individual characteristics or specific individuals. The name of the person who fills out the questionnaire will not appear on it. All comments and remarks will be absolutely confidential.

The majority of the questions can be answered simply and rapidly by means of an X. To answer the other questions requires only a very few words.

We appreciate very much your cooperation and participation in this study.

12a) What jobs have you had previously? (Please indicate your principal job with an X in each column.)

Occupations		First Job	2 Years Later	10 Years Later	15 Years Later
Unskilled worker		_____	_____	_____	_____
Skilled worker		_____	_____	_____	_____
Guard, messenger, porter		_____	_____	_____	_____
Police, policeman		_____	_____	_____	_____
Farmer	Owner	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Renter	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Sharecropper	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Worker	_____	_____	_____	_____
Clerk		_____	_____	_____	_____
Business		_____	_____	_____	_____
Farmer		_____	_____	_____	_____
Office worker		_____	_____	_____	_____
Supervisor		_____	_____	_____	_____
High executive		_____	_____	_____	_____
Owner of small company (annual sales less than \$1,500,000)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Owner of medium company (annual sales between \$1,500,000 and \$2,500,000)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Owner of large company (annual sales over \$2,500,000)		_____	_____	_____	_____
Professional	Engineer	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Doctor	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Architect	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Lawyer	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Scientist	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Chaplain	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Teacher	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Military man	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Merchant	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Professor	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Minister	_____	_____	_____	_____
	Other (Specify)	_____	_____	_____	_____
Voluntary Institution as Student		_____	_____	_____	_____
Active Military Service		_____	_____	_____	_____
Other occupation (Specify)		_____	_____	_____	_____

12b) For each of the four time periods indicated above, please indicate whether you were an employee of the public service.

Yes _____ No _____ Yes _____ No _____
Yes _____ No _____ Yes _____ No _____

13) By what method did you award the public service or the independent public sub-award?

With competitive examination _____

Without competitive examination _____

Appointed to executive position _____

Other procedure (What was it?) _____

14) In what field have you acquired the major part of your governmental experience?

Scientific research and development _____

Revenue or business regulation _____

Natural resource conservation or development _____

Technical or professional activity (engineering, etc.) _____

Procurement, supply, manufacturing, maintenance,
etc., of material _____

Military operations and training _____

Administrative services (Rationalization, budget,
budget, personnel, public relations, etc.) _____

Accounting _____

Planning _____

Other (What was it?) _____

- 13) Please indicate with an X the principal occupation of each member of your family, according to the list. If deceased, please indicate previous occupation(s).

Occupations	Father (Name, year born, and Subsisting?)	Potential Grand- father	Maternal Grand- father	Father- in-law
Skilled worker	_____	_____	_____	_____
Unskilled worker	_____	_____	_____	_____
Guard, messenger, porter	_____	_____	_____	_____
Police, prison	_____	_____	_____	_____
Farmer	_____	_____	_____	_____
Owner	_____	_____	_____	_____
Renter	_____	_____	_____	_____
Sub-contractor	_____	_____	_____	_____
Worker	_____	_____	_____	_____
Clerk	_____	_____	_____	_____
Salesman	_____	_____	_____	_____
Postman	_____	_____	_____	_____
Office worker	_____	_____	_____	_____
Supervisor	_____	_____	_____	_____
High occupation	_____	_____	_____	_____
Owner of small company (annual sales less than \$75,000,000)	_____	_____	_____	_____
Owner of medium company (annual sales between \$75,000,000 and \$250,000,000)	_____	_____	_____	_____
Owner of large company (annual sales over \$250,000,000)	_____	_____	_____	_____
Professions	_____	_____	_____	_____
Engineer	_____	_____	_____	_____
Doctor	_____	_____	_____	_____
Dentist	_____	_____	_____	_____
Lawyer	_____	_____	_____	_____
Scientist	_____	_____	_____	_____
Clergyman	_____	_____	_____	_____
Teacher	_____	_____	_____	_____
Military man	_____	_____	_____	_____
Merchant	_____	_____	_____	_____
Professor	_____	_____	_____	_____
Accountant	_____	_____	_____	_____
Other (Specify)	_____	_____	_____	_____
University instructor or student	_____	_____	_____	_____
Other military service	_____	_____	_____	_____
Other occupation (Specify)	_____	_____	_____	_____

- 14) Please indicate which of your family were public service employees:

Yes _____	Yes _____	Yes _____	Yes _____
No _____	No _____	No _____	No _____

17) If your father worked or works in the public service, are you connected now with the ministry or independent organization in which he worked or works? Yes____ No____.

18) If your father worked or works in the public service, please indicate in which of the following organizations:

Ministries (Executive Power)	_____
Independent Public Sub-Sector	_____
National Congress (Legislative Power)	_____
Judicial Power	_____
Electoral Power	_____
Departmental Government	_____
Provincial and Municipal Government	_____
Public Schools	_____
Universities	_____
International Organizations	_____
Armed Forces	_____
Other (Specify) _____	_____

19) Have you had active military service? Yes____ No____.

IF YOU HAVE HAD ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE ANSWER QUESTIONS 20-23.

20) How many years of military service have you had? _____

21) How much of your service was as an officer? _____ All
 _____ More than half
 _____ Less than half
 _____ None

22) In which branch have you served? _____ Army
 _____ Air Force
 _____ Navy

23) What was your highest grade in the military service? _____

24) Level of education of yourself and your parents. Please indicate only the highest level. The purpose of this question is to determine tendencies in educational levels over a period of ten generations.

	Grandfather	Father	Mother
Primary education	_____	_____	_____
Secondary education	_____	_____	_____
Some college	_____	_____	_____
College graduate	_____	_____	_____
Post-graduate studies	_____	_____	_____

25) If you have attended a university, please complete the following:

University	Faculty, School, or Specialization	Grades	Last Year of Attendance
------------	------------------------------------	--------	-------------------------

_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

- 34) How many promotions have you had during your government service? _____
- 37) Has your government service been interrupted? Yes _____ No _____
 How many times have you entered or left government service? (besides promotions) _____.
- 38) Do you have another occupation besides your government post? Yes _____ No _____, In what field? (i.e., education) _____
- 39) Do you receive income (from any kind of work) outside your government salary? Yes _____ No _____.
- 40) In which department of Peru is or was:
- Your first government position? _____
 - Your legal residence at the time of appointment? _____
 - Your present position? _____
 - Your present residence? _____
- 41) How long have you served in permanent government positions in the following areas?
- | | |
|---------------------|-------|
| Law and Economy | _____ |
| Other parts of Peru | _____ |
| In the exterior | _____ |

We would appreciate any comment you might care to make in regard to this study. If space is not sufficient for your reply please use the reverse of the sheet.

The questionnaire should be returned to:

Mr. Jack W. Hopkins
 National Office of Public Administration Reorganization and Training
 (ONARP)
 Los Angeles 300, California.

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Introduction

Brief explanation of how the executive was chosen for interview. Anonymous nature of interview. Explanation of purposes of the interview and how it will be conducted.

Questions

1. Why did you prefer the civil service to a non-government job?
2. Did you decide early to follow a career in the government?
3. Could you tell us what influenced your decision to enter the civil service? (reasons)
4. What jobs did you hold before entering the civil service?
5. Have you been offered opportunities for employment outside the civil service?
6. Do you think the government, in employing people, should consider factors other than education, and experience? (Examples: social position, family connections, wealth, religion, political beliefs)
7. What qualities do you think the ideal civil servant should have? What sort of person should he be?
8. Have you found government work to be a satisfying career? What do you like about government work? What do you dislike about it?
9. Would you tell us what the civil service means to you? Is it primarily a livelihood? Is it a special calling, or just how do you conceive of it?
10. Do you think civil servants should have their own professional society, such as doctors, lawyers, etc., have? Why?
11. I have heard that salaries in the civil service are inadequate. Are you able to live on your salary as a civil servant? Do you have other resources or sources of income?
12. Do you think civil servants should be allowed to hold other jobs? Why?

12. There are various reasons for thinking highly of a certain post or occupation. Four of these reasons are listed on this card. Would you please tell us what you think is their order of importance? (Give card to interviewee.)
- good salary and working conditions
 - skill required to do the work
 - opportunity to meet important people
 - opportunity to serve the public
 - opportunity to serve the state
13. When a new government takes office, should it have the right to dismiss all higher civil servants and replace them with its own nominees? Why?
14. In your experience, have governmental changes in Peru caused many interruptions in careers of civil servants?
15. If you had to advise a young man on a career, what career would you advise him to follow?
16. What do you think of the civil service as a career for an intelligent young man?
17. In Peru, if a young man wants to become a civil servant, what is the best way for him to do so?
18. I am interested in how people rate various posts and occupations. On this list, would you please place number 1 by the occupation the general public thinks most highly of, and so on.
- | | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|
| a. factory worker | g. small merchant |
| b. doctor | h. government clerk |
| c. landowner | i. bank director |
| d. lawyer | j. factory owner |
| e. farmer | k. government office director |
19. Do you think that the Peruvian people have sufficient interest in governmental activities? Does their interest have much effect on the government and how it operates?
20. Do you think the average Peruvian appreciates the job done by the civil servant?
21. Does the average Peruvian respect the civil servant, in your opinion?
22. What is the best way for an ordinary official to go to a higher-rank official about ordinary official business? (For example, writing a friend who knows the official, writing a relative who is also a civil servant, going directly to the official's office to state the problem.)

24. To what do you aspire in the profession?
25. How do you rate your chances for fulfilling this aspiration?
26. What do you think is the factor most important in your success up to now?
27. Looking back at your career, would you have done differently in any important ways? What?
28. In general, what do you expect of your subordinates?
29. Have they lived up to your expectations? If not, what do you consider most deficient about the average government employee?
30. Have you found your superiors to be able administrators?
31. Do they normally understand the problems of administration that you face in your job?
32. In what ways do you communicate with other officials in the government? Do you encourage your employees to have direct contact with other officials?
33. At times, do you find it difficult or impossible to comply with legal forms and requirements? If so, how do you handle the situation?
34. Do you sometimes find successful principles of public administration that incorporate for your situation? If so, what do you do?

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EDUCATIONAL SKETCH

Jack Walker Hopkins was born February 14, 1926, at Fitzgerald, Georgia. In May, 1947, he was graduated from Fitzgerald High School. In June, 1951, he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from the University of North Carolina, and until March, 1952, he studied at the Graduate School there. From 1952 until 1961, he served in the Supply Corps of the United States Navy, with billets in Japan, the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Pacific areas, and Great Britain. During his naval service he attended the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Other assignments included the Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington. Following his resignation from the Navy, he studied in the Graduate School of Emory University, where he received the degree of Master of Arts in August, 1962. In 1963, he enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Florida, where he held an R.D.R.A. Fellowship. From 1964 until 1965, he was a research consultant in connection with the Institute of Public Administration of New York, engaged in work for the U. S. Agency for International Development. Since September, 1965, he has been an assistant professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, where he continued his work toward the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

He is married to the former Katherine Lee Arthur and is the father of three children. He is a Commander in the Naval Reserve and a member of the Southern Political Science Association, the American Political Science Association, the Comparative Administrations Group of the American Society for Public Administration, Phi Sigma Alpha, and Phi Beta Kappa.

This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Deans of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June 24, 1966

E. L. Proctor
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

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Supervisory Committee

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